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Abstract 
Being the first to ask the question whether (a) systematic interindividual differences in irony 
performance can be found and (b) whether this interindividual variance can be explained by 
personality and ability variables, the present thesis aims to paint a clearer picture of who is 
able or inclined to detect or use irony. The aim in dealing with these questions is to open up a 
new field of study for both personality and irony research by conceptualizing irony detection 
as an aptitude and irony use as an enduring tendency. The results support these expectations 
by demonstrably (a) linking the aptitude to detect irony to general mental ability and 
personality traits, and (b) linking the tendency to use irony to personality traits. More 
broadly, the results support the central claims in that they indicate (a) that there is systematic 
and measurable interindividual variance in irony detection and use, and (b) that a substantial 
amount of this interindividual variance can be explained by variables from the realm of 
ability and personality as two central domains of individual differences. Furthermore, the 
present thesis introduces a new means of assessing irony detection performance (i.e., 
including ironic praise as a previously neglected category of stimuli). As a secondary result, 
the present thesis also supports pre-existing assumptions about the role of humor in irony 
behaviors. The findings have implications for different fields of irony and humor research. 
ABSTRACT 
III 
Zusammenfassung (German abstract) 
Diese Arbeit geht der Frage nach (a) ob sich systematische interindividuelle Unterschiede in 
Ironieverhalten nachweisen lassen und (b) ob sich diese interindividuelle Varianz mittels 
Persönlichkeits- und Fähigkeitsvariablen aufklären lässt. So zielt die vorliegende Arbeit 
darauf ab, ein deutlicheres Bild davon zu gewinnen, wer dazu fähig oder geneigt ist, Ironie zu 
entdecken bzw. zu gebrauchen. Ziel der Arbeit ist es, ein neues Feld sowohl in der Ironie- als 
auch in der Persönlichkeitsforschung zu erschliessen, indem Ironieentdeckung als Fähigkeit 
und Ironiegebrauch als überdauernde Eigenschaft aufgefasst wird. Die Ergebnisse stützen die 
getroffenen Annahmen, insofern als empirisch (a) die Fähigkeit, Ironie zu entdecken mit 
Intelligenz und Persönlichkeit und (b) die Neigung, Ironie zu gebrauchen mit Persönlichkeit 
in Verbindung gebracht werden konnte. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass (a) es 
systematische und messbare interindividuelle Varianz in Ironieentdeckung und –gebrauch 
gibt und (b) ein wesentlicher Anteil dieser Varianz durch Variablen aus dem Bereich der 
Fähigkeiten und Persönlichkeitsmerkmale aufgeklärt werden kann. Darüber hinaus stellt die 
vorliegende Arbeit ein neues Verfahren zur Messung von Irnonieentdeckung vor, das auch 
ironisches Lob einschliesst. Ferner stützt die vorliegende Arbeit auch bestehende Annahmen 
über die Rolle von Humor bei Ironieverhalten. Die Ergebnisse haben eine Tragweite für 
verschiedene Bereiche der Ironie- und der Humorforschung. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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General Introduction 
The present thesis has three broad goals: (a) to explore whether irony detection and use can 
be found as individual differences phenomena, i.e., whether there is systematic 
interindividual variance in terms of an irony detection aptitude and an enduring tendency to 
use irony, (b) to derive and test hypotheses as to which individual differences variables play a 
role in irony detection and use, and, as a secondary aim, (c) to contribute to the literature by 
ultimately deriving a theory that—in terms of the individual differences variables found or 
assumed as facilitating or impeding irony behaviors—explains why there are differences 
between individuals with regard to the extent to which they successfully receive irony. 
Irony detection has been extensively investigated in terms of comparing mean 
performances between experimental groups (e.g., Gibbs, 1986; cf. Kreuz, 2000), and also 
between healthy control subjects and natural groups (such as clinical groups) known as 
having impaired cognitive prerequisites for detecting irony (see section “Clinical groups 
known for Theory of Mind deficits”). These findings illustrate that there are known variables 
associated with limitations in cognitive and emotional inference processes that have an 
impact on verbal irony comprehension. When looking at the variance within the compared 
groups, these experimental studies also provide indications for the assumption that there is 
variance in irony detection that can be measured, even among healthy adults (see PART I). 
This is important, because without variance in the phenomena investigated, assuming an 
individual differences perspective would not make any sense. In fact, as a basic assumption 
to be studied in the present thesis, it is expected that there is a substantial amount of 
interindividual variance in irony detection performance. Most notably, it is assumed that 
these interindividual differences are systematic and meaningful (rather than negligible 
“noise”) as irony performance (a) is expected to correlate with itself (in terms of a stable and 
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enduring aptitude) and (b) is hypothesized to correlate with theoretically relevant traits and 
abilities. 
Likewise, there are only very few studies on irony use in general and most of them 
have investigated cultural or situational factors predicting irony use (see PART III). Only 
very few studies that investigate irony detection and use from an individual differences 
perspective can be found. These studies also support the assumption that (a) there is 
interindividual variance in irony detection and use; furthermore, they exemplify that (b) this 
variance can be explained by individual differences variables, that is, in terms of personality 
traits and ability. However, these studies focus only on a few and rather narrow traits, such as 
when linking irony detection to postformal thinking (Blouin & McKelvie, 2012) or need for 
consistency (Groeben, Seemann, & Drinkmann, 1985). As a further example, Langdon and 
Coltheart (2004) found that the schizotypal personality trait is associated with irony 
detection, suggesting that individuals who are assumed to have a heightened risk for 
psychotic illness (i.e., high scorers in the schizotypal personality measure) have an impaired 
aptitude to detect irony. As to irony use, Averbeck and Hample’s (2008) findings suggest that 
the inclination to use irony can be associated with aggression-related communicative 
tendencies (such as verbal aggressiveness). 
As will be hypothesized, both the detection and the use of irony base on the receiver’s 
ability-dependent cognitive processing and trait-dependent preferences. That is, cognitive and 
affective processes involved in irony detection and use may depend on traits and abilities 
from the realm of established individual differences variables. As a construct that delineates 
the successful performance on a variety of tasks that are cognitively demanding, general 
mental ability (intelligence) should be expected to play a role, especially in irony detection. 
This may be the case because irony detection is assumed to involve a cognitive challenge 
beyond the demand that the processing of literal speech poses on the individual (such as 
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when engaging in a cognitive search for the antecedent state of affairs an ironic utterance 
refers to and, ultimately, for the intended meaning of an ironic utterance).  
As to the role of personality, it can be assumed that⎯referring to the conceptual 
definition of personality traits used by Wilt and Revelle (2015)⎯the emotions, mental 
processes, behaviors, and motives involved in irony detection and use may interlink with the 
stable and enduring affective, cognitive, behavioral, and desire-related patterns that are 
summarized by personality traits. Hence, it is expected that interindividual variance in irony 
detection and use can be explained (to a certain degree) by personality and ability, as irony 
behaviors can be seen as “arena” in which traits and abilities manifest themselves in 
behavior. Irony use as a social behavior involving the experience and expression of emotions 
may be a designated behavioral domain in which certain personality traits express 
themselves. Likewise, the successful detection of irony may be hypothesized to base on the 
receiver’s readiness to process emotionally laden information and to recognize affective 
states in others; and presumably, this readiness is also a function of certain personality traits. 
As irony overlaps with humor, traits that delineate tendencies to understand humor, to 
appreciate humor, and to perform humor may be especially relevant. Accordingly, humor-
related traits such as trait cheerfulness and trait seriousness (as the temperamental foundation 
of the sense of humor, Ruch, Köhler, & Van Thriel, 1998) and especially the sense of humor 
itself (e.g., in terms of the virtue-related facets benevolent humor and corrective humor, Ruch 
& Heintz, 2016a) may be reasoned to link to irony detection and use.  
But why should we care about individual differences in irony detection and use? Irony 
detection is a prerequisite for professional and social activities, such as negotiating, debating, 
flirting, teasing, or joking. As a means of ridicule, irony can serve as a tool to point to 
transgressions of social norms. In this case, understanding the irony is a necessity for learning 
rules and adapting to group standards. As a means of humor, irony can also help to create 
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group cohesion and strengthen social bonds. In this case, missing the irony means missing the 
joke and also missing out on a positive social experience. Likewise, individuals who are not 
apt in using irony cannot take advantage of these benefits of irony. In this case, irony 
trainings may help to improve individuals’ social performance and well-being. In addition, 
linking interindividual differences in irony detection to known traits and abilities can help us 
learn more about the phenomenon of irony, which can be viewed as rich in interpersonal and 
intrapersonal purposes and functions. 
However, before assuming an individual differences perspective (i.e., looking at 
which traits and ability variables may explain interindividual variance in irony detection and 
use), it may be instructive to take a close look at the phenomenon of irony first. There are 
several theories that aim to define conditions that distinguish irony from non-irony and that 
make assumptions about functions of irony and motives for its use. Some of them also make 
assumptions about mechanisms involved in the detection of irony. After dealing with the 
definition of irony, the present author will attempt to summarize and integrate the existing 
theories of irony—which feature partly complementary, and partly redundant ideas—at the 
end of the respective section (i.e., “Theories of irony”).  
 
Definition of irony 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines irony as “the use of words to express something 
other than and especially the opposite of the literal meaning”. The term stems from the 
ancient Greek word eirōnia, which means “simulated ignorance“. The word eirōnia in turn 
was derived from the ancient Greek eirōn (to be translated as “dissembler”, which, in turn, 
according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, denotes someone who hides under a false 
appearance). The Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition that also includes motives 
for the use of irony: It defines irony as the “expression of one’s meaning by using language 
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that normally signifies the opposite, typically for humorous or emphatic effect; esp. (in earlier 
use) the use of approbatory language to imply condemnation or contempt (cf. sarcasm [...])”. 
And, as one of the alternative meanings according to the Oxford English Dictionary, irony 
simply means: “dissimulation” or “pretense”.  
This lexical definition is in line with features of the definitions of verbal irony that 
several theories of irony suggest. Characterized by an overt pretense, verbal irony is distinct 
from lies and deception in that speakers actually want the listener to see through their 
pretense.1 According to Groeben and Scheele (2003), this characteristic is agreed upon on by 
all definitions contained in the different theories of irony: when we use irony, we utter 
something different from what we want to say (especially so by using a choice of words 
denoting the opposite of our true appraisal of circumstances); however, we want the listeners 
to recognize the dissimulation and to understand the intended meaning of what we say 
nonetheless. Hence, this characteristic will be taken into account when defining irony in 
PARTs I-III; i.e., all PARTs of this thesis will use the same definition of irony, with more or 
less the same wording. Characteristically, there is a contrast between the valence of the literal 
utterance and the valence of speakers’ true appraisal of circumstances. This leads to a basic 
distinction between two basic formal types of irony: mock positive evaluation of negative 
circumstances (i.e., intended as criticism, “ironic criticism”, Dews, Kaplan, & Winner, 1995; 
                                                
1 Although irony is conceptually distinguished from lies and deception, it is of course 
thinkable that individuals use irony deceitfully; i.e., an ironic utterance can be used to convey 
untruthful information against the better knowledge of the speaker. To illustrate: imagine that 
you show up for work late and make up an excuse by saying “My train was cancelled due to a 
technical defect. I guess this is my lucky day!”. This would be an example in which the ironic 
self-pity is a way to make the lie even more convincing. Also, a speaker may use irony in 
order to act as if he or she had a negative attitude towards a given circumstance although this 
is not his or her true appraisal. To illustrate: imagine that you find yourself in a circle of 
colleagues from work who eat organic food from adequate animal housing only. You may 
pretend to adapt to their critical attitude toward the low-budget meat-industry by ironically 
and cynically joking when saying “These cows are lucky to be released from their miserable 
lives as soon as they are fat enough!”. In case you do not truly adhere to the concern of 
animal welfare when buying low-budget meat in private, this would be an instance of irony 
used in the context of covert dissimulation. 
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“ironic insult”, Dews & Winner, 1995; “canonical irony”, Kreuz & Link, 2002; “the use of 
approbatory language to imply condemnation or contempt”, the Oxford English Dictionary) 
and mock negative evaluation of positive circumstances (i.e., intended as praise, “ironic 
compliment”, Dews et al., 1995; “noncanonical irony”, Kreuz & Link, 2002). An example for 
ironic criticism would be saying “Nice shot!” when a player tries but fails to score a goal in a 
sports match (e.g., given that the speaker wants to ridicule his own or someone else’s positive 
expectation that the team would win the match because he or she now sees this expectation 
fail), whereas saying “Terrible shot!” if a player scores a goal would be an example for an 
ironic praise (e.g., given that the speaker wants to ridicule his own or someone else’s 
negative expectation that the team would lose the match because he or she now sees this 
expectation fail). The distinction between “canonical” (i.e., established) and “noncanonical” 
irony made by Kreuz and Link (2002) denotes the phenomenon that ironic statements are 
commonly theorized to be more typically ironic criticism than ironic praise (which in the 
following will be the term used for mock negative evaluation of positive circumstances). 
Schmidt-Hidding (1963) lists irony among other styles that constitute the comic (in 
terms of the aesthetic domain encompassing phenomena that are able to make us laugh or to 
amuse; cf. Ruch, 1998), such as wit, satire, and humor. According to Schmidt-Hidding 
(1963), irony (a) aims at creating a mutual sense of superiority toward a third, (b) targets a 
single situation (as opposed, for example, to cynicism, which has the weak world as its 
object), (c) is characterized by the agent’s conceited, superior, relaxed, frequently negative-
critical attitude, (d) is courting and including the intelligent while mocking the stupid, (e) 
works best with a circle of insiders or the informed, (f) is confusing to non-insiders and 
leaves the judgment remaining up in the air, and (g) is double-faced and characterized by the 
linguistic peculiarity of saying something differently to how it is meant. 
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In addition to the definition referred to above, in the present thesis an utterance will be 
defined as irony (a) if it is purposefully intended as irony by the sender and understood as 
such by the receiver (in terms of a correct positive detection), or (b) if it is purposefully 
intended as irony by the speaker and not understood as irony by the receiver (in terms of a 
false negative detection of irony). It is important to state that this conceptual definition is 
simplified (i.e., it invokes the two extremes of the possible outcomes of irony detection), 
because in the present thesis the detection of an ironic “signal” will not be operationalized as 
a dichotomous outcome in terms of “detected” or “not detected”. Rather, since ironic 
utterances (and in the operationalization of irony detection: ironic stimuli) conform with 
“prototypical irony” to varying degrees (cf. Utsumi, 2000), it is assumed that there is 
uncertainty involved in the detection process (i.e., when listeners are not sure whether an 
utterance is ironic or not). Accordingly, accounting for this uncertainty and the ambiguous 
nature of ironic utterances, in the present thesis irony detection will be assessed using a 
continuous (i.e., rating-scale based) rather than a dichotomous answer format (see PART II). 
Correspondingly, an utterance will be defined as non-ironic if no irony is intended by 
the speaker and none is understood by the receiver (in terms of a correct rejection of irony). 
What if a receiver detects irony although the sender intends none? In this case, it will be 
argued that—in terms of purposeful and reasonable communication—there was no ironic 
“signal” present in the first place and the detection of irony is a false alarm (i.e., the utterance 
per se is non-ironic)2 
                                                
2 The phenomenon of false alarms in irony detection was mentioned as being worthwhile of 
study (Kreuz, 2000). Accordingly, Bruntsch, Hofmann, and Ruch (2016, i.e., PART I) 
hypothesized that the rationale and scoring of future tests of irony detection should account 
for false negative irony detection. They also hypothesized that individuals with high 
expressions of the fear of being laughed at (gelotophobia) may be more prone to false alarms 
in literal compliments (as compared to fear-free individuals) because they have a tendency to 
anticipate being ridiculed. As a special case of false positive irony detection, non-ironic 
utterances were found to involuntarily create an ironic meaning if the speaker does not have 
crucial knowledge possessed by the receiver or the audience (Gibbs, O’Brien, & Doolittle, 
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Demarcation between verbal irony and situational irony 
Although both are referred to as “irony”, verbal irony and situational irony are distinct 
phenomena. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, irony also delineates “a situation 
that is strange or funny because things happen in a way that seems to be the opposite of what 
you expected”. More specifically, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines that irony, in this 
situational sense, denotes an “incongruity between the actual result of a sequence of events 
and the normal or expected result“ or “an event or result marked by such incongruity”. This is 
in line with the definition given by the Oxford English Dictionary that irony also 
denominates “[a] state of affairs or an event that seems deliberately contrary to what was or 
might be expected; an outcome cruelly, humorously, or strangely at odds with assumptions or 
expectations”. According to Lucariello (1994), irony as situational irony is characterized by 
unexpectedness but also by the exposure of human fragility or the illustration of “the 
vulnerability of the human condition” (p. 129) by mocking the normal order of things. The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary lists an example that illustrates Lucariello’s (1994) definition of 
situational irony: “The great irony of human intelligence is that the only species on Earth 
capable of reason, complex-problem solving, long-term planning and consciousness 
understands so little about the organ that makes it all possible—the brain. —Amanda Bower, 
Time, 20 Aug. 2001”. Bower describes the human weakness that we are not able to 
understand what makes us understanding beings. As one of the categories of situational 
ironies listed by Lucariello (1994), one also finds a logical “Catch-22” in this example: In 
order to make humans understanding beings, the brain needs to be more complex than they 
                                                                                                                                                  
1995). In this case, the speaker is honestly misled by a lack of knowledge, while the listener 
has knowledge of true facts that reverse the circumstances (so a mistakenly sent literal 
utterance turns into a true received ironic utterance). However, according to the definition 
that ironic utterances must be purposefully intended as irony, a mistaken utterance based on 
false or missing knowledge will not be considered as irony here, even if listeners think it is 
irony.  
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can understand; even if they were much smarter they would not understand the brain, because 
in this case the brain presumably would have to be even more complex in order to make 
humans smarter. 
 
Demarcation between irony and sarcasm 
Irony and sarcasm are overlapping but not interchangeably defined phenomena. While the 
Oxford English Dictionary defines sarcasm without the mention of irony as “A sharp, bitter, 
or cutting expression or remark; a bitter gibe or taunt.“, in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
sarcasm is defined as “a sharp and often satirical or ironic utterance designed to cut or give 
pain”. Further stressing the role of irony in sarcastic speech, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
explicates sarcasm also as “a mode of satirical wit depending for its effect on bitter, caustic, 
and often ironic language that is usually directed against an individual”. It can be observed 
that, foremost in the Anglo-American literature, many of the studies dealing with irony prefer 
the term sarcasm to the term irony. This might be owed to the fact that these studies are using 
sarcastic irony (for example, in the form of ironic criticism) in their stimulus materials. As 
the present thesis aims to also investigate non-sarcastic forms of irony (i.e., benevolent, 
playful, or teasing irony), the term sarcasm will not be used unless the reporting of pre-
existing studies that used this term makes it necessary to reuse it. As sarcasm does not 
necessarily involve irony, and also because those irony studies that use the term sarcasm 
always refer to ironic sarcasm, the present thesis will stick to the term irony. 
 
Four domains of irony behavior 
The present thesis targets the investigation of irony detection aptitude and the tendency to use 
irony as two domains of irony behavior. Importantly, these are not the only two domains in 
irony behavior that have been investigated in the existing literature. In Appendix A1, irony 
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behavior is described along two orthogonal dichotomous taxonomic aspects: (1) irony 
reception vs. irony production, and (2) irony ability (i.e., maximal behavior) vs. irony 
preference (i.e., typical behavior). As Appendix A1 shows, there are four domains of irony 
behavior resulting from the combination of these two taxonomic aspects. These domains are 
irony reception ability (i.e., irony detection aptitude), irony production preference (i.e., irony 
use tendency), irony production ability (i.e., irony creation ability), and irony reception 
preference (i.e., irony appreciation). While the former two are investigated in the present 
thesis, the latter two are not. This selection is also owed to the fact that there is only very 
little previous work on irony reception as a preference (i.e., irony appreciation, e.g., Blouin & 
McKelvie, 2012) and no studies at all could be found dealing with irony production as an 
ability (i.e., irony creation ability). Just like irony detection aptitude and irony use tendency 
(as investigated in the present thesis), irony creation ability and irony appreciation can be 
expected to vary systematically between individuals. In Blouin and McKelvie’s (2012) study, 
irony appreciation was operationalized by asking individuals to make ratings of “humor”, 
“profoundness”, “their interest”, and “liking” of a text containing irony (but also metaphor). 
As it turned out, an overall appreciation score was negatively correlated with formal thinking 
and positively correlated with postformal thinking in Blouin and McKelvie’s (2012) study 
(see section “Postformal thinking and creativity in irony detection”).  
As a possible operationalization for the assessment of irony creation ability, 
individuals could be instructed to generate irony in an open-ended answer format. Successful 
creation of irony subsequently would need to be rated by trained experts. What makes the 
operationalization of irony creation ability different from the operationalization of irony use 
tendency (which can also be assessed using open-ended response formats, cf. Dress, Kreuz, 
Link, & Caucci, 2008) is that irony creation ability measures can be reasoned to necessitate a 
performance test instruction. While individuals are requested to respond to the stimuli as if 
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they would encounter them in real life without any mention of the relevance of irony (cf. 
Dress et al., 2008; Matthews, Hancock, & Dunham, 2006) when measuring irony use 
tendency, measures of irony creation ability should reveal to test-takers that they are 
supposed to generate irony in their responses and to make an effort to achieve a high 
performance (e.g., to generate as many instances of irony as they can within a given time). 
 
What is irony detection aptitude? 
In the present thesis, irony detection aptitude is defined as the individual’s ability to 
successfully receive verbal irony. Irony is successfully received when the intended meaning 
of an ironic utterance is recognized. Irony detection aptitude is expected to vary across 
individuals to a substantial amount. Interindividual differences in irony detection aptitude are 
seen as stable and enduring, as individual’s irony detection aptitude is expected to manifest in 
irony detection performance across a variety of situations, stimuli, or settings in a constant 
fashion. Irony detection aptitude is assumed as a continuum with high scorers and low scorers 
framing an approximately normal distribution of this ability across the population. As a 
theoretical characterization, high scorers typically make sense of verbal irony in no time by 
recognizing its counterfactual nature and intuitively inferring the true meaning of what the 
ironic speaker wants to say. Low scorers, on the other hand, get puzzled by ironic utterances, 
as they do not see through the overt dissimulation the ironic speaker engages in and it is not 
obvious at all to them what the ironic speaker really wants to say. Low scorers’ irony 
detection aptitude deficits necessitate them to ask ironic speakers what they mean with their 
ironic utterance or else leave them oblivious to the communication goals of ironic speakers. 
As measures for the assessment of irony detection aptitude performance tests should be used 
(see section “Assessment of irony detection and irony use”). 
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What is irony use tendency? 
In the present thesis, irony use tendency is defined as the individual’s preference (i.e., 
disposition) to use verbal irony as a means of interpersonal communication. When irony is 
used, speakers engage in an evident dissimulation when inversing the valence of their true 
appraisal in the verbatim utterance (i.e., especially by using a choice of words denoting the 
opposite of their true appraisal of circumstances). Interindividual differences in irony use 
tendency are seen as stable and enduring, as individual’s irony use tendency is expected to 
manifest in irony use across a variety of situations, stimuli, or settings in a constant fashion. 
Irony use tendency is assumed as a continuum with high scorers and low scorers framing an 
approximately normal distribution of this preference across the population. As a theoretical 
characterization, high scorers in irony use tendency make use of irony more often than low 
scorers and they have a higher preference to achieve their communication goals by using 
irony rather than literal language (as compared to low scorers). As a necessary condition for 
irony use tendency to manifest itself in irony use, it can be reasoned that high scorers need to 
have the requisite skill to successfully generate irony in terms of irony creation ability. 
Accordingly, an interaction between the two domains of irony behavior can be assumed, with 
irony use tendency having a greater impact on irony use among those individuals who are 
able to successfully generate irony than among those who are not. 
 
Theories of irony 
Before assuming an individual differences perspective (i.e., looking at traits and ability 
variables that may explain interindividual variance in irony detection and use), it may be 
instructive to take a close look at the phenomenon of irony first. What is irony, why is it used, 
and which factors play a role when it is detected? The prominent theories of irony will be 
described in the following sections in order to provide readers with a deeper understanding of 
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the phenomenon of irony. The theories of irony will be listed in chronological order of their 
first appearance in the literature. Some of the theories were tested experimentally and are 
therefore supported by empirical evidence. However, constrained by the aim to provide a 
concise introduction relevant to the specific topic of the present thesis, those empirical 
studies that aimed to test the specific assumptions made by the different theories will not be 
reported here. 
 
What do they attempt to explain? 
The theories described in the remainder of this section deal with the phenomenon of irony by 
attempting to explain (a) which general basic preconditions for natural communication enable 
ironic communication (i.e., Grice, 1975), (b) why irony is preferred to non-ironic language 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1981), (c) several features of irony such as the asymmetry of affect, i.e., 
why ironic criticism is more prevalent than ironic praise (Clark & Gerrig, 1984), (d) which 
general preconditions must be fulfilled for irony to be understood (i.e., an allusion to an 
antecedent, Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989), or attempting to (e) integrate several features of 
different pre-existing theories (Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, & Brown, 1995), or (f) define 
the general laws that help to distinguish irony from non-irony (Utsumi, 2000).  
However, a theory aiming to explain genuinely psychological aspects of irony, such 
as emotional antecedents and consequences of irony, could not be found—not to mention the 
absence of a theory aiming to describe and to explain interindividual differences in different 
domains of irony behavior. Still, the pre-existing theories have certain implications for the 
psychology of irony in terms of the general laws in which irony behavior occurs and also for 
the aim to assume an individual differences perspective on irony behavior. These 
implications will be discussed at the end of the current section (i.e., “Conclusion on theories 
of irony”). 
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Grice’s (1975) theory of conversational implicature and the cooperative principle 
In his theory of conversational implicature, Grice (1975) posits that natural talk exchanges 
follow a cooperative principle, meaning that every participant in a conversation is engaged in 
the pursuit of a purpose, dedicated to successful and efficient communication. It must be 
noted that this theory is not specific for irony, but instead aims to define basic preconditions 
for natural communication in general. However, Grice (1975) exemplifies how certain 
assumptions he makes hold true in the case of irony. Grice (1975) defines a set of four 
maxims that shape natural communication. These maxims help listeners to understand what 
other people want to say—also in the case of irony. The four maxims are: quantity, quality, 
relation, and manner. It is noteworthy that these maxims are not normative in terms of 
advisable guidelines. Rather, they are naturally occurring and observable in language in terms 
of an inherent principle of communication. In other words, Grice does not lecture how us on 
we can communicate more successfully and efficiently. Instead, he posits that we are used to 
(and inevitably engaged in) these rules in order to make sense of others’ communicative 
contributions, and to make ourselves understood. The four maxims are characterized as 
follows: (1) Contributions should be made as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange), but not more informative than is required (maxim of quantity), (2) 
contributions are expected to be genuine and not false (maxim of quality), (3) contributions 
are expected to be appropriate for immediate needs at each stage of the transaction (maxim of 
relation), and (4) conversation partners are expected to disclose clearly what contribution 
they are making, and to execute their performance with reasonable dispatch (maxim of 
manner). As irony typically involves counterfactual utterances or statements that do not 
reflect speakers’ true appraisal of circumstances, these utterances can be characterized as 
insincere. Accordingly, next to metaphor and hyperbole, Grice (1975) lists irony as a typical 
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category of speech acts that flout the maxim of quality. Grice (1975) provides the following 
example of irony, along with an explanation: “X, with whom A has been on close terms until 
now, has betrayed a secret of A's to a business rival. A and his audience both know this. A 
says 'X is a fine friend'. (Gloss: It is perfectly obvious to A and his audience that what A has 
said or has made as if to say is something he does not believe, and the audience knows that A 
knows that this is obvious to the audience. So, unless A’s utterance is entirely pointless, A 
must be trying to get across some other proposition than the one he purports to be putting 
forward. This must be some obviously related proposition; the most obviously related 
proposition is the contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward.)” (p. 53) 
Considering this explanation, how is irony detected according to the theory of 
conversational implicature and the cooperative principle? In the case of irony, conversational 
implicature can be described as the process with which the listener recognizes that the ironic 
speaker ostensibly flouts the maxim of quality by saying something false. Rather than 
expecting the speaker’s contribution to be purposeless, the listener anticipates that the 
speaker is still committed to the cooperative principle, and subsequently the listener engages 
in a search for the true meaning of the speaker’s utterance. By assuming that the speaker uses 
irony, the listener finds a sincere contribution on the level of the implicated meaning. In other 
words, irony is detected if it is the most plausible explanation for untruthful communicative 
contributions. Because of the cooperative principle, speakers have the option to flout the 
maxim of quality on the level of what is uttered, and can rely on listeners to make an effort to 
search for the true meaning on the level of the implication, where the maxim of quality still 
holds true.  
 
The “echoic mention” theory by Sperber and Wilson (1981) 
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Sperber and Wilson (1981) define ironic utterances as utterances in which speakers are 
“literally saying one thing and figuratively meaning the opposite” (p. 295). In their theory of 
echoic mention, they address a basic question: If ironic utterances can be alternatively 
expressed by their literal opposite, why do we use irony? Or as they put it: “why a speaker 
should prefer the ironical utterance What lovely weather to its literal counterpart What awful 
weather which, on this analysis, means exactly the same thing” (Sperber & Wilson, 1981, p. 
295). According to the theory of echoic mention, it is characteristic that, with an ironic 
utterance, the speaker mentions something that was previously said (i.e., the proposition) in 
order to “make clear that he rejects it as ludicrously false, inappropriate, or irrelevant” 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1981, p. 308). Sperber and Wilson (1981) point out that Grice’s (1975) 
theory of conversational implicature falls short of accounting for instances of irony for which 
the criterion of truthfulness does not apply, such as ironical questions, ironical 
understatements, and ironical references to the inappropriateness or irrelevance of an 
utterance rather than to the fact that it is false. In other words, Sperber and Wilson (1981) 
posit that untruthfulness is not a necessary condition for irony; nor is it a sufficient condition, 
as not every instance of untruthfulness can be considered as irony. In their view, what 
distinguishes irony from untruthful non-irony is precisely the fact that ironic utterances are 
cases of echoic mention. It is noteworthy that the proposition, which is echoed in the ironic 
utterance, does not need to be an explicitly spoken remark. Rather, even if there is no prior 
utterance that possibly can be echoed, irony can mention unspoken propositions. It may be 
instructive to look at Sperber and Wilson’s (1981) elaboration on the ironic utterance given 
as an example earlier: “What lovely weather. Suppose that, as we were deciding to set off on 
our walk, someone told us that the weather was going to be lovely. It is quite clear that 
[…][What lovely weather] is an ironical echo of this remark. Or suppose we have spent a 
rainy winter talking about the walks we will have in the summer sun. The echoic quality of 
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[…][What lovely weather], though its source is more distant, is nonetheless clear. Even when 
there is no prior utterance some vague echoing is still involved. One normally sets off for a 
walk in the hope or expectation of good weather: What lovely weather may simply echo these 
earlier high hopes.” (p. 310). 
Sperber and Wilson (1981) provide a list of aspects of irony that can partly be 
explained by their theory. Three of them are taken up by a later theory (i.e., the pretense 
theory of irony by Clark and Gerrig, 1984), which is why they will be described in the 
remainder of the current section. Firstly, Sperber and Wilson (1981) note that there is an 
asymmetry between two basic forms of irony: (1) ironically saying something positive about 
something negative, and (2) ironically saying something negative about something positive. 
According to their account, the first category is used more frequently than the second one. In 
other words, they state that mock positive evaluations of negative circumstances (which 
oftentimes are labeled “ironic criticism”) are more likely to occur in language use than mock 
negative evaluations of positive circumstances (oftentimes labeled “ironic praise”). The 
explanation given by Sperber and Wilson (1981) can be put as follows: standards or rules of 
behavior that generate positive expectations (which, when violated, can be addressed by 
ironic criticism) are more available than those standards or rules of behavior that generate 
expectations of negative outcomes (which, when violated, can be addressed by ironic praise). 
Hence, for ironic praise “[i]n the face of a perfect reality, there must be past doubts or fears to 
echo if the mention of a critical judgment is to count as ironical” (Sperber & Wilson, 1981, p. 
312). 
Secondly, Sperber and Wilson (1981) discuss that irony characteristically is aimed at 
a particular target or victim. On the one hand, ironic utterances are argued to carry critical 
overtones targeted at the originators of the utterances or opinions being echoed (as the ironic 
speaker rejects them as “ludicrously false, inappropriate, or irrelevant” (Sperber & Wilson, 
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1981, p. 308). On the other hand, irony can be victimizing if the addressee of the ironic 
utterance publicly fails to detect its figurative meaning (i.e., the meaning intended by the 
ironic speaker) and gets excluded from the “conspiracy” (Sperber & Wilson, 1981, p. 313) 
between the speaker and third parties. As described in the section “Definition of irony”, this 
aspect was also mentioned by Schmidt-Hidding (1963), who defined that irony works best 
with the circle of insiders or the informed. 
Thirdly, Sperber and Wilson (1981) acknowledge the existence of an ironic 
(synonym: ironical) tone of voice. They point out that the ironic tone of voice “is merely one 
of the variety of tones (doubtful, approving, contemptuous, and so on) that the speaker may 
use to indicate his attitude to the utterance or opinion mentioned” (p. 311).  
Sperber and Wilson (1981) point out that their theory provides an advancement over 
Grice’s (1975) theory but leaves some problems unaddressed, as “a mention may be more or 
less ironical, with many intermediary and complex shades between stereotypical cases of 
irony and other kinds of echoic mention.” (p. 315). This is an important notion, as it 
demonstrates that the conditions constituting irony in this theory (and also in the other 
theories of irony, e.g., the condition of insincerity) are not necessarily specific to irony (i.e., 
echoic mention and insincerity can also be used non-ironically). Furthermore, this notion is 
important because the conditions assumed for irony may occur in ambiguous or transitional 
varieties rather than in a dichotomous fashion. Addressing this issue, the implicit display 
theory of irony (Utsumi, 2000) accounts for the aspect of ambiguity, as in one of its axioms it 
includes the degree to which an ironic utterance deviates from prototypical irony; see section 
“The implicit display theory of verbal irony by Utsumi (2000)”. Nonetheless, due to the 
richness of observations, ideas, and discussions offered, Sperber and Wilson’s (1981) essay 
on the echoic mention theory inspired several subsequent theories of irony. 
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The pretense theory of irony by Clark and Gerrig (1984) 
According to the pretense theory by Clark and Gerrig (1984), irony is characterized by 
speakers pretending to assume the role of a person who imprudently believes in the literal 
meaning of the ironic utterance. The speaker, however, expects the listeners to see through 
this dissimulation and thereby discover that the speaker has an attitude toward the person he 
or she is impersonating. The pretense theory aims to provide explanations for several features 
of irony mentioned by Sperber and Wilson (1981), namely (1) the asymmetry of affect, (2) 
victims of irony, and (3) the ironic tone of voice. Clark and Gerrig (1984) explain the 
asymmetry between ironic criticism and ironic praise (which they call asymmetry of affect) 
by defining irony as a pretense in which the speaker assumes the role of persons who see the 
world according to norms of success and excellence. By pretending to “view the world 
through rose-colored glasses” (Clark & Gerrig, 1984, p. 122), the ironic speaker ostensibly 
adopts a mentality of ignorance characterized by positive expectations and hence ironic 
criticism is more likely to occur than ironic praise. 
Furthermore, Clark and Gerrig (1984) claim that the echoic mention theory of irony 
cannot distinguish between two types of victims of irony. According to Clark and Gerrig 
(1984) the first kind of victim, in terms of the pretense theory, is the “unseeing or injudicious 
person the ironist is pretending to be” (Clark & Gerrig, 1984, p. 122). The second kind of 
victim is the uncomprehending audience, which is not in the inner circle of listeners who 
discover the pretense. However, the incremental explanatory value of the pretense theory 
over the echoic mention theory can be seen as not very noticeable for this aspect. 
The ironic tone of voice can be defined as the phenomenon that an ironic utterance is 
spoken with a different vocal expression and emphasis than its both its literal counterpart and 
identical utterances without ironic intent. Clark and Gerrig (1984) claim that the pretense 
theory accounts for this phenomenon, as “[i]n pretense or make-believe, people generally 
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leave their own voices behind for new ones.” (p. 122). The ironic speaker is supposed to 
assume a voice that is appropriate for the person he or she is pretending to be, while 
exaggerating and caricaturing this voice. 
 
The echoic reminder theory of verbal irony by Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) 
In their echoic reminder theory of verbal irony, Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) take up ideas 
entailed in Sperber and Wilson’s (1981) theory of echoic mention. Kreuz and Glucksberg 
(1989) state that ironic utterances characteristically have to allude to an antecedent event if 
they are to be understood. They claim that their theory extends the theory of echoic mention 
by also accounting for instances of irony in which the antecedent is not explicitly or 
implicitly mentioned in an echoic utterance. Rather, irony works if it alludes to an antecedent 
state of affairs. By reminding the listener of an antecedent state of affairs, the ironic utterance 
exposes a discrepancy between what is and what should be. Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) 
claim that this principle of irony can also account for the phenomenon of asymmetry between 
ironic criticism and ironic praise. In line with Sperber and Wilson’s (1981) reasoning, Kreuz 
and Glucksberg (1989) explain that positive statements can more readily be used ironically, 
because positive norms are naturally more prevailing than negative expectations. 
Accordingly, an ironic positive evaluation of negative circumstances (i.e., ironic criticism) 
can use these ubiquitous positive norms as antecedents. Ironic negative evaluations of 
positive circumstances (i.e., ironic praise), on the other hand, cannot make use of such 
consented norms and need an explicit antecedent if they are to be understood as irony. 
Typically, the antecedent in ironic praise leads to negative expectations, which—when 
violated—can be reminded of by an ironic utterance in order to hint at the discrepancy 
between what is and what should be, on grounds of the antecedent state of affairs. 
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Allusional pretense theory by Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995) 
In their allusional pretense theory of discourse irony, Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995) 
integrate and extend Grice’s theory of conversational implicature, the theory of echoic 
mention (i.e., echoing something that was previously said or echoing conventional, foremost 
positive, expectations; Sperber & Wilson, 1981), and echoic reminder (i.e., reminding the 
listener of an antecedent event, shared norms, or mutual expectations in order to hint at a 
discrepancy between what is and what should be; Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989) to arrive at a 
more comprehensive theory of irony. Supporting Sperber and Wilson’s (1981) view, Kumon-
Nakamura et al. (1995) point out that Grice’s theory is restricted to utterances that are 
declarative assertions, for which the criterion of truth applies, and they note that Grice’s 
theory does not include ironic utterances other than declarative assertions that are reversible 
into their opposite. According to Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995), irony also involves 
counterfactual assertion for which the criterion of truth does not apply, but for which the 
criterion of sincerity applies, such as compliments, questions, and offers. To include those 
categories of irony, they use the more comprehensive term “pragmatic insincerity”. The term 
“pragmatic insincerity” refers to Grice’s theory, which—because it claims that conversation 
partners are inevitably engaged in reasonable and practical communication—is often called 
“pragmatic theory”. Pragmatic insincerity does not only involve uttering the opposite of what 
we mean, but also other forms of insincerity. For example, a question cannot be true or false, 
but it can sincerely demand an answer (e.g., if you say to a friend who while he lifts a huge 
box to help you move into a new flat: “Are you sure you can carry this all the way upstairs by 
yourself?”) or be uttered insincerely in form of an ironic remark (e.g., if you ask this same 
question when your lazy friend is carrying a very small item). Furthermore, Kumon-
Nakamura et al. (1995) agree that the echoic irony is one option to allude to unfulfilled 
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expectations, but they posit that there are many more ways of calling “the listener’s attention 
to some expectation that has been violated in some way” (p. 5). 
Accordingly, Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995) posit that ironic speech acts are 
characterized by two conditions: firstly, they allude to expectations that have not been met. 
Secondly, ironic utterances are defined by pragmatic insincerity because “they violate one or 
more of the felicity conditions for well-formed speech acts.” (p. 5). As a possible function of 
irony, Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995) suggest that it helps to implicitly communicate 
expectations and an “attitude toward the expectation and the discrepancy between the 
expectation and reality” (p. 21), which characteristically (but not exclusively) is a negative 
attitude. 
 
The implicit display theory of verbal irony by Utsumi (2000) 
With his implicit display theory of verbal irony Utsumi (2000) aims to explain how listeners 
distinguish irony from non-irony, that is, he defines criteria that are necessary for irony 
detection. In his essay, Utsumi (2000) claims that preexisting theories fall short of 
sufficiently explaining how listeners judge whether an utterance is ironic or not. The implicit 
display theory makes three central claims. Firstly, for a listener to detect irony, an ironic 
environment is required. The ironic environment consists of a speaker’s failed expectation 
and the speaker’s negative emotional attitude (e.g., disappointment, anger) toward this failed 
expectation. That is, the listener needs to infer that the discourse situation is a setting that 
motivates verbal irony. Secondly, the ironic utterance must be recognized as an implicit 
display of the ironic environment. That is, the listener must realize that the ironic utterance 
refers to a situation that motivates irony. Implicit display is achieved by alluding to the 
speaker’s expectation, includes pragmatic insincerity by intentionally violating one of the 
pragmatic principles (cf. Grice, 1975; see section “Grice’s (1975) theory of conversational 
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implicature and the cooperative principle”), and expresses indirectly the speaker’s negative 
emotional attitude towards his or her failed expectation. Thirdly, irony is distinguished from 
non-irony by assessing the degree to which a given utterance resembles prototypical irony. 
That is, since not every ironic utterance has all the properties required for the implicit display 
of an ironic environment—or unambiguously fulfills the constituting criteria—the listener 
detects irony by assessing the similarity between a given utterance and a prototype of irony. 
The similarity of an utterance with the ironic prototype is judged by assessing to what degree 
the utterance (1) is coherently related to the speaker’s expectation, (2) violates pragmatic 
principles, and (3) indirectly expresses a negative attitude through the use of ironic cues (e.g., 
hyperbole, prosody, nonverbal behavior).  
 
Conclusion on theories of irony 
One of the essential features of irony that the discussed theories of irony agree on is that it 
involves an overt pretense (cf. Groeben & Scheele, 2003). The speaker utters something 
denoting the opposite of their true appraisal of circumstances; importantly, this dissimulation 
is supposed to be recognized by the listener, so the speaker wants to be understood with their 
ironically implied meaning. 
The described theories are important for the aims of the present thesis in several ways: 
firstly, at least one of them suggests certain general psychological laws in which irony 
occurs, such as emotional antecedents and consequences of irony. To illustrate: Sperber and 
Wilson (1981) discuss that irony characteristically is aimed at a particular victim and argue 
that ironic utterances carry critical overtones targeted at the originators of the utterances or 
opinions being echoed (as the ironic speaker rejects them as “ludicrously false, inappropriate, 
or irrelevant” (Sperber & Wilson, 1981, p. 308). It may be suggested to derive certain 
predictions as to the emotional antecedents and consequences from this notion. That is, 
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ridiculing criticism (a) can be seen as typically motivated by certain emotions (such as anger 
and contempt, see the definition of irony in the Oxford English Dictionary as “the use of 
approbatory language to imply condemnation or contempt”), and (b) can be reasoned to 
represent an antecedent typically eliciting certain emotions (such as shame, embarrassment, 
and guilt, Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). These assumptions can be seen as 
substantiated by the findings discussed in the sections “Why do we use irony?” and 
“Emotional consequences of irony”. 
Secondly, some of the described theories have implications for individual differences 
aspects of irony. To illustrate: according to Grice’s (1975) theory, speakers have the option to 
flout the maxim of quality on the level of what is uttered and, because of the cooperative 
principle, can rely on listeners to make an effort to search for the true meaning on the level of 
the implication, where the maxim of quality still holds true. This search for the intended 
meaning can be reasoned to involve cognitive processes that depend on individuals’ general 
mental ability and sense of humor. Accordingly, in PART II it will be argued that ironic 
praise as a form of irony that can be assumed to be more demanding than ironic criticism 
when employed in an irony detection task is more strongly associated with intelligence and 
certain facets of the sense of humor. 
Furthermore, according to the pretense theory by Clark and Gerrig (1984), who claim 
that irony involves a kind of act or role-play, irony use can be linked to the inclination to 
engage in as-if behaviors in terms of the histrionic self-presentation style (cf. Renner, Enz, 
Friedel, Merzbacher, & Laux, 2008). For example, according to Clark and Gerrig (1984), the 
ironic speaker is supposed to assume a voice that is appropriate for the person they are 
pretending to be, while exaggerating and caricaturing this voice. This description can be 
linked to Renner et al.’s (2008) definition of as-if behaviors that are described to “involve 
more subtle forms of communication and may include the use of metaphors, irony or 
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humorous word games, grimaces, rolling one’s eyes or modulating one’s voice etc.” (p. 
1304). 
Linking irony to traits associated with ridicule, Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995) 
suggest that, as a possible function of irony, it helps to implicitly communicate expectations 
that, characteristically but not exclusively, are a negative attitude (see section “Why do we 
use irony?” of the present thesis). Accordingly, in PART III, those traits that delineate 
laughing-at, aggressive, or critical humorous behavior, such as katagelasticism (Ruch & 
Proyer, 2009) or the aggressive humor style (Martin, Puhlik-Doris, Larsen, Gray, & Weir, 
2003) were examined. 
The theories of irony mentioned thus far can also be used as guidelines for generating 
ironic stimuli for the assessment of irony detection and use. As Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) 
point out, irony typically refers to an antecedent event or state of affairs that leads to an 
expectation, which—when violated—can be reminded of by an ironic utterance in order to 
hint at the discrepancy between what is and what should be, on the grounds of the antecedent 
state of affairs. For example, in order to facilitate the use of irony in an experimental task, the 
stimuli should provide an antecedent event generating an expectation. Furthermore, this 
expectation needs to be violated in order to give the speaker (or, ultimately, the participant) 
the chance to critically remind the listener of the discrepancy between expectancy and reality, 
for example, by echoic mention. Accordingly, the stimuli used in the forced-choice irony use 
measure employed in PART III were adapted by including the violation of an expectancy, 
such as when the addressee of the ironic remark does not stick to their own rules.  
With regard to the assessment of irony detection, Utsumi’s (2000) theory can be seen 
as particularly relevant for the present thesis, as the measurement approach chosen in the 
studies conducted for PART II involves ambiguous stimuli. Utsumi’s (2000) theory accounts 
for varying degrees of certainty with which irony is being detected. The notion that there may 
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be imperfect similarity between an utterance and prototypical irony can be seen as supporting 
the rationale of the irony detection measure developed in PART II of the present thesis, 
which involves stimuli that, due to their ambiguous nature, may not be classified as irony 
with a perfect consensus or certainty. 
 
Why do we use irony? 
One aim of the present thesis is to test the possibility that (a) interindividual differences in 
irony use are habitual (i.e., trait-like) and, if so, (b) that these differences are associated with 
personality traits. In order to build hypotheses about which traits matter for the prediction of 
the activities and processes denoted by these two domains of irony behavior, it may be 
worthwhile to take a look at the motives that speakers have when using irony, the functions 
irony can have in social interaction, the benefits of irony over literal communication, and 
which communication goals are typically pursued with irony. The motives, functions, 
benefits, and goals that go along with each other in irony use may be entangled with the 
experiential and behavioral tendencies typical of high scorers in certain personality traits.  
As Kreuz, Long, and Church (1991) reason, if irony is used despite the risk that the 
listener might misunderstand the speaker by taking the irony literally, irony must have 
benefits over literal communication. They point out that irony makes it possible for the 
speaker to fulfill communication goals that would be more difficult, if not impossible, to 
fulfill literally. In an attempt to explain why ironic utterances were previously found to be 
memorized better than their literal counterparts, Kreuz et al. (1991) collected ratings of 
various communication goals for the scenarios they used in their recall study. Although they 
found that their participants recalled scenarios that ended with an ironic utterance only 
marginally better than scenarios with a literal final remark in their main analysis, they report 
that irony involved certain communication goals to a higher degree in their study, as more 
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participants indicated that they thought that “to be funny or to be witty“, “to play or to be 
silly”, or “to mock” was a communication goal fulfilled foremost by the ironic statements (as 
compared to the literal statements). Kreuz et al. (1991) suggest that as a benefit of irony, 
speakers can achieve their communication goals highly effectively. Furthermore, they 
conclude that ironic statements are high in pragmatic involvement, for example, to mock, to 
insult, or to be mean or funny. These findings are in line with the results reported by Roberts 
and Kreuz (1994), who asked their participants to generate responses to the question why 
they think irony is used (among other forms of figurative language, such as metaphor). 64% 
of the participants generated answers falling into the category “To be humorous”, and 94% 
even responded in a way that was classified as “To show negative emotion”. Between these 
two categories, irony was the highest-ranking form of figurative language, that is, for no 
other form did participants generate more responses in the categories “To be humorous” and 
“To show negative emotion”. 
So why do we use verbal irony? In light of the two studies described in the current 
section, this question could be answered on two levels: (a) because it represents a way of 
achieving one’s communication goals efficiently, and (b) because we want to mock, to show 
negative emotion, to be funny or witty, to be humorous, to play, or to be silly. The view that 
irony can achieve more communication goals than the respective literal translation of irony is 
supported, for example, by Oomen (1983). According to Oomen (1983), ironic utterances are 
preferred over non-ironic phrasing by speakers when its surplus over literal communication is 
desired and the speaker intends to express disappointment, blame, or criticism toward 
something else than the subject of the ironic utterance.  
Concerning the question of which goals are typically achieved by irony, the lists by 
Kreuz et al. (1991) and Roberts and Kreuz (1994) could still be extended. As irony has been 
mentioned as a means of playful teasing in close interpersonal relationships, we could add 
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bonding to the list of functions of irony. As Norrick (1994) points out, “mocking and sarcasm 
are by definition aggressive in attacking an interlocutor and violating the norms of politeness, 
albeit within a play frame” (p. 429). By breaking with the norms of politeness and respect 
when using mocking irony, ironic speakers can be argued to convey a bonding metamessage 
in terms of ironic teasing (Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & Heerey, 2001). This is because 
they demonstrate that they think that the relationship with the communication partner is 
beyond the “politeness stage”, the stage during which everyone is trying to be respectful and 
friendly in order not to offend each other. Showing that the relationship is close enough not to 
require formalities, ironic teasing hence may strengthen the bond between friends. Close 
friends would criticize each other for their transgressions but would prefer to do so in a 
benevolent or playful frame. Using irony as a jocular way of conveying a critical attitude 
(e.g., Garmendia, 2014) may bond individuals because it signals the speaker’s appraisal that 
the relationship is strong enough to stand teasing. Or, as Norrick (1994) puts it “sarcasm and 
mocking can express both aggression and solidarity - aggression in the message, attacking 
others for their foibles and errors, and solidarity in the metamessage, including others in a 
playful relationship with increased involvement” (p. 423). Substantiating this notion, both 
teasing and irony were reported to be more prevalent among friends (or other close 
individuals) than among strangers (cf. Keltner et al., 2001; Pexman & Zvaigzne, 2004).  
 
Psychological approaches to humor 
Although the phenomena of humor and irony are frequently mentioned together in the 
existing literature, and their relationship has been purposefully discussed (e.g., Dynel, 2014; 
Hirsch, 2011; Littman & Mey, 1991), there is no consensus on how humor and irony 
interrelate. Certainly, not every instance of irony can be seen as an instance of humor (and 
vice versa). However, the phenomena of humor and irony can be seen as naturally 
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overlapping to a certain degree (see Bruntsch et al., 2016, i.e., PART I of the present thesis, 
for a more detailed definition and discussion). Likewise, many of the research questions and 
conceptual approaches used in the investigation of the psychology of humor may also apply 
to the investigation of the psychology of irony.  
Humor has been studied across different scientific disciplines, but, importantly, the 
term humor did not consistently denote the same phenomena in studies typically conducted in 
the different fields of humor research. Oftentimes, humor scholars targeted the investigation 
of humorous products, for example when the “mechanics” of jokes or the semantic and 
pragmatic characteristics of humorous texts were analyzed in linguistic studies (e.g., Attardo, 
2001a; Raskin, 1985). As a second prominent approach, the study of the characteristics of 
individuals (but also natural groups or cultures), performing or consuming humor in certain 
qualities or quantities, can be named (cf. Ruch, 2004). Psychological studies of humor 
typically follow this second approach.  
So, what are typical psychological approaches to humor? As a first step, this question 
could be confined to account for the focus of interest in psychological studies of humor: 
What kinds of humor behavior are there? According to Ruch’s (2008) description, humor 
behavior refers to a person’s activities but also internal processes (such as thinking or 
emotional feeling) involved in the psychology of humor. Based on an extensive literature 
review, Ruch (2008) discusses that humor behavior among further aspects involves (a) the 
perception that something is funny, (b) typical responses, like laughter and foremost smiling, 
(c) cognitive processes, such as the integration of contradiction or the resolution of 
incongruity, (d) motivational antecedents (such as repressed sexuality or aggression but also 
feelings of interpersonal superiority), (e) mood and other states (such as playfulness or low 
seriousness), (f) personality traits delineating humor behavior (in the sense of what is called 
the sense of humor in everyday language). Among the latter, Ruch (2008) distinguishes 
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between ability (in the sense of maximal behavior) and style (i.e., typical behavior in the 
sense of habitual preferences). Ruch (2008) conceptualizes that the sense of humor has 
different domains when disentangling it as (a) humor ability (such as in the sense of wit), (b) 
humor as a an habitual preference (such as in the sense of playfulness or different styles of 
humor use), (c) humor as a character strength (in terms of a disposition to virtuous humor 
behavior), and (d) humor as an aesthetic perception (i.e., individuals’ “taste” in humor). 
Among the research questions that Ruch (2008) lists for the investigation of humor behavior, 
some also are applicable (or already have been applied) in the investigation of irony, such as 
humor pathologies (i.e., humorlessness), development of humor over the life span, factors 
that support or impede humor, intervention programs, cross-national and cross-cultural 
perspectives, heritability, and evolution (i.e., phylogenetic development). Hence, if we leave 
aside the notion for a moment that irony and humor may overlap to a certain degree, the 
investigation of humor can be seen as a rich source of paradigms for the investigation of 
irony. 
 
Aggression and humor as motives for irony use 
Although there are other functions of irony mentioned in the literature, such as venting 
frustration (Ducharme, 1994) or demonstrating power by emotional self-control (Dews et al., 
1995), two of the most pervasively reported functions of irony can be seen in its overlap with 
the phenomena of aggression and humor. Although there is a debate about whether irony 
increases the condemnation of a criticism (cf. Colston, 1997) or whether it dilutes the 
condemnation and hence reduces the threat to the speaker’s face, making further conflict less 
likely (cf. Dews et al., 1995; Jorgensen, 1996), irony can be noted as being used in aggressive 
communication. This assumption is supported by the findings of a correlational study by 
Averbeck and Hample (2008) that jointly investigated irony use tendency and 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 31 
communication-related traits relevant to aggression (i.e., verbal aggressiveness and 
argumentativeness). As their study showed, irony use was positively correlated with self-
reported individual aggressive communication tendencies. 
Considering that irony was found to be perceived as being used when speakers intent 
to mock, to insult, to be mean, or to be funny (cf. Kreuz et al., 1991), irony may also be 
relevant for the overlap between aggression and humor, which can be seen in the 
phenomenon of disparagement humor (Zillmann, 1983; cf. PART I of the present thesis). As 
irony can be argued to be aggressive and funny at the same time, humor that victimizes its 
targets by means of mockery, debasement, and ridicule may employ irony in order to achieve 
its humorous and caustic effect. As argued in PART I of the present thesis, the debasing or 
ostracizing effect of disparaging irony may be found in the immediate target of ridicule, 
whereas the humorous effect may be found in bystanders witnessing disparagement humor. It 
could be argued that derisive laughter or amusement elicited in a group of bystanders 
aggravates the shaming effect of disparagement humor, possibly making it a suitable tool for 
punishing the transgression of social norms or misbehavior in a group (cf. Shott, 1979). In 
line with this assumption, Norrick (1994) points out that sarcasm helps to apprise the 
recipient of social norms. Moreover, Norrick (1994), once again bridging irony and teasing, 
sees teasing as a means of enforcing norms. This view is supported by Keltner et al. (2001), 
who came to the conclusion that “[i]ndividuals often tease others who have violated social 
norms” (p. 237). Teasing can be seen as running on a continuum: as playful form of 
provocation, it may be a means of bonding, whereas on the other side of the spectrum it may 
resemble “biting” ridicule (Boxer & Cortés-Conde, 1997; Keltner et al., 2001). One may 
argue that ironic teasing runs along the same spectrum between playful, benevolent 
provocation and disparaging ridicule. Accordingly, irony may be one tool for humor within 
humor’s entire spectrum that spans between the poles of compassionate humor on the one 
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hand and disparagement humor on the other hand. Following this logic, one must expect that 
there are humor phenomena in between these morally valued extremes, which can be found 
true, for example, in the case of corrective humor, which is typically used for shaming 
corrupt individuals into betterment (Ruch & Heintz, 2016a). 
Conclusion 
As previously suggested, individuals view irony to be used both in order to achieve a funny 
or amusing effect on the one hand and to mock or show negative emotions on the other. Since 
irony may be involved in both, the phenomena of humor and aggression, irony may have a 
special role when it comes to the disparaging part of the humor spectrum. Therefore, in 
addition to personality dimensions relating to aggression (i.e., psychoticism), the present 
thesis will take on humor-related traits that not only delineate playful compassionate aspects 
of the sense of humor (such as benevolent humor; cf. Ruch & Heintz, 2016a), but also those 
traits that go along with a preference for laughing-at humor, such as katagelasticism (Ruch & 
Proyer, 2009) and the aggressive humor style (Martin et al., 2003), or the tendency to use 
satiric humor with virtuous motives (i.e., corrective humor; Ruch & Heintz, 2016a). 
 
Emotional consequences of irony 
In the present thesis it is argued that the successful detection of irony may base on the 
receiver’s readiness to process emotionally laden information (and that to a certain degree 
this readiness is a function of certain personality traits). Therefore, it can be seen as necessary 
not only to discuss the findings on the motives of irony use (see previous section) but also 
literature on the emotions typically elicited by irony. There is a considerable body of research 
investigating how individuals perceive (a) attributes of ironic utterances (e.g., humorousness, 
politeness), (b) the speaker’s motivation to use irony (e.g., status elevation, anger), and (c) 
assumed effects on the addressee (e.g., how they think the addressee would feel as a result of 
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a given ironic remark). Importantly, most of these studies make their participants judge these 
aspects from the perspective of the observer (e.g., Bowes & Katz, 2011; Colston, 1997; Dews 
et al., 1995; Matthews et al., 2006; Pexman & Olineck, 2002). There are only very few 
studies targeting emotional reactions to ironic stimuli directly in the addressee of ironic 
remarks. In one of those studies, Leggitt and Gibbs (2000) explored emotional responses to 
ironic and non-ironic stimuli by asking their participants to imagine themselves as actually 
taking part in each of a list of situations, take the perspective of the addressee of the 
respective ironic remark, and to imagine how they would feel when the speaker said what he 
or she said to them. Participants reported their emotional reactions along ratings targeting 
each of a list of emotions. As it turned out, certain forms of irony (e.g. sarcasm, 
overstatement, rhetorical questions) elicited a higher degree of (a) “angry, irritated, and 
mad”, (b) “disgusted, turned off, and repulsed”, and (c) “scornful, disdainful, and 
contemptuous” emotions (as one category each; Leggitt & Gibss, 2000, p. 8) than the rest of 
the given types of speech acts that did not involve verbal irony. These findings go along with 
those of Akimoto et al. (2014) who report that their participants perceived higher degrees of 
negative emotion and humor in their ironic and non-ironic stimuli. That is, one and the same 
stimulus stories elicited more perceived negative emotion and more perceived humor (these 
categories are not explained in any more detail in Akimoto et al.’s, 2014, report) when they 
were designed as ironic criticism (mock praise, i.e., ironically commenting on a failure as if it 
was a success, see PART II of the present thesis) than when they were designed as literal 
praise (i.e., commenting on a success by using a positive literal appraisal). Contradicting 
these findings, another study found that irony dampened the positive emotional effect of 
praise: employing electro-physiological measures of facial expressions, Thompson, 
Mackenzie, Leuthold, & Filik, (2016) found less activity in the corrugator supercilii muscle 
(i.e., reduced frowning) as an indicator of a reduced negative emotional impact of ironic 
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praise as compared to literal praise. Thompson et al. (2016) interpret their result as a support 
for the tinge hypothesis proposed by Dews and Winner (1995). Dews and Winner (1995) 
assume that the presence of a positive verbatim meaning helps speakers to take the edge off 
their criticisms in the case of ironic criticism (as compared to literal criticism) and likewise 
that the presence of a verbatim negative meaning mutes the positive appraisal in the case of 
ironic praise by effecting a more critical evaluation than literal praise. However, there are 
more recent studies contradicting these assumptions when suggesting that in ironic criticism 
condemnation is enhanced rather than diluted (as compared to literal criticism) and that ironic 
insults are perceived to be more mocking than direct insults (i.e., Colston, 1997; Pexman & 
Olineck, 2002).  
Taken together, the emotions elicited in the addressees of irony can be seen as 
understudied. The existing literature suggests that the emotions elicited by the ironic stimuli 
used in the described studies are mainly more negative than responses to non-ironic stimuli 
(as far as self-reported emotions are concerned). As a general methodological issue, it can be 
seen as questionable whether irony and non-irony are directly comparable in the mentioned 
studies (in terms of internal validity). For example, ironic praise and literal praise may not 
only differ in the degree of irony used in communication but also regarding the 
communication goals the speaker wants to achieve. This may be the case especially if the 
metamessages of the irony are taken into account. For example, in ironic teasing (cf. Keltner 
et al., 2001) speakers may wish to be playful and critical at the same time. Hence, if an 
instance of teasing ironic praise is compared to an instance of literal praise as to the emotions 
they elicit, one does not only compare irony to non-irony but also teasing to non-teasing. 
Furthermore, given that (a) irony serves as a means to achieve various communication goals 
and (b) the mentioned studies did not sample their stimuli in a representative fashion with 
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regard to these communication goals, it is not clear to which extent the described findings can 
be generalized. 
 
Sources of variance in irony detection and use described in the existing literature 
The idea of investigating person-specific variables in the context of irony behavior is not 
new. However, the vast majority of these studies were not looking at normal functioning 
adults’ irony detection and use. Rather, groups known for impaired irony detection 
performance or impairments abilities assumed to be a prerequisite for irony detection were 
compared to normal adults. As the following sections will describe, there is a plethora of 
research reports dealing with underperformance in irony detection among children, 
individuals with an autism spectrum disorder, and among patients suffering from 
schizophrenia, posttraumatic brain injury, Parkinson’s disease, or Alzheimer’s disease. 
Concerning irony use, some studies have focused on person-specific variables as correlates of 
irony use, such as culture, gender, or traits relating to aggression. 
 
Ontogenetic aspects of irony detection 
The detection of irony has been studied extensively in children (cf. Anglieri & Airenti, 2014). 
The reason for testing children can be seen in the fact that the cognitive prerequisites for 
irony detection are assumed to develop at a young age. These prerequisites include verbal 
ability and, in particular, the ability to infer mental states in others, which is commonly 
labeled using the term Theory of Mind. While Theory of Mind is assumed as fully developed 
in normally functioning adults, with only little interindividual variance (cf. Brüne & Brüne-
Cohrs, 2006), studying irony detection in children in different age groups is a paradigm that 
provides variance in Theory of Mind. Commonly, deficits in irony detection among younger 
vs. older children or adults are explained by the inability to infer others’ knowledge and 
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intentions and to take on others’ mental perspectives. In order to realize that a speaker utters 
something different from what he or she really means, the listener has to represent the 
speaker’s mental state. As successful irony detection is dependent on realizing the speaker’s 
true knowledge and intentions, the developing Theory of Mind in young children is seen as 
one reason for the finding that irony detection rates improve steadily as individuals grow 
older. For example, Anglieri and Airenti (2014) found increasing irony detection rates 
between the ages of three and six-and-a-half years. Elsewhere, children were found to 
understand the non-literal meaning of irony by the age of five to six years, but fall short of 
understanding the pragmatic functions of irony (i.e., ratings of how mean the speaker was) 
until the age of nine to ten years (i.e., Glenwright & Pexman, 2010). It may be worth 
discussing, in more detail than is appropriate for the scope of the present thesis, whether the 
association postulated and found between irony detection and Theory of Mind has to become 
evident quite naturally when studying children in an age-heterogeneous sample due to the 
confounding effect of general cognitive development. For example, Anglieri and Airenti 
(2014) report moderate correlations between irony detection and theory of mind (as measured 
with three different pre-existing tasks). However, both irony detection and Theory of Mind 
are correlated considerably higher with age in this study. This possible limitation of the 
developmental paradigm can be seen as support for the relevance of the aim of the present 
thesis to focus on adults’ irony detection and use. 
 
Clinical groups known for Theory of Mind deficits 
Based on the existing literature, it is hard to distinguish what came first: (a) the observation 
that certain clinical groups have an impaired aptitude to detect verbal irony, (b) the 
observation that these same groups have deficits in inferring others’ mental states and 
emotions with regard to the abilities denoted by the term Theory of Mind, or (c) the 
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assumption that Theory of Mind is a prerequisite for irony detection. In the literature, there is 
a plethora of studies comparing irony detection performance between groups of normal 
functioning individuals on the one hand and groups of individuals known for impaired 
cognitive functioning in terms of Theory of Mind deficits on the other. Among the 
pathologies that are known to co-occur with reduced Theory of Mind deficits, there are 
patients with schizophrenia, brain damage, and degenerative brain disorders, as well as 
autism spectrum disorders (cf. Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). Tellingly, all of these groups 
have also been investigated as to their deviation from normal functioning individuals’ irony 
detection performance levels. For example, patients suffering from right hemisphere brain 
damage were demonstrated to be characterized by lower irony detection performance as 
compared to the performance found in healthy controls (e.g., Winner, Brownell, Happé, 
Blum, & Pincus, 1998). Mitchley, Barber, Gray, Brooks, and Livingston (1998) showed that, 
on average, schizophrenic patients interpreted ironic utterances in a literal way more often 
than a control group. In line with this finding, individuals with increased risk for psychotic 
illness in terms of schizotypal personality were found to be less apt at detecting irony (i.e., in 
terms of reporting that ironic utterances make sense to them; Langdon & Coltheart, 2004). 
Impaired irony detection performance was also found in individuals with Asperger syndrome 
and autism disorder (e.g., Happé, 1993; Martin & McDonald, 2004), as well as Alzheimer’s 
disease (e.g., Gaudreau et al., 2013; see Rapp & Wild, 2011, for an overview) and 
Parkinson’s disease (Monetta, Grindrod, & Pell, 2009). 
The lowest common denominator of these studies’ results can be seen in the finding 
that deficits in irony detection are associated with deficits in the ability to form 
representations of others’ mental states in terms of Theory of Mind, and especially so in 
deficits when attributing second-order beliefs (i.e., inferring what a person thinks about 
another person’s thoughts; cf. Monetta et al., 2009). Although Theory of Mind has been 
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investigated in infants and clinical groups for many decades, the investigation and assessment 
of individual differences in Theory of Mind among healthy should be viewed as still in its 
infancy. Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate on a conceptual level about which abilities 
and processes are actually involved in what is termed Theory of Mind (e.g., Schaafsma, Pfaff, 
Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015).  
Conclusion 
Despite the above-mentioned shortcomings, this field of clinical irony research is worth 
mentioning in the present thesis because it illustrates the limitations of this large subset of 
irony research. These studies demonstrate what makes irony detection possible in normally 
functioning adults (i.e., Theory of Mind). However, the design of these studies can be seen as 
limited because (a) the informative value about the “laws” in which irony detection deficits 
occur in the population of normally functioning adults (in which Theory of Mind is typically 
fully developed) can be seen as vague, (b) as internal validity may be reduced (resulting from 
the fact that impaired Theory of Mind is confounded with all kinds of disorder-related 
variables in clinical studies), and (c) as the method of investigation is costly (because clinical 
studies are less feasible than investigating irony behavior in the normally functioning 
population). The individual differences approach has the potential to eventually overcome 
these limitations (at least to a certain degree) in describing and explaining interindividual 
differences in irony behavior by linking them to those known personality and ability variables 
that show stable variance across the population of normally functioning adults. 
 
Culture and gender differences in irony use 
Based on the assumptions that (a) irony provides certain benefits in social interaction over 
literal communication, and (b) these benefits are less desirable for collectivists than 
individualists, and may also have different desirability for women than for men, Rockwell 
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and Theriot (2001) investigated the role of gender and individualist vs. collectivist culture in 
irony use. More specifically, they reasoned that individuals from collectivist cultures (such as 
the Japanese, Chinese, or Thai), due to their tendency not to express negativity toward other 
group members, could be expected to use irony less frequently than individuals from 
individualist cultures (such as the Americans, British, or Germans). Indeed, their collectivist 
participants used irony less frequently in dyadic face-to-face conversations (i.e., according to 
self-reports, see below). There was no directed hypothesis regarding gender. As it turned out, 
women used irony less frequently than men (especially when the women were talking to 
other women, i.e., in gender-homogeneous dyads). Rockwell and Theriot (2001) explain this 
finding by women’s tendency “to place greater emphasis on maintaining relationships and 
avoiding injury to conversational partners” (p. 49). The methodological strength of this study 
can be seen in the fact that face-to-face conversations were investigated. Participants were 
instructed to deal with 15 questions designed to elicit irony, for example, by requesting 
participants to utter something negative about positive circumstances (e.g., “Why do you 
hope you will never win the lottery?”), or something positive about negative circumstances 
(e.g., “Why do you really like to go to the dentist?”). As a possible limitation of the study, 
irony use was assessed via self-reports rather than objective ratings: Following the 
conversations, participants rated how much sarcasm they think they used, as well as the 
amount of sarcasm used by their conversation partners.  
Rockwell and Theriot’s (2001) results on the role of gender are in line with the ones 
found in a study by Colston and Lee (2004). As they expected, the latter authors found that 
women reported lower endorsement of ironic remarks. In line with Rockwell and Theriot’s 
(2001) reasoning that the benefits of irony are not equally desirable for individuals from 
different cultures or between men and women, Colston and Lee (2004) argue that it is 
possible that “(a) verbal irony accomplishes a variety of pragmatic functions that are different 
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from those of other figurative and indirect forms, and (b) males, due to whatever causal 
mechanisms, might have a different set of discourse goals on average than females” (p. 291). 
According to this explanation, men’s discourse goals match the pragmatic functions of verbal 
irony (such as enhancing the condemnation expressed towards others) better than this is the 
case for females’ discourse goals. Furthermore, as the use of irony poses the relatively greater 
risk of misinterpretation (as compared to literal communication), Colston and Lee (2004) 
explain men’s higher (vs. women’s lower) endorsement of irony by men’s higher risk taking 
tendencies (relative to women’s lower risk taking tendencies).  
Conclusion 
Although their investigation did not support the “discourse goal match” explanation, Colston 
and Lee’s (2004) study can be argued to illustrate how the present thesis can advance the 
field of irony research. Their aim was to explore why particular social and cultural 
differences are found in nonliteral language use. By looking at gender differences, they used 
a known groups paradigm. That is, in order to gain a deeper understanding of why irony is 
used (i.e., the pragmatic functions of irony), they compared two groups known for different 
discourse goals (i.e., men and women). Of course, this approach can be seen as limited, as 
men and women differ in many more respects than the variables assumed to be associated 
with gender differences in irony use (i.e., discourse goals and risk taking). However, Colston 
and Lee’s (2004) approach can be taken as a model for the present thesis when it comes to 
learning more about the phenomenon of verbal irony by finding out which personality traits 
and abilities are associated with irony detection and use. In the same way in which the gender 
differences approach was construed as a way to learn more about the discourse goals of irony 
in Colston and Lee’s (2004) study, it may be argued that the individual differences approach 
used in the present thesis may help to gain knowledge about functions of irony. To illustrate: 
Averbeck and Hample (2008) attempted to explore “why we produce ironic messages” by 
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linking irony use to aggressiveness. As they argued, the finding that irony use correlates with 
aggressiveness indicates that irony could be a means of interpersonal aggression (cf. 
Averbeck & Hample, 2008). It is noteworthy that the rationale of their investigation can be 
seen as different from the logic mostly found in studies in personality research: commonly, it 
is the personality constructs that are supposed to be validated by comparing known (e.g., 
extreme) groups with natural differences as to certain phenomena, and not the other way 
around; i.e., usually it is not the assumed phenomena (e.g., the aggressive function of irony) 
that are supposed to be validated by use of a personality construct (e.g., aggressiveness). Of 
course, there may be confounding variables between aggressiveness and irony use. But it can 
be argued that the outlined individual differences approach to answering the question of 
whether aggression is a function of irony provides still higher internal validity than answering 
the same question by, for example, comparing men and women (i.e., under the presupposition 
that there are gender differences in aggression between men and women). Irony as a 
communication phenomenon is assumed to serve various intra- and interpersonal functions 
(see section “Why do we use irony?”). Accordingly, as different personality traits can be 
argued to go along with different experiential and behavioral tendencies in the social domain, 
learning more about which personality traits are associated with irony detection and use may 
help to learn more about which experiential and behavioral tendencies are relevant for irony. 
To illustrate: If trait bad mood was found to be associated with irony use in a positive 
direction (as it was hypothesized by Ruch & Hofmann, 2012), one could hypothesize that 
irony is used, for example, in order to express sullen, grumpy, or grouchy feelings.  
 
Some thoughts on phylogenetic aspects of irony 
As several of the theories of irony outlined earlier in the present thesis, such as the allusional 
pretense theory of discourse irony by Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995), the echoic reminder 
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theory of verbal irony by Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989), the pretense theory of irony by Clark 
and Gerrig (1984), or the “echoic mention” theory by Sperber and Wilson (1981) suggest, 
irony can involve an allusion to an antecedent event, an overt pretense, or an imitation of 
something that was previously stated. By uttering something that was previously said, the use 
of irony may resemble the aping of the speaker of the antecedent utterance. For example, 
Person A may predict: “The dinner party will be totally boring!”. When the facts prove 
Person A’s prediction wrong, Person B may mock Person A for his or her misanthropic or 
pessimistic outlook by ironically uttering “Well, the dinner party was indeed totally boring!”. 
This example illustrates that irony may involve an imitation (i.e., an echoic mention) as well 
as a pretense when Person B acts as if he or she was Person A in order to reject his or her 
utterance as overly pessimistic or simply not true. Like in this example, it can be argued that 
in some cases of irony, the ironic utterance may resemble an aping of someone or something 
that was previously uttered. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, to ape means to 
mimic, copy, or imitate something or someone, and is defined to be a synonym of the verb to 
mock. As a noun, ape is the term for monkey, or, more precisely, for primates such as the 
chimpanzee, gorilla, orangutan, or gibbon. In the German language, the closest translation of 
the transitive verb to ape is nachäffen, which again is rooted in the term for the animal 
species of the ape (i.e., Affe). As the meaning of nachäffen in German that goes beyond the 
meaning of to ape is best translated using the English terms to imitate or to mock, the 
association between mocking imitation and the ape as the phylogenetically nearest 
neighboring species of the homo sapiens is also evident in the German language (and there 
may be even more languages in which this is the case). This observation may lead us to the 
question of whether aping as a very basic form of mocking something or someone may be a 
prototype of verbal irony in the repertoire of social interaction patterns and stereotypical 
figures of speech that have evolved in the course of the phylogenetic development of the 
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human species and its cultures. Although there is an ongoing debate about whether apes are 
in fact able to act as if they were someone else in terms of a pretense play (e.g., Gomez, 
2008; Whiten, 1992), in human languages, a mocking exposure of someone’s weaknesses or 
transgressions has been associated with an ape-like imitation of the very behavior one is 
trying to make fun of or criticize. It is not intended to postulate here that there is irony among 
apes. Rather, it can be argued that ape-like mocking imitation of someone else’s behavior 
may be prototypical element of what has evolved as verbal irony in humans, which in a very 
basic form involves echoing an antecedent utterance in order to derisively “reject it as 
ludicrously false, inappropriate, or irrelevant” (Sperber & Wilson, 1981, p. 308). To 
conclude, the fact that mocking imitation in language use has been associated with primates’ 
behavior may be seen as a hint to the possibility that aping is a behavior that developed early 
in phylogenesis. Possibly, irony as an elaborate form of derisive simulation roots in aping as 
a more “primitive” form of mocking imitation.  
This consideration can be seen as important for the present thesis because it may 
support the aim to conceptualize irony detection and irony use as an ability and a behavioral 
tendency, respectively: If irony behaviors truly were to be understood as systematic und 
enduring tendencies (in terms of individual differences), it would be thinkable (if not a 
theoretical presupposition) that these tendencies have a genetic foundation. Hence, if there 
was a phylogenetic development of irony behaviors, this could be taken as an indicator for a 
possible heritability of irony detection aptitude and irony use tendency (or the psycho-
physiological components possibly underlying these behaviors). 
 
Assuming an individual differences perspective in irony research 
Targeting the investigation of interindividual differences in irony detection and irony use 
implies that one assumes there to be a substantial amount of systematic interindividual 
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variance in these two domains of irony behaviors. In the present thesis, it is expected that this 
variance can be explained (to a certain degree) by personality and ability, as irony behaviors 
can be seen as an “arena” in which traits and abilities manifest themselves in behavior. To 
provide an overview of the relevant literature, this section reviews the studies that could be 
found to investigate irony detection or use in the population of normally functioning adults 
by relating them to known traits and abilities. 
 
Postformal thinking and creativity in irony detection 
As an exception to the general neglect in research of healthy adults’ irony detection in 
relation to individual differences variables, a study by Blouin and McKelvie (2012) jointly 
investigated the reception and also the appreciation of irony with concepts from the realm of 
individual differences, namely creativity and postformal thinking. As Blouin and McKelvie 
(2012) report in their review of the relevant literature, postformal thinking transcends 
adolescents’ formal thinking and is defined to comprise two stages which are seen as bound 
to post-adolescent developmental maturity. Whereas formal thinking delineates the 
preference for dual thought patterns and a fixed view of the world with no tolerance for 
contradiction (which is seen as most prevalent in young adults), the first stage of postformal 
thinking, relativistic thinking (most prevalent in older adolescents or young adults), is 
characterized by a mode of thought in which contradiction is seen an inherent aspect of 
circumstances. In the second stage of postformal thinking, dialectical thinking, individuals 
(typically middle-aged or older adults) reconcile contradicting aspects that arise when when 
making sense of the world by understanding them as facets of an underlying whole or 
overarching unity. As a culmination of cognitive development in dialectical thinking, the 
dialectical whole is constantly challenged by arising incongruities to evolve to new stages of 
resolution. Although Blouin and McKelvie (2012) do not explicitly declare postformal 
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thinking as an individual differences variable, they treat it as one when they assess it as “the 
ability to accept and integrate a variety to [sic!] truths that are context-dependent and may 
even be incompatible” (p. 41) using a preexisting measure that was previously reported to 
have high internal consistency and test-retest correlations. Furthermore, postformal thinking 
was implied to vary across adults as Blouin and McKelvie (2012) used a sample in which 
they observed that “the vast majority were between 18 and 23 old” (p. 47; age and gender 
were not recorded in their study). 
In Blouin and McKelvie’s (2012) study, irony detection was assessed via a task that 
measures the ability to identify irony and metaphor. Participants had to identify and mark 
irony with a pen in a dialogue involving irony (i.e., “Wow, I really thought we were beyond 
the ‘small talk’ stage, but I guess we’re going to have to go back to boring old shallow 
conversations…”, when talking about death) and metaphor (i.e., “No but seriously, Em, 
aren’t we all ostriches with our heads in the sand?”). Additionally, they had to explain why 
they thought the respective part of the dialogue was irony or metaphor and, among other 
ratings, indicate how much they liked the respective instance of irony or metaphor. 
Participants’ scores in the irony and metaphor identification task (which included correct 
identification and correct explanation of irony) correlated substantially with their scores in 
the task for the assessment of postformal thinking, but also with their scores in a divergent 
thinking task. Divergent thinking performance was assessed as a measure for creativity 
because the authors linked postformal thinking not only to the identification and appreciation 
of irony and metaphor, but also to creativity. Hence, the finding that irony and metaphor are 
better identified and explained by creative individuals is a secondary result in this study, and 
not discussed by the authors. However, as the identification of irony and metaphor were 
jointly scored, it is hard to distinguish whether it is the identification and explanation of irony 
or metaphor that is responsible for the associations found between the irony and metaphor 
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identification task on the one hand and postformal thinking and creativity on the other. 
Furthermore, it will not be discussed here whether postformal thinking can be classified as a 
personality trait in terms of a preference for a certain worldview, or rather as an ability to 
engage in holistic thinking and reasoning. Neither will it be discussed whether postformal 
thinking is a unique concept or a blend of different known traits or abilities. Rather, Blouin 
and McKelvie’s (2012) findings will be taken as a demonstration of systematic variance in 
irony detection. As this variance is likely not to be fully explained by postformal thinking and 
creativity, further individual differences variables may play a role when studying the role of 
personality and ability in irony detection. 
 
Rigor of decoding the implicit and need for consistency in irony use 
As a further exception to the general neglect of an individual differences perspective in irony 
research, Groeben et al. (1985) investigated the role of theoretically relevant (albeit narrow) 
trait variables in irony production. However, presumably due to the fact that their set of 
studies was published in German language, their approach and their findings were not 
acknowledged in the English-speaking scientific community. Although Groeben et al. (1985) 
included irony reception in their large-scale investigation, they did not investigate the role of 
trait variables in irony reception. Furthermore, they did not operationalize irony reception in 
terms of an irony detection criterion. That means they did not strictly assess whether subjects 
detected the irony in the stimulus or not. Instead, they collected ratings about speaker and 
speech characteristics (e.g., superiority, indirectness). As regards irony use, Groeben et al. 
(1985) found that a set of personality characteristics were associated with irony production, 
namely need for consistency (Konsistenzbedürfnis) and rigor of decoding the implicit 
(Stringenz der Implizitätsdekodierung). Need for consistency was assessed with a preexisting 
questionnaire for the measurement of tolerance of ambiguity by Rydell and Rosen (1966; 
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sample items are: “A problem has little attraction for me if I don't think it has a solution.”, 
and “There's a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything.”). Rigor of decoding the 
implicit was assessed with a measure that was developed ad-hoc, consisting of riddle-stories 
that participants had to respond to by indicating how they made sense of the stories with 
open-ended responses. These traits can be seen as related to postformal thinking because 
need for consistency can be reasoned to be lower in individuals that score high in postformal 
thinking than in formal thinkers. Hence, the same dispositions may affect both the detection 
and the use of irony. In Groeben et al.’s (1985) study, irony use was assessed by asking 
participants to indicate their choice between five predefined utterances, among which one 
was designed as ironic. These findings are encouraging as they are a first demonstration of 
the role of dispositional variables in irony use and lay the groundwork for building 
hypotheses on the role of broad personality dimensions and humor-related traits in irony use. 
 
The role of ability in irony detection and irony use 
One of the aims of the present thesis is to jointly investigate personality and general mental 
ability on the one hand and irony detection on the other, in order to try to replicate and extend 
pre-existing studies that suggest the existence of systematic and meaningful variance in irony 
detection that can be explained by individual differences in terms of personality and ability 
variables (i.e., variance that can be explained rather than being negligible “noise”). Although 
it may appear worthwhile to also look at the role of intelligence in irony use (as irony can be 
seen as a witty and clever figure of speech), the role of ability in irony use will not be 
addressed in the present thesis for several reasons: (a) as most of the individuals who know 
how to use irony probably do not use irony to the full extent of their possibilities (i.e., much 
less frequent than thinkable), irony use can be seen as a typical behavior in of the sense of 
habitual preferences, (b) besides the circumstance that irony detection was found to be 
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correlated with intelligence, and one may hypothesize that irony use and irony detection are 
interdependent (as the knowledge of the concept of irony and the ability to detect it 
successfully may be a prerequisite for successfully using irony), there is hardly any 
theoretical indication for the hypothesis that general mental ability plays a role in irony use, 
and (c) in the conceivable case that intelligence is found to be positively correlated with irony 
use in a potential study, it would be hard to distinguish (albeit not methodologically 
impossible examine) why ironic utterances are preferred (vs. rejected) by more (vs. less) 
intelligent individuals (for example, due to enhanced irony detection in the stimuli used or 
due to enhanced wit), so the informative value of jointly investigating irony use and 
intelligence may be limited. 
In contrast, it may be worthwhile to study the role of ability in irony detection for 
several reasons: (a) as it is expected that not all individuals can perform equally well in irony 
detection, irony detection performance can be seen as theoretically related to individual 
differences variables delineating maximal behavior, (b) hence, jointly investigating irony 
detection and general mental ability can help to test the assumption that there is systematic 
interindividual variance in irony detection (rather than merely negligible “noise”) that can be 
explained by known individual differences variables, and (c) there is empirical support for 
the assumption that intelligence explains variance in irony detection. For example in 
Mitchley et al.’s (1998) study, intelligence was numerically more strongly associated with the 
errors made in ironic items (i.e., r = -.53) than with the errors made in the literal items of the 
irony detection measure (i.e., r = -.42) among schizophrenic patients. This difference was 
even more pronounced when general mental ability was assessed with a measure of 
premorbid intellectual ability, albeit the correlations did not reach the level of significance. 
Supporting this finding, Varga et al. (2014) found that irony detection was positively 
correlated with intelligence (i.e., r = .54) in their schizophrenic patient group. However, in 
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the two named studies, the association between irony detection performance and intelligence 
in the healthy control groups was not reported. 
Therefore, intelligence will be examined as a potential correlate of irony detection 
aptitude in PART II of the present thesis. It is expected that irony detection and intelligence 
correlate with each other highly enough to confirm pre-existing findings that irony detection, 
as assessed with a newly developed measure, poses a cognitive demand for the individual. At 
the same time, irony detection and intelligence are expected to be inter-correlated low enough 
to validate that the construct of irony detection aptitude is distinct from general mental 
ability. Furthermore, ironic praise, as the more complex and less stereotypical form of irony, 
is expected to be more dependent on intelligence than ironic criticism (see PART II of the 
present thesis for details). 
 
Assessment of irony detection and irony use 
The studies conducted for the present thesis made use of both preexisting and newly 
developed measures for the assessment of irony detection and irony use. To enable the reader 
to integrate the measures that were chosen for the studies conducted for the present thesis, 
some of the most frequently used measurement approaches for the assessment of irony 
detection and irony use in the existing literature are characterized in the following sections. In 
addition, the shortcomings of some of the existing measures will be discussed. 
 
Measures of irony detection 
As a basic common feature of previously used measures of irony detection, participants were 
typically provided with a scenario ending with a target utterance. While there are studies 
using audiotaped stimuli (e.g., Ackerman, 1983; Dews et al., 1995; Winner et al., 1998), 
written stimuli are used more commonly in the existing literature. In face of the plethora of 
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irony detection measures that were administered in written format, it seems justified to say 
that irony can be detected with no other cues provided than those possible to write down. 
This does not mean that irony is not easier to detect when recipients can make use of 
paraverbal cues, such as facial expression or intonation. In fact, McDonald et al. (2006) used 
audiovisual stimuli that were completely deprived of factual cues, so their test-takers had to 
rely only on paraverbal cues, such as intonation and facial expression of the actors, when 
appraising videotaped dialogues. However, as the next section aims to describe, these cues 
are not necessarily important for irony detection. It could even be argued that audiotaped or 
audiovisual stimuli add noise to irony detection studies (and, arguably, especially so when 
comparing ironic stimuli to non-ironic stimuli), as (a) the phonological features of stimuli 
may be hard to control in terms of comparability, and (b) audiotaped stimuli may add 
confounding features to the ironic utterances. 
 
Does irony detection require an ironic tone of voice? 
It was suggested that ironic utterances are typically accompanied by certain phonological 
markers; however, there is no consensus as to which markers these are, and there are even 
contradictory assumptions about some of them (such as the pitch of voice, which some deem 
to be higher and some deem to be lower in ironic utterances; cf. Attardo, Eisterhold, Hay, & 
Poggi, 2003). Clark and Gerrig (1984) account for this phenomenon when they claim that, in 
support of their pretense theory, the ironic speaker is supposed to assume a voice that is 
appropriate for the person he or she is pretending to be while exaggerating and caricaturing 
this voice (see section “The pretense theory of irony by Clark and Gerrig [1984]”). 
As Kreuz and Roberts (1989) suggest, the ironic tone of voice may be not be specific 
for irony, but rather specific for hyperbole (i.e., a choice of words exaggerating the true 
circumstances). As they suggest, hyperbolic statements are typically expressed by heavy 
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stress and a slow speaking rate, which has been defined as the ironic tone of voice in previous 
literature (cf. Kreuz & Roberts, 1989). In other words, the ironic tone of voice may be 
confounded by the use of hyperbole in ironic utterances. In a similar vein, Sperber and 
Wilson (1981) mention the existence of an ironic tone of voice. However, they suggest that 
the ironic tone of voice is not specific for irony, but rather for the emotional valence of the 
attitude expressed by the ironic utterance when they point out that the ironic tone of voice “is 
merely one of the variety of tones (doubtful, approving, contemptuous, and so on) that the 
speaker may use to indicate his attitude to the utterance or opinion mentioned” (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1981, p. 311; see also section “The ‘echoic mention’ theory by Sperber and Wilson 
[1981]” of the present thesis). In line with this conclusion, Bryant and Fox Tree (2005) did 
not find support for the postulation that an ironic tone of voice, which they defined as 
prolonged articulation and exaggerated pitch, has an impact on the degree of sarcasm 
perceived in ironic utterances.  
 
Characterizing existing instruments for the assessment of irony detection 
Typically, in the existing literature, the stimuli used for the assessment of irony detection 
consist of a list of short stories (oftentimes also called scenarios, sometimes also labeled 
vignettes) providing information about a situation with two or more protagonists interacting. 
The scenarios usually end with a target utterance that is designed as either ironic or non-
ironic. Ironic target utterances can commonly be characterized as counterfactual statements 
that the speaker in the scenario intends to be interpreted as such by the addressed protagonist. 
For the irony to be detected, the reader of the scenarios has to realize that the utterance is 
counterfactual to the information provided previously in the scenario. Likewise, the reader 
has to realize that the speaker in the story knows that the recipient is aware of the true 
circumstances and accordingly he or she (the recipient) has to appraise the utterance as 
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counterfactual. Importantly, the reader also has to be aware of the fact that the recipient 
knows about the speaker’s knowledge of the recipient’s knowledge. In other words: in order 
to detect the irony, the reader has to appraise that there is a common ground of knowledge 
about relevant facts between the conversation partners that is openly violated by the ironic 
utterance. Although the target utterance mostly represents a mock positive evaluation of 
negative circumstances described in the scenario (i.e., ironic criticism; cf. Sperber & Wilson, 
1981), there are also studies using mock negative evaluations of positive circumstances (i.e., 
ironic praise; e.g., Langdon, Davies, & Coltheart, 2002). Characteristically, the ironic 
utterance refers to a positive expectation (i.e., in the case of ironic criticism) or negative 
expectation (i.e., in the case of ironic praise) that was not fulfilled (for the critical nature of 
irony see, for example, Garmendia, 2014; Sperber & Wilson, 1981). A special case can be 
seen in Winner et al.’s (1998) stimuli (that were used for Study 3 of Part II of the present 
thesis), as they defined irony as a counterfactual statement that is neither ironic criticism nor 
ironic praise. Rather, the counterfactual (i.e., ironic) statements are uttered jokingly in order 
to cover up the speaking protagonists’ embarrassment over getting caught during a violation 
of some social rule. As the ironic speakers are aware of the fact that their conversation 
partners know about their “sneaky” transgression, they overtly pretend that they did not do it 
with the aim of producing a certain humorous and embarrassment-reducing effect. This is 
why it was possible to rephrase “using irony” with “joking” when asking participants about 
their interpretation of the stimuli in Winner et al.’s (1998) study. 
As regards the response format of the instruments used for the assessment of irony 
detection, there is a fair amount of different approaches to assess whether participants choose 
a literal or an ironic interpretation of the stimuli. An overview of different measures for the 
assessment of irony detection aptitude is given in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, many of the 
previous studies used fact questions in order to determine whether irony was detected or not. 
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Irony detection measures are typically scored by counting the number of ironic items (i.e., 
scenarios with an ironic target utterance) that participants’ responses indicated as having been 
interpreted as ironic. The total number of correctly answered items or interpretation errors is 
then used to compute a total score (e.g., an error rate). In the remainder of the current section, 
different procedures for the operationalization of irony detection as used in the existing 
literature will be described. 
One example of a measure of irony detection using fact questions is provided by 
Ackerman (1983). He asked his participants to answer story-specific fact questions and 
speaker attitude questions that revealed whether or not they appraised the utterance as literal 
or ironic in the given stories. Happé (1993) used a somewhat different approach to determine 
whether her subjects chose a literal or ironic interpretation of the stimuli. She asked her 
participants how the target utterances in her “metaphor vs. irony task” was intended to be 
understood by the speaker by providing a choice of two options, one of which was reflecting 
the ironic and one of which was reflecting the literal meaning of the target utterance (e.g., 
“What does David’s father mean? Does he mean David is clever or silly?”; Happé, 1993, p. 
119).  
In order to assess whether their participants detected the irony in the stimuli, Langdon and 
Coltheart (2004) simply asked them whether it made any sense for the fictional speaker to 
make the target utterance. The rationale of this procedure stems from the circumstance that, 
due to their counterfactual nature, ironic utterances semantically do not fit in with the 
situational context, such as the contextual information provided in the respective stimulus 
stories, if one does not grasp the ironically embedded meaning.  
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Table 1 
Overview of Measures for the Assessment of Irony Detection and Irony Use. 
 Participants’ task Stimuli 
Irony detection measures   
Winner et al. (1998) Categorize a target sentence as “irony” or “joking”. 
Short 
stories 
with target 
utterances 
Ackerman (1983) Answer dichotomous (i.e., “yes” or “no”) story-
specific fact questions and speaker attitude questions. 
McDonald and Pearce 
(1996) 
Explain what they thought was going on between the 
speakers (responses are coded dichotomously along a 
list of criteria). 
Happé (1993) Answer dichotomous questions about intended 
meaning. 
Langdon et al. (2002) Answer dichotomous questions as to whether it made 
sense for the speaker to make the target utterance. 
Channon, Pellijeff, and 
Rule (2005) 
Explain verbally the final remark, the action or the 
event immediately after presentation of the scenario 
(responses were scored by raters). 
Irony use measures   
Averbeck and Hample 
(2008) 
Rating-based: indicate on a rating scale the 
likelihood with which they would make each one of 
ten predefined ironic remarks. Scenarios 
and 
utterances Matthews et al. (2006) Forced choice: indicate which of two predefined 
utterances they would choose in response to the 
given scenario. 
Dress et al. (2008) Free production: generate a free response that they 
would make if they were in the place of one of the 
described protagonists in the respective short story. 
Short 
stories 
Hancock (2004) Face-to-face interaction: discuss celebrity fashion 
images with their conversation partners (that were 
designated examples of poor fashion taste) as if they 
were commenting a fashion show (e.g., by praising 
the outfits). Conversations were scored by raters 
using a coding scheme. 
Discussion 
topics 
Ivanko, Pexman, and 
Olineck (2004) 
Self-report: answer questions assessing their estimate 
of the likelihood with which they use sarcasm. 
Self-report 
questions 
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Irony detection has also been operationalized by assessing participants’ judgments of 
whether a non-ironic paraphrase of the target utterance in the scenario is true or false. For 
example, Ackerman (1982) used two kinds of questions that had to be answered in a true or 
false format. One kind of question asked about the speaker’s state of mind or propositional 
attitude that the speaker intended to communicate (e.g., displeased, angry, or hostile). The 
other kind of questions asked if the non-ironic “translation”, in terms of a literal paraphrase 
of the target utterance, was true or not. In a similar vein, McDonald and Pearce (1996) made 
use of questions targeting mental states and emotions of both the speaker and the target of the 
ironic utterance. 
Other studies used open response formats. For example, participants had to verbally 
respond to the question of what the fictional character in the stimuli meant by his or her 
remark in a face-to-face assessment with the experimenter, who scored participants’ 
responses as to whether they reflected literal or ironic interpretation of the target stimulus 
(e.g., Channon et al., 2005).  
Some studies assessed irony detection by rewording the use of irony as “joking” and 
asking participants whether the ironic utterance was meant as a joke (i.e., irony) or a lie (e.g., 
Winner et al., 1998). The instrument introduced by Winner et al. (1998) was also used by 
Gaudreau et al. (2013). As they explain, like Winner et al. (1998) they avoided the term 
“irony“ in their materials as not to prime their participants. As Gaudreau et al. (2013) did not 
elaborate on this issue, the next section will deal with the question of what forms of priming 
can occur during the assessment of irony detection. . 
 
Indirect response formats in the assessment of irony detection 
This leads to the report of another observation about the existing measurement methods for 
the assessment of irony detection: Usually, participants are not asked immediately whether 
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they think that the stimuli are ironic or not. Rather, irony detection is assessed indirectly or 
unobtrusively. The reason for not making irony salient and thereby making participants aware 
of the possible occurrence of irony can only be guessed at, as usually they are not reported in 
the respective studies. As already mentioned, the notion that it is advisable to avoid priming 
effects by unobtrusive assessment of irony detection can be found in the literature (Gaudreau 
et al., 2013). Avoiding “priming” by distracting from the true intention of an irony 
performance task may have at least two benefits: (a) given that the chance hit rate in most of 
the instruments can be expected to be at 50%, since there are only two options, each 
specifying the intentions of the speaker, making irony salient may lead to ceiling effects 
when tasks become too easy to solve, and (b) especially when comparing cognitively 
impaired groups, clinical participants may produce socially desired responses in terms of 
demand effects, as they may guess that irony detection may be affected by their disorder 
(especially when no non-ironic control stimuli are used). Since it can be seen as an important 
aspect of the assessment of irony detection, the role of irony alertness will be revisited in 
PART II of the present thesis. Based on the findings of Study 3 in PART II, it will be 
suggested that, for the investigation of the role of personality and ability in irony detection, 
making irony salient for test-takers (i.e., an irony alert mode of testing) may be preferred to a 
procedure in which irony is not mentioned to participants (i.e., an irony non-alert mode of 
testing)—at least when using psychometrically difficult (i.e., ambiguous) stimuli. 
 
A new direction in the assessment of irony detection 
As the present thesis innovates the field of irony research by also addressing healthy adults’ 
irony detection (rather than resorting to clinical groups), new means of assessment that are 
tailored to the performance level of the target group are needed. That is, an ideal test of irony 
detection performance would allow for discrimination between different levels of high irony 
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performance. A novel test is required because pre-existing measures typically suffer from 
ceiling effects (i.e., due to low psychometric difficulty of the items). Such ceiling effects can 
be found, for example, in normally functioning control groups in studies comparing them to 
clinical groups (indicated by close-to-perfect detection rates and very low standard deviations 
(e.g., Langdon et al., 2002; Mitchley et al., 1998). To fill this research gap, newly developed 
instruments tailored to normally functioning adults’ performance levels will be introduced in 
PART II of the present thesis. 
 
Assessment of irony use 
While there are, remarkably, fewer studies on irony use than on irony detection in the 
existing literature, irony use has nonetheless been operationalized by using a whole variety of 
different approaches. An overview of different measures for the assessment of irony use 
tendency is given in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, generally, these approaches fall into five 
broad categories: (a) rating-based measures, (b) forced choice measures, (c) free production 
measures, (d) face-to-face interaction tasks, and (e) self-report questionnaire. As an example 
for a rating-based measure, Averbeck and Hample (2008) asked their participants to indicate 
(on a rating scale) the likelihood with which they would make each one of ten predefined 
ironic remarks in a given scenario. In one of the experimental conditions in this study, 
participants were instructed to assume that they were sharing a flat with a noisy, messy, 
parasitic, and disrespectful person. Participants had to indicate how likely it is that they 
would address their flatmate with a list of 20 criticisms, of which ten are phrased as ironic 
and ten as literal. This measure is used in one of the versions provided by Averbeck and 
Hample (2008) and described in more detail in PART III of the present thesis.  
As a measure falling into the forced choice measure category, the procedure used by 
Matthews et al. (2006) uses short stories in which two protagonists are interacting. 
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Participants were requested to indicate which of two predefined utterances they would choose 
in response to the given scenario if they were to encounter the described situation in real life, 
from the perspective of the protagonist making the final utterance. One of the utterances 
provided in the selection task was designed as ironic and one as a literal response. Scores 
reflect the frequency with which participants choose an ironic statement. This measure is 
adapted from Matthews et al. (2006) for the use for the present thesis and described in more 
detail in PART III.  
As regards the category of free production measures, a study by Dress et al. (2008) 
used an open-ended response format by employing a list of short stories designed to elicit an 
ironic utterance. Participants had to picture themselves as taking part in the interaction 
described in the short stories (which were adapted from the stimuli introduced by Kreuz & 
Glucksberg, 1989) and generate a free response that they would make if they were in the 
place of one of the described protagonists in the respective short story. Dress et al. (2008) 
hoped to elicit ironic responses by the following setup: In the scenarios, one story character 
makes a positive prediction that then fails to come true, with the other story character being a 
witness (or even being affected by the negative consequences of the failing prediction). The 
rationale of this procedure can be seen in the fact that the positive prediction provides 
material that can be mentioned in order to convey a critical attitude towards the false 
prediction or the failing expectation. That is, when participants were requested to respond as 
if they were the other story character, they could use a mock positive evaluation of negative 
circumstances in terms of an ironic criticism in response to these stimuli (cf. Sperber & 
Wilson, 1981).  
As an example of the face-to-face interaction tasks category, Hancock (2004) used 
two conversation tasks. Similar to Rockwell and Theriot’s (2001) procedure (see section 
“Culture and gender differences in irony use”), the tasks were designed to elicit irony by 
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making participants utter something positive about negative circumstances. For example, in 
one task participants had to discuss celebrity fashion images with their conversation partners 
that were designated examples of poor fashion taste, as they were taken from the “Worst 
Dressed” pages of pop-culture magazines. Participants were instructed to act as if they were 
commenting a fashion show (e.g., by praising the outfits). The conversations in the face-to-
face condition of Hancock’s (2004) study were videotaped and scored using a coding scheme 
incorporating four types of speech acts in which irony can occur as mentioned by Gibbs 
(2000): (a) sarcasm (i.e., stating the opposite of the intended meaning in order to convey a 
negative attitude), (b) understatement (i.e., counterfactual statement in terms of stating less 
than is the case), (c) hyperbole (i.e., exaggeration of the situation), and (d) rhetorical 
questions (i.e., when the speaker seemingly asked a question in order to convey his attitude 
but did not await an answer). 
As regards the self-report category, Ivanko et al. (2004) used a 16-item questionnaire 
to assess how participants appraise the likelihood with which they use sarcasm in general 
(e.g., “How sarcastic do you think you are?”) and the likelihood with which they would use 
sarcasm in certain specific predefined situations (e.g., “You just got a big promotion at work. 
You are having dinner with your family to celebrate your achievement…”) on a 7-point scale 
(not at all likely to extremely likely). 
Taken together, there are various forms of measures for the assessment of irony use. 
As a general weak point, the identification of irony use can be seen as being subject to the 
respective researchers’ appraisal of whether a given response is ironic or not in all of the 
described approaches. That is, the respective researchers either designed predefined 
responses as ironic or scored the occurrence of irony according to their own appraisal of free 
speech productions. As a proxy for ironic intent, responses are commonly defined as ironic if 
the valence of the literal interpretation of the utterance is opposite to the valence of the true 
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circumstances. However, strictly speaking it would be necessary to ask participants explicitly 
whether they intended to use irony or not, at least as a control question after the irony use 
assessment (as not to bias participants’ responses in terms of irony alertness during the irony 
use measure). As none of the described studies used these kinds of control questions, it is not 
clear how much noise should be expected in the responses of the described irony use 
measures, such as noise caused by guessing answers if participants cannot make sense of the 
scenarios used (although it would be possible to estimate the proportion of error variance in 
the score by testing the reliability of the measures). 
 
Aiming to derive a theoretical model of individual differences in irony behavior 
As a secondary objective of the present thesis, it is aimed to ultimately derive a theoretical 
model summarizing and organizing individual differences in irony behavior. This model will 
deal the individual differences constructs relevant to irony behavior that are tested or 
theoretically assumed in the present thesis. As a newly introduced construct, the sense of 
irony as an individual differences variable manifesting itself in the extent to which people 
detect irony, produce irony, seek irony, or enjoy irony (see PART I of the present thesis) will 
play a prominent role in this model. According to Cronbach and Meehl (1955), a theoretical 
construct is constituted by a system of laws, which they refer to as a nomological network. As 
Cronbach and Meehl (1995) point out, “"[l]earning more about" a theoretical construct is a 
matter of elaborating the nomological network in which it occurs, or of increasing the 
definiteness of the components.” (p. 290). In the General Discussion section of the present 
thesis, an attempt will be made to summarize the “laws” in which (a) observable properties or 
quantities of the sense of irony relate to each other, (b) the sense of irony relates to 
observables; and (c) different theoretical constructs relate to the sense of irony (cf. Cronbach 
& Meehl, 1955). This step can be seen as crucial when assuming systematic interindividual 
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variance in irony behavior due to the sense of irony and ultimately targeting its assessment, as 
“[t]o validate a claim that a test measures a construct, a nomological net surrounding the 
concept must exist” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 291). 
 
Summary and conclusion of General Introduction 
This section summarized the current knowledge on irony behavior in terms of pre-existing 
theories of irony, attempting to explain irony phenomena by making assumptions about 
which general features help to distinguish irony from non-irony (such as a negative attitude 
toward a failed expectation, e.g., Utsumi, 2000), which linguistic characteristics typically go 
along with irony (such as “echoic mention”, e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1981), or which 
pragmatic processes are involved in irony detection (e.g., the “cooperative principle”, Grice, 
1975). It was described how these theories relate to the aim of the present thesis, in that they 
indicate which traits can be expected to be relevant for the prediction of irony behaviors, and 
also which aspects should be considered for their assessment. It is noteworthy that none of 
the existing theories make assumptions about whether characteristics of the speaker play a 
role in irony behavior, indicating that the present thesis addresses a gap in research by aiming 
to introduce a theory of irony reception that incorporates an individual differences 
perspective. Next, as two central functions of irony, humor and aggression were found as 
pervasive in the literature. Since irony may be involved in both the phenomena of humor and 
aggression, irony may have a special role when it comes to the disparaging part of the humor 
spectrum. Therefore, in addition to personality dimensions relating to aggression (i.e., 
psychoticism) the present thesis will take on humor-related traits that not only delineate 
playful compassionate aspects of the sense of humor, but also those traits that go along with 
the preference for laughing-at humor. 
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Furthermore, the clinical approach in irony research was examined in the introduction. 
This approach utilizes patient groups suffering from a depletion of the abilities denoted by 
Theory of Mind. The description of this approach was viewed as worthwhile to include 
because it demonstrates the potential advantage of investigating individual differences in 
irony detection, an approach that can overcome the limitations of clinical studies (such as 
problems concerning internal validity and feasibility) by targeting the population of normally 
functioning adults. Next, studies investigating culture and gender differences were reported. 
These studies compared groups known for differing discourse goals (e.g., men and women, 
e.g., Colston & Lee, 2004) in order to gain a deeper understanding of why irony is used (i.e., 
the pragmatic functions of irony). Of course, this approach can also be seen as limited 
because, for example, men and women differ in many more respects than the variables 
assumed to be associated with gender differences in irony use (i.e., discourse goals and risk 
taking, cf. Colston & Lee, 2004).3 Previous studies that reported initial findings as to the role 
of creativity and intelligence in irony detection and use were discussed in the General 
Introduction to demonstrate that it is indeed worthwhile to assume an individual differences 
perspective in irony research. In addition, the assessment of irony detection and use was 
addressed by describing the features of the most established measurement procedures. Lastly, 
the aim of the present thesis to derive a theoretical model of individual differences (and 
especially so the assumed sense of irony) as predictors of irony behavior was described. This 
                                                
3 However, Colston and Lee’s (2004) approach of drawing conclusion from correlations 
between gender and irony use to learn more about the phenomenon of irony can be taken as a 
paradigm for drawing conclusions from the expected results of the present thesis from an 
interdisciplinary angle: Learning more about who is able to detect irony and inclined to use 
irony (i.e., characterizing “the typical irony user” in terms of personality and ability) may 
also help research disciplines other than the individual differences field (such as experimental 
psychology) to generate and test hypotheses about when and why irony is detected and used. 
Eventually, pre-existing assumptions and knowledge about the “laws” in which irony occurs 
could in futures works be reappraised and extended using an interdisciplinary point of view.  
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model is intended to be used as a basis for deriving a theory explaining successful irony 
reception.  
If one main conclusion is to be drawn from the General Introduction, it’s that the 
literature reviewed therein indicates that the present thesis is targeting an important gap in 
research. Being first to target the question whether (a) systematic interindividual differences 
in irony performance can be found and (b) whether this interindividual variance can be 
explained by personality and ability variables, the present thesis can help to get a picture of 
who is able or inclined to detect or use irony. The aim of dealing with these questions, is to 
open up a new field of research for both personality and irony research, by conceptualizing 
irony detection as an aptitude and irony use as enduring tendency for which, according to a 
compelling (yet neglected) pre-existing theoretical and empirical indication, a link to ability 
and personality should be expected. As a by-product of the results expected in PART II and 
PART III of the present thesis, pre-existing assumptions about the special role of humor-
related traits will be put to the test by (a) exploring their role in irony detection as compared 
to the role of broad personality dimensions (i.e., the Big Five dimensions of personality) and 
(b) testing their incremental predictive value for irony use beyond broad personality 
dimensions (i.e., Eysenck’s personality dimensions). 
Previous experimental findings are viewed as encouraging for the aim of the present 
thesis to introduce irony behavior as a phenomenon native to the realm of individual 
differences. Since substantial relations to general mental ability and the affective, behavioral, 
cognitive, and motivational aspects of personality traits can be expected, irony behaviors 
should not remain a topic of experimental research (or the study of cultural groups or gender) 
because—as a central claim of the present thesis—(a) systematic interindividual variance in 
irony detection and use exists and should be described and (b) this interindividual variance 
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cannot be explained sufficiently while neglecting ability and personality as two central 
domains of individual differences. 
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Interindividual Differences in Verbal Irony Detection and Use: The Role of Personality 
and Ability 
PART I. The aim of the paper is fourfold: (1) demonstrate why humor scholars should study 
irony, (2) explore the need for considering interindividual differences in healthy adults’ irony 
performance, (3) stress the necessity for developing tools assessing habitual differences in 
irony performance, (4) indicate future directions for joint irony and humor research and 
outline possible applications.  
PART II. The paper aims to distinguish two facets of irony detection aptitude, namely the 
aptitude to detect ironic criticism vs. the aptitude to detect ironic praise, in order to allow for 
more accurate predictions and conclusions when exploring personality and ability correlates 
of irony detection aptitude. As a methodological prerequisite, the aim is to develop a novel 
test for the assessment of the detection of ironic criticism and ironic praise. Because irony 
detection aptitude is assessed indirectly, and because difficult items are used in order to 
prevent ceiling effects, the materials will be evaluated by using an experimental approach, 
and also by including additional explicit ratings of ironic content.  
PART III. The aim of this paper is to explore whether (a) broad personality 
dimensions and humor-related traits predict irony use and, if this is the case, whether (b) 
humor-related traits have incremental explanatory value over broad personality dimensions in 
this prediction. It is hypothesized that traits facilitating humor-related behavior (i.e., 
gelotophilia, katagelasticism, the aggressive and the affiliative humor style, and the histrionic 
self-presentation style) as well as trait bad mood will predict irony use in a positive direction, 
just as traits that impede humorous behavior (i.e., trait seriousness) will predict the use of 
irony in a negative direction.  
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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is fourfold: 1) show why humor scholars should study irony; 2) explore 
the need for considering interindividual differences in healthy adults’ irony performance; 3) 
stress the necessity for developing tools assessing habitual differences in irony performance; 
4) indicate future directions for joint irony and humor research and outline possible 
applications. Verbal irony is often employed with a benevolent humorous intent by speakers, 
but can also serve as a means of disparagement humor. In both cases, encoding and decoding 
activities entailing irony need to be considered in the context of the psychology of humor. We 
argue that verbal irony performance can be considered a phenomenon native to the realm of 
humor and individual differences. We point out that research has widely neglected the 
meaningfulness of variance in irony performance within experimental groups when looking at 
determinants of irony detection and production. Based on theoretical considerations and 
previous empirical findings we show that this variance can be easily related to individual 
differences variables such as the sense of humor, dispositions towards laughter and ridicule 
(e.g., gelotophobia), and general mental ability. Furthermore, we hypothesize that there is an 
enduring trait determining irony performance we will label the sense of irony. The sense of 
irony possibly goes along with inclinations towards specific affective and cognitive 
processing patterns when dealing with verbal irony. As an application, novel irony 
performance tests can help to study psychological and neuro-physiological correlates of irony 
performance more feasibly, i.e., in non-clinical groups. 
 
Keywords: Assessment, Gelotophobia, Humor, Individual Differences, Irony
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Introduction 
When we use verbal irony, we typically utter something different from what we actually want 
to express. For example, we utter an opposite of what we mean or use assertions that are 
counterfactual, oftentimes in order to communicate a critical attitude (Garmendia, 2014; 
Haverkate, 1990). Characteristically, we expect the listener to get the intended meaning of 
what we say nonetheless (Groeben & Scheele, 2003). The category of verbal irony typically 
entails positive evaluations of negative circumstances (e.g., ironic criticism via a mock 
compliment) as well as negative evaluations of positive circumstances (e.g., an ironic 
compliment via a mock criticism), with the latter being viewed as less prototypical for verbal 
irony (for an account on this asymmetry, see for example Kreuz & Link, 2002). Although a 
single example has to fall short of representing verbal irony in its variety, it might be 
illustrating to take a look at the following instance provided by Gibbs (1986, p. 8): “Gus just 
graduated from high school and he didn't know what to do. One day he saw an ad about the 
Navy. It said that the Navy was not just a job, but an adventure. So, Gus joined up. Soon he 
was aboard a ship doing all sorts of boring things. One day as he was peeling potatoes he said 
to his buddy, "This sure is an exciting life."”. Here, the reader is expected to grasp Gus’ 
intention to state that his life as a soldier is boring (with the possible subtext of a critical 
attitude toward the false promise made by the advertisement as a meta-message).  
Although speakers usually want their irony to be recognized, listeners do not always 
detect it, i.e., they get the meaning of the ironic utterance wrong. Differences in irony 
detection performance were linked to characteristics of the stimuli or context, age-related 
developmental stages, or attributed to pathological or abnormal cognitive impairment (for an 
overview, see for example Colston & Gibbs, 2007). Individual differences in terms of a 
variation of maximal and typical irony detection (and production) performance, stable across 
situations and time, have been neglected. Therefore, to date, there is only scarce evidence to 
answer the question of who is inclined to use ironic speech and who is inclined to get the 
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meaning of ironic utterances wrong among healthy adults. Following the notion that 
schizophrenics’ impaired irony comprehension may be found also in subjects with 
vulnerability for psychotic illness, Langdon and Coltheart (2004) linked schizotypal 
personality to irony detection performance in non-schizophrenic young adults. Furthermore, 
some of the rare studies reporting on personality constructs considering the use of irony deal 
with the histrionic self-presentation style (Renner, Enz, Friedel, Merzbacher, & Laux, 2008). 
2008; Renner & Heydasch, 2010). Other relevant traits have been overlooked, namely the fear 
of being laughed at (gelotophobia; Ruch & Proyer, 2008), and the sense of humor (see Martin, 
1998).  
The question arises, whether there is stable variance in irony performance that cannot 
be associated with known traits and abilities. In this case, a trait-like sense of irony can be 
hypothesized as an antecedent of irony performance4. Furthermore, the “sense of irony” can 
be reasoned to moderate the impact of the sense of humor on irony performance. For 
example, without a repertoire of acts of verbal irony (i.e., irony production), humorous intent 
cannot express itself via verbal irony. 
The aim of the current theoretical position paper is fourfold: First, we show why it is 
worthwhile for humor scholars to study irony. Second, we explore the need for considering 
interindividual differences in irony performance in the light of the literature. Third, we stress 
the necessity for developing assessment tools tapping into the variance in healthy adults’ 
irony performance in terms of both, the typical level of irony activities as well as maximal 
irony performance in its different facets (i.e., misses and false alarms). Forth, we indicate 
future directions for joint irony and humor research and outline possible applications of the 
consequences of assuming an individual differences perspective in irony research. 
 
                                                
4 Accordingly, irony performance can have both, the status of a dependent or independent 
variable, reliant on whether it is treated as a criterion predicted by known personality traits or 
as an indicator of the sense of irony. 
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Why bother about verbal irony in the psychology of humor? 
Humor frequently results as a (by-) product of irony (Garmendia, 2014) and irony is 
viewed as used when people want to be humorous (Roberts & Kreuz, 1994). Thus –albeit 
humor is not necessarily involved in every instance of verbal irony (and vice versa)– humor-
related individual differences possibly explain differences in irony performance. In an early 
analysis of the English and German language, irony was shown to emerge as a pin in a 
framework of terms constituting the lexical field of the comic, along with humor in its narrow 
aesthetic meaning (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963). In the academic tradition of the aesthetic, humor 
“is simply one element of the comic –as are wit, fun, nonsense, sarcasm, ridicule, satire, or 
irony– and basically denotes a smiling attitude toward life and its imperfections: an 
understanding of the incongruities of existence” (Ruch, 1998, p. 6). It is noteworthy that the 
comic here is defined as the faculty able to make one laugh or to amuse whereas the “other 
major terminological system, largely endorsed by current Anglo-American research (and in 
everyday language) uses humor as the umbrella-term for all phenomena of this field” (Ruch, 
1998, p. 6). In other words, the term humor replaced the comic in language use. There are two 
conclusions to draw from this: first, in the terminological system of the aesthetic, irony and 
humor belong to the same faculty –the comic (as distinguished from other aesthetic qualities, 
such as the tragic); second, if the term humor delineates what used to be subsumed under the 
term of the comic, irony can be viewed as a humor phenomenon able to make us laugh or to 
amuse. Hence, irony performance may be both constituting humor as well as depend on a 
sense of humor. Furthermore, we argue that irony is structurally similar to humor, as both 
entail ability and preference components. In support of these ideas, studies aiming at 
assessing discourse goals or pragmatic functions of ironic communication characteristically 
provide humor as a rating category. For example, Dews, Kaplan, and Winner (1995) defined 
humor along with status elevation, aggression, and emotional control as a social function of 
irony and found ironic criticisms and compliments to be rated as funnier than their literal 
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counterparts. In a similar vein, Gibbs (2000) found jocularity (“where speakers teased one 
another in humorous ways”, p. 12) to be more frequent (50%) than sarcasm (28%; “where 
speakers spoke positively to convey a more negative intent”, p. 12) in five types of irony 
deducted from a corpus of recorded ironic conversational turns. In line with these scholars’ 
ideas and findings, also laypeople indicated in interviews that humor is a component of verbal 
irony: when Roberts and Kreuz (1994) asked their participants to indicate the reasons why an 
individual might use irony, 65% generated a response falling into the category “to be 
humorous”.  
From the listener’s perspective, verbal irony is often involved in speech acts 
experienced as humorous: when Akimoto et al.’s (2014) subjects indicated the degree of 
experienced humor in different kinds of target statements, utterances were rated as more 
humorous when they were ironic rather than literal. Furthermore, ironic turns in conversations 
were viewed predominantly as humorous and regularly responded to with laughter (Gibbs, 
2000). Thus, humor is frequently targeted in studies on irony and non-literal speech.  
In psychological humor research, on the other hand, verbal irony is still neglected. 
Although Ruch (1998) suggested that for research purposes humor can be used “as an 
umbrella term […] including negative forms of humor, since the term now tends to exclude 
less benevolent forms of the comic like sarcasm, mock, ridicule, satire, irony” (p. 11), irony is 
seldom included in humor studies. Yet, as Garmendia (2014) reasons, ironic utterances follow 
the structure or processes described in humor theories. Ironic utterances can be argued to 
entail elements of incongruity and resolution (see Suls, 1972, for accounts on incongruity), or 
also superiority (see Ferguson & Ford, 2008, for an overview). It was also discussed whether 
the humorous quality of irony roots in the “incongruity between what speakers semantically 
state and what they ironically imply” (Gibbs, Bryant, & Colston, 2014, p. 585). This links 
irony to elements of incongruity-resolution theories in humor. Supporting the assumption of 
superiority mechanisms, Schmidt-Hidding (1963) characterized irony by the speaker’s intent 
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to create a mutual sense of superiority towards a third with an initiated audience and a 
behavior towards the next that is described as “mocking the stupid” (p. 51). In the face of 
these considerations, it is thus highly surprising that irony is largely absent from accounts on 
humor production or as a style to be humorous (i.e., “I make ironic criticisms to tease my 
friends”). In similar vein, irony is rarely represented in tools assessing the sense of humor5.  
Moreover, verbal irony can be reasoned to be one tool in disparagement humor 
(Zillmann, 1983), aiming at ridiculing, humiliating, or putting others down (i.e., target its 
objects with biting criticism and make others laugh at the same time). As an empirical support 
for this view, Leggitt and Gibbs (2000) found their participants to rate a speaker feeling more 
„scornful, disdainful, and contemptuous“ (p. 6) when making statements classified as 
sarcastic and ironic, compared to other types of statements. Colston (1997) presents findings 
demonstrating that ironic criticism enhances condemnation compared to literal criticism, 
further indicating that irony can serve as a means of “salting a wound” and making it a form 
of speech suitable to ridicule others. Given that ridicule typically also employs disparaging 
humor to critically point to or even punish social transgressions (e.g., Bergson, 1924; Titze, 
2009), the “clash” of a critical attitude and humor in irony (Garmendia, 2014) can be 
reconciled by separating the addressees of the critical and the receivers of the humorous 
component. Supporting this notion, Gibbs (2000, p. 10) states: “In some cases, then, ironic 
comments can be both humorous and negative, precisely because people find amusement in 
disliked targets being disparaged”. Furthermore, if listeners do not get the irony in a 
conversation, this can lead to taunting amusement in the person making the ironic statement 
as well as bystanders.  
                                                
5 For an exception, see items of the State-Trait-Cheerfulness Inventory (trait form, STCI-
T<106>; Ruch et al., 1996, item 86: “Irony doesn’t suit me”) as well as the Humorous 
Behavior Q-sort Deck (HBQD; Craik, Lampert, & Nelson, 1996, item 57: “Is sarcastic.”). 
Furthermore, the As-If-Scale (Renner et al., 2008) accounts for both humor and irony when 
paraphrasing use and employment of cues for verbal irony (e.g., item 2: “When I say 
something I often change my voice to indicate that I do not really mean what I say“). 
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To conclude, irony can be a tool to produce humorous remarks, which can be of 
benevolent or disparaging nature. In other words, it may depend on a person’s sense of humor 
how inclined he or she is to use irony or to get the meaning wrong in humorous ironic 
utterances. Consequently, not all of us may be able or prone to use irony to the same extent, 
just as not everyone may have the same inclination to detect verbal irony. However, little is 
known about how typical and maximal verbal irony behavior varies across individuals. 
Therefore, we next explore the conceptualization of irony from an individual differences 
perspective. 
Is there individual differences variance in irony detection and production? 
Verbal irony has been studied in a variety of experimental settings as regards the 
comprehension (see Colston & Gibbs, 2007, for an overview) and to a lesser extent also the 
production (Averbeck & Hample, 2008; Hancock, 2004; Rockwell & Theriot, 2001) of ironic 
utterances. The typical experimental approach consists of systematically varying target 
sentences in vignettes (Kreuz, 2000). As Kreuz (2000) points out, this has been used to test 
narrow predictions made by competing theories on irony processing. Still, “… variables such 
as personality and culture remain largely unaddressed” (Kreuz, 2000, p. 105). In an outlook 
on the future of irony studies Gibbs and Colston (2007) state that it is not yet clear “as to what 
personality characteristics make someone more prone to speaking ironically” (p. 590). The 
authors point to the finding that participants used speaker occupation as a cue when assessing 
speaker’s tendency to use ironic speech (Pexman & Katz, 2001, cited in Gibbs & Colston, 
2007). There is even more literature dealing with the role of speaker characteristics in 
listeners’ interpretation of verbal irony (for an overview, see Pexman, 2005). We agree that 
these findings –that Pexman (2005) explains using theories of irony– are a starting point for 
building hypotheses on who is more inclined to use irony; however they were not a strict or 
direct test of who uses irony. Rather, in the studies reviewed by Pexman (2005) speaker 
characteristics usually were either treated as an experimentally varied cue, or participants 
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were asked to rate how likely they think speakers of different occupations are to use ironic 
speech. Supporting the view that not all of us are equally likely to use verbal irony, Gibbs and 
Colston (2007) suggest conducting case study analyses of individuals who are renowned for 
their use of irony in order to explore the qualities of what they call “the ironic mind” (p. 590). 
Following this notion, we assume that irony performance has a stable variance across 
individuals with some more prone to use and understand verbal irony and some less. In other 
words: “the ironic mind” can be hypothesized to be an individual differences variable to be 
found in all of us to a varying degree. 
To our knowledge, only two studies have investigated interindividual variance in irony 
production behavior in a targeted fashion (Ivanko, Pexman, & Olineck, 2004; Renner et al., 
2008). Ivanko et al. (2004) employed a scale for self-reported use of sarcasm6 to account for 
interindividual variance in an irony production task (choice of either ironic or literal 
responses) and also an irony interpretation task (rating the speaker’s intent). Interestingly, 
self-reported use of sarcasm not only explained ironic statement choice in the production task 
but also the ratings of speaker’s attributes in the interpretation task. Although the study by 
Ivanko et al. (2004) is encouraging, the informative value of the findings needs to be seen as 
limited, most of all because irony production tendencies were assessed via self-reports and 
also because the interpretation task was evaluated in terms of ratings of speaker’s attributes 
(rather than scored with an irony detection performance criterion).  
                                                
6 The terms “irony” and “sarcasm” are often used interchangeably in the existing literature. 
Here, we say “sarcasm” rather than “irony” if the authors used this term. However, we 
generally use the term “irony” as it was defined as a superordinate category entailing also 
sarcasm. Following Schmidt-Hidding (1963), irony is characterized by saying something 
differently than what is meant (but with an in-group-serving intent), whereas sarcasm indeed 
employs the figure of irony but in the context of hostile behavior. In line with this distinction, 
Gibbs (1986) refers to The Oxford English Dictionary when he defines that “sarcasm depends 
for its effect on ‘bitter, caustic, and other ironic language that is usually directed against an 
individual’” (p. 3). However, he specifies that “it is possible to make sarcastic remarks 
without being ironic” (Gibbs, 1986, p. 3). Hence, not least in the context of humor, “irony” 
rather than “sarcasm” appears to be the term covering the broad spectrum of ironic language. 
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When assuming an individual differences perspective, we look at persons’ tendencies 
across a wide range of different situations involving verbal irony. We are interested in verbal 
irony behavior in terms of inclinations across measurement points in time and across 
situations. Therefore, for our approach, specifics of the situation (e.g., context or social 
factors) will be considered as “noise” because they add variance to the expression of 
underlying traits in behavior that is not specific to the person and hence distort the true 
influence of a person’s behavioral tendency (just like the variance accounted for by person 
characteristics is commonly treated as error variance in experimental studies on irony testing 
predictions by varying characteristics of the situation). In the remaining part of the current 
section, existing findings on irony performance will be explored with respect to two aspects. 
First, they will be evaluated in terms of the reported variance between individuals within the 
same experimental groups looking at standard deviations (SDs)7. Second, the attention will be 
turned to explained variance in irony performance. The rationale behind considering this 
aspect is that meaningful variance in irony performance is a necessity for explaining it as a 
dependent variable by independent person-specific variables.  
Akimoto et al. (2014) asked their participants’ to decide whether the intention of a 
speaker in 80 scenarios was ironic or not. The chance accuracy rate alone can be expected to 
be 50%. They report an average accuracy rate of 96.2% with 5.3% SD in their irony detection 
task. This is a much higher hit-rate than the accuracy found in a preliminary survey the 
authors conducted (80%). So in face of the fact that tasks were rather easy to solve (indicated 
by the high means, i.e., subjects were detecting the irony in most of the tasks) there were still 
noteworthy differences between subjects’ performances. These findings are consistent with a 
further study employing a dichotomous interpretation task: Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, 
                                                
7 Low SDs (in relation to the possible range of the variable) indicate that individuals do not 
disperse much in terms of the deviation of their performance from the sample mean. High SDs 
indicate a broad distribution of individuals’ performance scores along the possible range of 
the variable. 
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and Pincus (1998) found an average error rate of .22 with a considerable variance (SD = .28) 
among healthy controls when they had to detect whether a target utterance was a joke 
(involving irony) or a lie. So in this study some participants detected the irony in all items 
whereas some were not performing above chance level. 
In one of the few studies assessing irony production, Matthews, Hancock, and 
Dunham (2006) found considerable interindividual variance (SDs): when their participants 
had to choose between a literal and an ironic communicative response to eight situations, on 
average around half of the criticisms (M = 4.31, SD = 1.14) and one fourth (M = 2.00, SD = 
1.75) of the compliments were delivered ironically, that is, by mock compliments and mock 
criticisms, respectively. Hence, also the use of ironic utterances varies between individuals. In 
a comparable paradigm used by Ivanko et al. (2004) the resulting individual differences in 
statement selection in a forced choice production task were meaningful in terms of self-
reported use of sarcasm explaining variance in the choices made (self-reported use of sarcasm 
was positively related to the frequency of choosing sarcastic statements). To summarize, there 
appears to be a pattern in the results reported in studies investigating irony detection 
performance. First, performance means are usually rather high (i.e., low error rates or high hit 
rates), pointing to a low difficulty of the tasks employed or selective sampling. Second, 
despite low difficulty (and possibly resulting ceiling effects) there is still variance that can be 
possibly made sense of in terms of explaining it by variables specific to the person. 
Furthermore, there is interindividual variance in irony production performance. 
The question arising now is whether the individual difference variance can be fully 
explained by established traits, or whether there is something beyond. We argue that 
individual differences are linked to irony in two ways: First, the detection and production of 
verbal irony will be subject to established traits. Second, we expect individual differences in 
the extent to which people detect irony, produce irony, seek irony, or enjoy irony (i.e., the 
PART I 
 77 
sense of irony) over and above the variance shared with known variables. We will next 
present a set of hypotheses concerning those two notions. 
Explaining differences in irony performance by known traits and ability 
It can be assumed that established traits and abilities to a certain degree impact on the typical 
level of irony performance (i.e., in unobtrusive tasks), whereas general mental ability restricts 
the maximal level of performance (when being explicitly instructed to detect or produce 
irony). Involving cognitive and emotional processes, such as inferring another person’s belief 
about the current state of affairs and inferring, identifying and understanding emotions (Ziv, 
Leiser, & Levine, 2011), irony detection can be argued to be subject to personality traits with 
cognitive and emotional components, such as biased beliefs or emotional responses. The 
production of irony may be subject to traits influencing interpersonal and humorous behavior, 
such as teasing, acting, and joking (e.g., Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & Heerey, 2001). As 
one of these traits, the histrionic self-presentation style was conceptualized to also go along 
with irony production (Renner et al., 2008). Histrionic self-presentation is defined as “a way 
of shaping everyday interactions by explicit As-If-behaviors” (Renner et al., 2008, p. 1303). 
As-If-behaviors, typically employed in order to “gain attention, entertain others, liven up a 
situation, create good mood and to relieve stress and tension in oneself and others” (Renner et 
al., 2008, p. 1305), also encompass verbal irony. 
Once more bridging irony and humor, we would like to hypothesize a link between the 
mis-detection of verbal irony and the fear of being laughed at (gelotophobia, Ruch & Proyer, 
2008). The fear of being laughed at is a personality trait characterized by the bias to 
experience a broad range of social interactions involving humor (which gelotophobes 
generally misperceived as put-down humor if directed at them) and laughter (generally 
perceived as victimizing) as hurtful attacks, ridicule and contempt (see Ruch, Hofmann, Platt 
& Proyer, 2014, for a review). There are several reasons why gelotophobes can be assumed to 
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be prone to misses but also false alarms in irony detection whereas non-gelotophobes do not. 
First, gelotophobes are characterized by having a strong sensitivity towards offense (Titze, 
2009) and a low self-esteem (see Ruch et al., 2014). Being convinced to be deficient they can 
be considered to have a tendency to expect being criticized by others, especially in a derisive 
way, making them prone to suspect ironic compliments to be literal criticism. Secondly, given 
that “biting sarcasm” can be employed to ridicule others, gelotophobes may suspect irony 
when being addressed by compliments, because they have a bias to expect being ridiculed. 
Furthermore, irony can be used when putting down others in a derisive or sarcastic way. 
Hence, as a third possible explanation, gelotophobes may have experienced traumatizing 
events with ridicule conveyed by ironic compliments and thereupon –with a paranoid 
tendency to anticipated ridicule (Platt, Ruch, Hofmann, & Proyer, 2012)− view others as 
likely to address them with sarcasm. Hence, we assume that gelotophobia affects verbal irony 
detection, specifically when dealing with ironic compliments expressed via a mock criticism 
and also when dealing with literal compliments (in terms of a false positive irony detection).  
Aside from gelotophobia and still staying in the realm of humor, there is reason to 
expect that the temperamental basis of humor affects irony performance. High-scorers in 
seriousness (as assessed with the State-Trait Cheerfulness Inventory–STCI, Ruch, Köhler, & 
van Thriel, 1996) are described by “the preference for a sober, object-oriented communication 
style (for example, saying exactly what one means without exaggeration or ironic/sarcastic 
undertones)” (Ruch et al., 1996, p. 308). Thus, serious individuals, preferring a bona fide 
communication mode, may be inclined to miss out on irony when expecting pragmatic 
communication. Furthermore, seriousness might go along with a reduced readiness to process 
play signals typically going along with ironic teasing (Keltner et al., 2001).  
When looking at irony production, two different dispositions towards laughter and 
ridicule can be expected to be relevant: interindividual tendencies to either a) enjoying being 
laughed at (i.e., gelotophilia; Ruch & Proyer, 2009), or b) enjoying to laugh at others 
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(katagelasticism; Ruch & Proyer, 2009). While for example ironically criticizing oneself (by 
mock self-praise) might be a behavior aiming at making others laugh at one’s expense, ironic 
criticisms directed at others may serve to expose the reasons why others can be laughed at. 
Furthermore, bad mood (assessed with the STCI, Ruch et al., 1996) and especially the facet 
ill-humoredness (sullen, grumpy, grouchy feelings; Ruch et al., 1996) can be reasoned to go 
along with the expression of a negative attitude, hence making ironic criticisms more likely. 
General mental ability in terms of intelligence has been assessed in several of the 
studies comparing patients and healthy controls as to their irony detection performance. 
Gaudreau et al. (2013) for example report a substantial association between irony detection 
and executive functions (with 21% shared variance). Mitchley, Barber, Gray, Brooks, and 
Livingston (1998) found a comparable correlation between the rate of errors made when 
cognitively appraising the meaning of sarcastic utterances and a non-verbal measure of 
general intellectual ability (28% shared variance) but not with a measure of premorbid verbal 
intelligence among n =13 patients with schizophrenia. The authors explain the absence of a 
homologous relationship among healthy controls by the lack of variance in the irony 
performance task in this group (i.e., all controls answered all of the sarcastic items correctly). 
This implies that more difficult tasks are needed in order to avoid ceiling effects among 
healthy adults. Varga et al. (2014) report similar results when looking at the association 
between irony comprehension performance and general intelligence (27% shared variance). 
The strength of these relationships can be viewed as sufficiently high to demonstrate that 
there is meaningful variance in irony comprehension performance that relies also on 
intellectual ability, but sufficiently low to discriminate irony comprehension from general 
intellectual ability. As regards irony production, there is not more than a weak hint at the role 
of general mental ability with intelligence being slightly correlated (i.e., indicating 14% 
shared variance) to self-reported use of irony as assessed with one item (Milanowicz, 2013). 
PART I 
 80 
To conclude, our position is that there are meaningful differences in irony 
performance that we can make sense of in terms of explaining it by personality or general 
mental ability (intelligence). Although irony performance is argued to rely on processes and 
mechanisms that are subject to personality and intelligence, meaningful individual differences 
in irony performance may not be fully accounted for by established traits. This consideration 
leads us to hypothesize that there may be a trait that we label the sense of irony. Next to 
entailing an ability component (as assessed by the maximal performance), the sense of irony 
can be reasoned to have a habitual component (as assessed by the typical performance). Thus, 
we next look into how the “sense of irony” could be conceptualized and eventually measured. 
What is the sense of irony? 
We would like to bring to discussion that person-specific affective and cognitive processing 
patterns important for irony performance culminate in a trait that we label the sense of irony. 
Traits are relatively stable over time and consistent across situations. We hypothesize that 
when dealing with ironic utterances and situations eliciting the production of irony, a person’s 
irony performance also depends on his or her sense of irony. For a more complete 
understanding of irony (and for successful experimenting or assessment) we want to 
distinguish among the following components: First, maximal irony behavior must be 
distinguished from typical irony behavior. Maximal irony behavior refers to a person’s 
capacity to produce or detect irony. It determines the upper limit of possible performance in 
the sense of ability. Characteristically, the maximal irony behavior would be assessed with a 
performance test, just like intelligence. Typical irony behavior denotes a person’s habitual 
level of irony production and detection. If not explicitly instructed to watch out for irony (or 
produce such; i.e., in an unobtrusive test), the rate at which individuals detect (or produce) 
irony would resemble this habitual component. For example, cultural rules, habits and 
expectations may explain why a person can score high in an explicit irony production test but 
at the same time hardly ever uses irony in real life. Apart from these factors, we argue that the 
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sense of irony encompasses enduring tendencies toward a certain level of irony performance 
in relation to the upper limit of one’s full capacity. Furthermore, the sense of irony may 
predict the emergence of mind-sets facilitating or impeding irony detection and production. 
Therefore, individuals high in sense of irony may be inclined to get into a state (e.g., bad 
mood) where they are prone to produce irony more readily when joining a group and also 
have a higher readiness to detect playful signals cueing irony (facilitating irony detection). 
Assessment of the sense of irony 
There is a need to develop means of assessment that make variance in irony performance 
measurable. In general, tests are needed that allow for the assessment of habitual levels of 
irony performance (i.e., the typical behavior rather than only maximal behavior). This could 
be attained by unobtrusive tests or by means of utilizing more ambiguous stimuli.  
A test for the assessment of the sense of irony needs to employ items that are more 
difficult than the performance tasks and ad-hoc tests developed so far. Item difficulties should 
show a range allowing for a differentiation between subjects on the whole spectrum of the 
variable. Also, the evaluation of non-ironic distractor items is essential in order to cover false 
positive detection of irony (cf. Kreuz, 2000). In terms of signal detection theory (Green & 
Swets, 1966), research on verbal irony detection has –to our knowledge without exception− 
focused on factors leading to false negative detection of verbal irony, neglecting the 
investigation of false positive detection; i.e., taking literal language for verbal irony (false 
alarms). We hypothesize that the presumed phenomenon of false positive irony detection is 
not limited only to individuals with the fear of being laughed at (gelotophobia). Also non-
gelotophobes can be assumed to differ in their inclination to falsely detect irony in literal 
utterances. Given that situations involving literal language can be ambiguous and, therefore, 
misperceived, false positive irony detection can be considered to also have high relevance in 
social and professional functioning (such as joking, flirting, teasing, negotiating, debating, 
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etc.). Literal language is far more frequent than verbal irony, which according to Gibbs’s 
(2000) findings can be estimated to occur with a frequency of 8% of turns taken (in 
conversations among friends). Hence, the possibilities provided for mistaking literal 
utterances as irony are by nature more frequent than instances when ironic language could 
remain unrecognized.  
Outline of future directions and possible applications 
To summarize, we argued that irony can be described to get frequently used with a humorous 
intent, both in benevolent and disparaging ways. Furthermore, we reviewed evidence stressing 
the need for considering interindividual differences in irony performance. Also, we 
recommend developing assessment tools for both, the typical and maximal irony behavior in 
its different facets (i.e., considering also false positive irony detection).  
We propose that there are at least three ways to apply the assessment of individual 
differences in irony performance to new research questions. First, focusing on individual 
differences in irony performance is a prerequisite to study who is able (and inclined) to 
produce and experience the humor in irony (also in the disparaging part). Second, in the face 
of first evidence for regional differences in self-reported use of sarcasm (Dress, Kreuz, Link, 
& Caucci, 2008), new standardized tests can fuel cross-cultural research on irony. Third, 
correlates and mechanisms of irony performance can be studied in a more targeted (and more 
controlled) fashion if we develop tests tapping into interindividual variance in irony 
performance among healthy adults instead of resorting to subjects with disorders.
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Abstract 
Studies of irony detection have commonly used ironic criticisms (i.e., mock positive 
evaluation of negative circumstances) as stimulus materials. Another basic type of verbal 
irony, ironic praise (i.e., mock negative evaluation of positive circumstances) is largely 
absent from studies on individuals’ aptitude to detect verbal irony. However, it can be argued 
that ironic praise needs to be considered in order to investigate the detection of irony in the 
variety of its facets. To explore whether the detection ironic praise has a benefit beyond 
ironic criticism, three studies were conducted. In Study 1, an instrument (Test of Verbal Irony 
Detection Aptitude; TOVIDA) was constructed and its factorial structure was tested using N 
= 311 subjects. The TOVIDA contains 26 scenario-based items and contains two scales for 
the detection of ironic criticism vs. ironic praise. To validate the measurement method, the 
two scales of the TOVIDA were experimentally evaluated with N = 154 subjects in Study 2. 
In Study 3, N = 183 subjects were tested to explore personality and ability correlates of the 
two TOVIDA scales. Results indicate that the co-variance between the ironic TOVIDA items 
was organized by two inter-correlated but distinct factors: one representing ironic praise 
detection aptitude and one representing ironic criticism detection aptitude. Experimental 
validation showed that the TOVIDA items truly contain irony and that item scores reflect 
irony detection. Trait bad mood and benevolent humor (as a facet of the sense of humor) 
were found as joint correlates for both ironic criticism and ironic praise detection scores. In 
contrast, intelligence, trait cheerfulness, and corrective humor were found as unique 
correlates of ironic praise detection scores, even when statistically controlling for the aptitude 
to detect ironic criticism. Our results indicate that the aptitude to detect ironic praise can be 
seen as distinct from the aptitude to detect ironic criticism. Generating unique variance in 
irony detection, ironic praise can be postulated as worthwhile to include in future studies—
especially when studying the role of mental ability, personality, and humor in irony detection. 
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Introduction 
Ironic criticism and ironic praise can be distinguished as two basic types of verbal irony (cf. 
Kreuz & Link, 2002). The two types are structurally similar to each other as both involve 
mock evaluations of circumstances with a valence opposite to the speaker’s true appraisal. As 
the characteristic difference between the two, ironic praise is characterized by a negative 
valence in what is said and a positive valence in the appraisal that is ironically implied, while 
in ironic criticism the converse is true.8  
When we use irony, we typically utter something different from what we want to 
express, i.e., typically the opposite of our true appraisal of circumstances. Characteristically, 
we expect the listener to recognize our overt dissimulation by seeing through the 
counterfactual nature of our utterance and to eventually detect the intended meaning of what 
we say nonetheless (Groeben & Scheele, 2003). However, this is not always the case, as 
listeners may not detect the irony for certain reasons. For example, imperfect irony detection 
rates were found as a function of the ambiguity of the context of ironic utterances. 
Accordingly, Ackerman (1983) reports considerable average error rates in his irony detection 
task (ranging from 5.6% to 24.1% depending on the difficulty of the stimuli) in a control 
group consisting of college students. Furthermore, individuals differ in their aptitude to detect 
                                                
8 To illustrate: imagine that a circle of friends is watching a sports match and some of the 
attendees support Team A while other attendees support Team B. An example of ironic 
criticism would be if one of the supporters of Team A said “Terrific shot! You’re handing us 
a resounding defeat!” when a player of Team B tries but fails to score a goal in the match (for 
example when the speaker wants to ridicule the arrogant prediction made by one of the 
supporters of Team B that “their” Team B would win at a canter). In contrast, if one of the 
supporters of Team A said “Terrible shot! We don’t stand the slightest chance!” when a 
player of Team A scores a goal, this would be an example of ironic praise (for example when 
the speaker wants to ridicule one of the supporters of Team B for his or her arrogant 
prediction that Team A would lose the match in a sad spectacle of defeat). 
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verbal irony, which results in systematic variance in irony detection performance (e.g., 
Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, & Pincus, 1998; see Bruntsch, Hofmann, & Ruch, 2016, for 
an overview).  
In the studies investigating irony detection, a plethora of tasks and ad-hoc test has 
been used to assess individuals’ aptitude to detect verbal irony. However, most of these 
studies did not utilize both ironic criticism (as a mock positive evaluation of negative 
circumstances) and ironic praise (as a mock negative evaluation of positive circumstances). 
Rather, the stimuli used in the existing studies on irony detection mostly rely on ironic 
criticisms (such as in the form of sarcasm9), whereas ironic praise is not represented (e.g. 
Ackerman, 1983; Happé, 1993; McDonald & Pearce, 1996; Mitchley, Barber, Gray, Brooks, 
& Livingston, 1998). This is somewhat puzzling, as ironic praise can be found as 
counterbalanced with ironic criticism in the stimuli used in studies targeting different aspects 
of irony processing, such as when investigating processing times (i.e., response latencies) of 
ironic stimuli vs. their literal counterparts (Schwoebel, Dews, Winner, & Srinivas, 2000). 
Likewise, there are studies investigating perceived speaker’s intent in “ironic insults” 
(matching the definition of ironic criticism we adhere to; cf. Kreuz & Link, 2002) and “ironic 
compliments” (matching the definition of ironic praise) vs. direct insults and direct 
compliments, respectively (e.g., in terms of ratings of mocking and politeness, i.e., Pexman & 
Olineck, 2002).  
                                                
9 The terms “irony” and “sarcasm” are sometimes used interchangeably (e.g., Pexman & 
Olineck, 2002) and there is an ongoing debate as to whether sarcasm and irony are essentially 
the same thing (cf. Attardo, 2000). However, we wish to adhere to a demarcation between 
irony and sarcasm in terms of two naturally overlapping but conceptually distinct 
phenomena. For example, in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary sarcasm is defined as “a sharp 
and often satirical or ironic utterance designed to cut or give pain”. Irony can be seen as 
related to sarcasm because phrasing a criticism ironically was found to enhance the degree of 
perceived condemnation (as compared to phrasing it literally, i.e., Colston, 1997). In the 
present paper we will stick to the term irony (even if sarcasm is involved in a specific 
instance of irony), foremost because if any of the studies in our literature review use the term 
sarcasm, they originally refer to ironic sarcasm (rather than non-ironic sarcasm). 
 
PART II 
 87 
However, studies investigating irony detection have largely neglected the sampling of 
ironic praise stimuli. This may be owed to the view that ironic praise can be seen as the less 
prevalent and less “prototypically ironic” type of irony (cf. Kreuz & Link, 2002). However, a 
study by Langdon, Davies, and Coltheart (2002) demonstrated that stimuli containing ironic 
praise led to different results than ironic criticism stimuli. Langdon et al. (2002) used both, 
ironic criticism (labeled as sarcasm) and ironic praise (labeled as banter), and distinguished 
them in separate scores for their investigation of irony detection in schizophrenic patients vs. 
normally functioning control subjects.10 As Langdon et al. (2002) report, ironic praise was 
harder to detect than ironic criticism, especially in the group of patients with schizophrenia. 
Thus, it can be hypothesized that ironic praise may be the very type of irony that is affected 
by impaired or unusual cognitive and affective functioning. More generally, it may be 
suggested that ironic praise leads to meaningful interindividual variance in irony detection 
tasks beyond the one found for ironic criticism.  
 
Ironic criticism vs. ironic praise  
As detailed below, we argue that the two types of irony can be distinguished considering at 
least three aspects: (a) they have different purposes and functions in communication, (b) in 
irony detection ironic praise may depend on individuals’ expression of certain traits more 
                                                
10 Langdon et al. (2002) use the term banter when labeling the category of their stimuli 
containing a negative statement being used in a positive context (which corresponds to the 
definition of ironic praise we adhere to) without the intention to harm or to criticize, whereas 
their sarcasm stimuli were characterized by a positive statement used in a negative context 
(which corresponds to the definition of ironic criticism) with the intention to harm or to 
criticize. It is necessary to mention here that elsewhere bantering irony was conceptualized to 
occur not only in situations in which the speaker intends to ironically praise (i.e., in terms of 
kind banter) but also when ironically criticizing (i.e., in terms of sarcastic banter; cf. Anolli, 
Ciceri, & Infantino, 2002). However, as far as we can tell from their report, Langdon et al. 
(2002) used banter only in the form of kind banter (i.e., they did not include sarcastic banter 
involving ironic criticism) in their banter stimuli. 
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than ironic criticism, and (c) in irony detection they demand different cognitive and affective 
processes in individuals.  
(A) One may characterize that ironic praise is typically used for different purposes 
(for example good-natured “ironic teasing”; Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & Heerey, 2001) 
than ironic criticism (for example aggressive ridicule). In the form of teasing, ironic praise 
may be reasoned to be a way to humorously apprise the recipient of social norms when 
harmless transgressions occur—such as when using it as a playful provocation in socializing, 
flirting, or entertaining. In contrast, ironic criticism may be employed for the purpose of 
apprising the recipient of social norms when more severe transgressions occur—such as 
when resolving conflicts by aggressive ridicule (cf. Norrick, 1994; Keltner et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, as ironic praise is typically used in the face of positive circumstances, one may 
reason that ironic praise is more suitable than ironic criticism (which in turn is typically used 
in the face of adverse circumstances) for certain of the discourse goals found for verbal irony, 
such as to be funny or witty, to be humorous, and to play or to be silly (cf. Kreuz, Long, & 
Church, 1991).  
(B) The different functional aspects of the two types of irony (such as different 
utilities in social interaction) may affect the detection of ironic criticism and ironic praise 
differently, depending on individuals’ expression of certain traits, such as the sense of humor. 
As the notion that humor is a function of irony is pervasive in the literature (cf. Bruntsch et 
al., 2016), the sense of humor (which can be defined as relatively stable interindividual 
differences in the tendency to react to humor and to produce humor, and a serene attitude 
toward life; see Ruch, 1998) can be assumed to go along with the readiness to detect or mis-
detect verbal irony. Certain facets of the sense of humor may come into play more evidently 
in the detection of ironic praise than in the detection of ironic criticism. Furthermore, looking 
at ironic praise as a playful and light-hearted figure of speech, its detection may be facilitated 
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by cheerfulness (e.g., Ruch, Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996) more than this is the case for ironic 
criticism. This may be the case because highly cheerful individuals may process cues 
signaling playfulness more readily, which helps to reject the uttered negative evaluation and 
detect the more positive implication of ironic praise. Importantly, this may not hold true for 
ironic criticism, which may be seen as less playful and less jocular than ironic praise.  
(C) It can be argued that the norm violation that irony typically alludes to and 
criticizes (e.g., Garmendia, 2014; Utsumi, 2000) is harder to recognize in the case of ironic 
praise: it may be more obvious and hence easier to understand why ironic criticism is used. 
This may be because people generally have positive expectations (e.g., successful players in 
professional sports; cf. Kreuz & Link, 2002). Thus, the detection of ironic praise may require 
a more complex mental representation of the background of the ironic remark and a more 
effortful cognitive search for the antecedent event that ironic remarks typically refer to 
(Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989), as compared to the detection of ironic criticism. In line with 
this consideration, intelligence may be more relevant for the detection of ironic praise than 
for the detection of ironic criticism. If the role of intelligence truly was more evident in the 
detection of ironic praise, ironic praise should be included in irony research when mental 
abilities as well as mental impairments are targeted. 
 
Aims of the paper 
The current paper has three main aims. Firstly, a test for the assessment of irony detection 
with two different scales (i.e., ironic criticism vs. ironic praise) will be developed, opting for 
an indirect measurement format (Study 1). It is aimed to use two testing modes with different 
degrees of irony alertness: hiding the measurement intention from participants (i.e., irony 
non-alert mode) vs. making irony salient (irony alert mode). Using confirmatory factor 
analysis, the two-factor structure (corresponding to the distinction between ironic criticism 
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and ironic praise) will be tested. Secondly, in Study 2 we will validate the soundness of the 
stimuli and the indirect measurement by (a) using an experimental approach (i.e., comparing 
four testing conditions: irony alert testing, irony non-alert testing, forced ironic interpretation, 
and forced literal interpretation), (b) testing whether there is a convergence between the test 
scores and direct irony-ratings, and (c) comparing direct irony-ratings between ironic items 
and non-ironic distractor items (which should differ from each other). Thirdly, Study 3 will 
explore ability and personality correlates of the two scales. It is expected that ironic praise 
detection scores are at least as strongly related—if not even more strongly related—to (a) 
intelligence, (b) the ability to distinguish irony from a lie, (c) different facets of the sense of 
humor, and (d) traits constituting the temperamental foundation of the sense of humor (e.g. 
cheerfulness), as this is the case for the detection of ironic criticism. 
 
Study 1: Development of the Test of Verbal Irony Detection Aptitude (TOVIDA) 
It is assumed that there is meaningful interindividual variance in irony detection performance 
in terms of an irony detection aptitude. It is hypothesized that this aptitude comprises two 
facets: the aptitude to detect ironic criticism and the aptitude to detect ironic praise. After 
selecting those items with the most acceptable psychometric features, a confirmatory factor 
analysis will be employed to investigate whether the two predefined concepts used in the 
instrument (ironic criticism and ironic praise) are represented by two different structural 
components. A first sample will be used to determine psychometric properties under irony 
non-alert testing conditions, as this unobtrusive method can be reasoned to reflect 
individuals’ everyday mode of dealing with irony (i.e., usually, we do not deliberately watch 
out for irony). Then, a second sample will be used for cross-validation to see whether the fit 
of a two-factor model (i.e., ironic criticism vs. ironic praise) can be confirmed under irony 
alert testing conditions. Maximizing irony alertness can be reasoned to reduce systematic 
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noise in the interindividual variance. To specify: as some individuals may be more biased not 
to anticipate irony in a psychological survey than others, irony non-alert testing presumably 
would lead to artificial co-variance between the items. Furthermore, as the shared variance 
between items systematically depends on the interindividual variance that makes co-variance 
arise in the first place, this method can be seen as a source of data accommodating a more 
conservative test of the assumed model.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via university mailing lists, social platforms, and leaflets. Two 
independent samples were used. Sample 1 consisted of 152 German-speaking subjects (40 
males [35.7%]). Age in Sample 1 ranged from 18 to 51 years with a mean of 22.8 (SD = 5.8). 
Sample 2 consisted of 159 German-speaking subjects (39 males [32.5%]). Age in Sample 2 
ranged from 18 to 67 years with a mean of 24.1 (SD = 7.3).  
Materials 
Test of Verbal Irony Detection Aptitude-40 (TOVIDA-40). To develop a test for the 
assessment of irony detection aptitude, thirty scenarios containing ironic target utterances 
(among which 20 contained ironic criticism and ten contained ironic praise) and ten scenarios 
with non-ironic target utterances were written using a rational construction procedure. Irony 
detection was defined as the comprehension of the true meaning of ironic target utterances as 
opposite to the literal meaning in ambiguous situations short of distinct information. Each 
scenario consists of a short story about two or more people and culminates in a final utterance 
(the target utterance) made by one of the protagonists. Target utterances contain either verbal 
irony or literal speech. When generating the stimuli, irony was designed as follows: in the 
ironic utterances used in the ironic criticism stimuli, speakers (i.e., the story characters 
making the target utterance) use a choice of words which, when used non-ironically, denotes 
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a positive appraisal—while ironically implying an opposite (i.e., negative) appraisal. 
Conversely, as the characteristic feature of the utterances found in the ironic praise stimuli, 
speakers use a choice of words which, when used non-ironically, denote a negative appraisal 
of circumstances—while ironically implying an opposite (i.e., positive) appraisal. In the 
ironic criticism stimuli, speakers comment on a negative circumstance described in the short 
story (with a mock positive evaluation). In contrast, in the ironic praise stimuli, speakers 
comment on a positive circumstance (with a mock negative evaluation). In the TOVIDA-40, 
ironic utterances typically involve meta-messages indirectly implied by the speaker, such as 
when mocking the addressee’s overly self-critical or self-effacing attitude.11 
The scenarios are designed as ambiguous in order to warrant sufficient psychometric 
item difficulty, i.e., to avoid ceiling effects. This is why the stories still make some sense 
when irony is not detected in the ironic items (i.e., in the case of false negative detection) and 
when irony is falsely detected in the non-ironic items (i.e., in the case of false positive 
detection). Accounting for ambiguity in the process of irony detection, Utsumi (2000) points 
out that irony is distinguished from non-irony by assessing the degree to which a given 
utterance resembles prototypical irony. That is, not every ironic utterance unambiguously 
fulfills the constituting criteria of irony. Rather, the listener detects irony by assessing the 
similarity between a given utterance and a prototype of irony. Hence, ambiguity can be seen 
as a typical feature of real-life situations involving irony. However, in the scenarios of the 
TOVIDA-40 there are unobtrusive cues signaling the preconditions for the ironic utterance, 
i.e., hints to a reason for the speaker to express a negative attitude via ironic criticism or 
                                                
11 As speakers say something different from what they actually want to express, irony 
classifies as an indirect speech act, cf. Holtgraves, 1997). What makes irony different from 
other forms of indirect speech acts is that ironic speech acts are characterized by an overt 
insincerity. That is, ironic speakers achieve indirectness by engaging in an evident 
dissimulation when inversing the valence of their true appraisal in the verbatim utterance 
(i.e., especially by using a choice of words denoting the opposite of their true appraisal of 
circumstances, cf. Attardo, 2000, 2001b).  
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ironic praise (cf. Garmendia, 2014; Utsumi, 2000)12. In order to assess whether participants 
chose a literal or an ironic interpretation of target utterances, participants have to judge 
scenarios along statements about factual aspects of the situation or actors’ emotional states as 
causes or consequences of target utterances. A person detecting the irony correctly appraises 
the situation differently from a person not detecting the irony. The TOVIDA-40 was designed 
as an unobtrusive test that can be optionally administered without any mention of irony and 
distracts test-takers from its true measurement intention. Six statements are provided for the 
appraisal of the situation (to be rated on a four-point scale ranging from 1 = “does not apply 
at all” to 4 = “fully applies”), among which three are indicative of irony detection (see 
Appendix A2). The other three appraisal statements are designed to distract from the 
intention of the task. For example, there is a statement asking whether the protagonists 
behave like a typical male or female (according to his or her gender) provided for every 
scenario. A high item score in the ironic items indicates correct positive irony detection, i.e. 
the comprehension of the true meaning of ironic target utterances as opposite to the literal 
meaning. The ironic items are administered alternating with the non-ironic distractor items.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually using an online-survey. They were randomly assigned to 
one of two groups (labeled here as Sample 1 and Sample 2). They either were instructed 
without any mention of irony (Sample 1: irony non-alert testing) or provided with a 
definition of verbal irony and instructed to watch out for irony in the stimuli, i.e., they were 
                                                
12 As Garmendia (2014) argues, irony is always negative in terms of a critical attitude. That 
is, also in the case of ironic praise, which⎯as a meta-message⎯can be described to typically 
involve a hint to the transgression of (sometimes unwritten) rules, for example the norm of 
not to be vain, not to boast, not to be arrogant, not to be overly modest, not to make false 
promises, and so on. That does not mean that there is not another meta-message on a higher 
level that can be characterized as benevolent and more positive. For example, ironic teasing 
can be corrective and bonding at the same time, as the teaser implies that he or she thinks that 
the relationship with the teased person is strong and close enough to make playful 
provocation possible without risking a serious social damage (cf. Boxer & Cortés-Conde, 
1997; Norrick, 1994). 
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instructed that some of the scenarios they were about to appraise contain verbal irony 
whereas others do not (Sample 2: irony alert testing). Participants completed the TOVIDA-
40 after they filled in questions about their demographic features and German language 
proficiency. 
Preliminary Analyses 
In order to arrive at more reliable items scores, two of the three indicative statements were 
selected for every item applying a scale reliability criterion: inter-correlations between the 
three indicators were computed using Sample 1. The two indicators with the highest inter-
correlation were selected and averaged to generate the item scores. In order to attain a more 
economic form of the TOVIDA-40, corrected item-total correlations (CITCs) were computed 
and considered as a selection criterion. Ironic criticism and ironic praise items were analyzed 
separately in this step. For selection purposes, only Sample 1 was used. For each of the two 
sub-scales eight items showed CITCs of rcit ≥ .45 and were selected to build two scales to be 
analyzed in the further steps of Study 1. The sixteen selected ironic items and the ten non-
ironic distractor items taken from the TOVIDA-40 will be referred to as the TOVIDA in the 
following sections. 
Results 
Internal consistencies of the two resulting sub-scales were sufficiently high. Cronbach’s 
alpha was .83 (.76) for the ironic criticism scale and .83 (.77) for ironic praise scale in 
Sample 1 and Sample 2 (values for Sample 2 in brackets). 
Within the irony alert sample (Sample 2), the fit of two different structural equation 
models was estimated. In the assumed model, two inter-correlating factors were modeled: one 
factor was defined by ironic criticism items and the other factor by ironic praise items. In the 
control model, a single factor was modeled defined by both ironic criticism and ironic praise 
items. As it turned out, the assumed two-component model had acceptable fit (χ2 = 153.296, 
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df = 103; Bentler Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .906; root mean square error of 
approximation [RMSEA] = .056 [90% CI: .036; .073]; standardized root mean square 
residual [SRMR] = .0643). In contrast, the control model did not show acceptable model fit 
(χ2 = 227.025, df = 104; CFI = .771; RMSEA= .078 [90% CI: .071; .102]; SRMR = .0840). 
The path coefficients for the assumed two-factor model are given in Figure 1. As Figure 1 
shows, the ironic criticism scale and the ironic praise factors were substantially 
intercorrelated.  
 
Figure 1. Estimates for path coefficients in the two-factor model that was confirmed in Study 
1. 
Discussion 
The selection from the two types of items resulted in two scales with sufficient internal 
consistency. This indicates that there is an underlying irony detection aptitude creating shared 
variance in the items. Furthermore, the two-factorial structure could be affirmed, implying 
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that ironic praise generated unique variance in the TOVIDA. Hence, the findings of Study 1 
support the assumption that the aptitude to detect ironic praise is worth distinguishing from 
the aptitude to detect ironic criticism.  
 
Study 2: Experimental evaluation of the TOVIDA  
The stimuli employed in the TOVIDA were designed as ambiguous in order to warrant 
sufficient psychometric item difficulty, i.e., to avoid ceiling effects. Furthermore, irony 
detection is assessed indirectly in order to make a testing mode feasible in which subjects are 
non-alert to the occurrence of irony in the stimuli. So it was deemed necessary to validate that 
the stimuli of the TOVIDA truly contain irony, and if so, that high (vs. low) test scores truly 
indicate high (vs. low) irony detection performance. The aim of study 2 was to address these 
questions.  
Four criteria were defined to evaluate whether the TOVIDA allows for the assessment 
of irony detection: firstly, participants in the irony alert group are expected to have higher 
scores than participants in a forced literal appraisal group (i.e., participants instructed to 
view all items as non-ironic). This criterion reflects the consideration that there must be a 
group consensus among participants who know about the intention of the test that differs 
from a forced appraisal opposite to the designed ironic content. Secondly, participants in the 
irony alert group are expected to have higher scores than the ones in the irony non-alert 
group. The rationale of this criterion is that irony detection is facilitated when participants are 
instructed to watch out for irony (vs. being not informed about the possible occurrence of 
irony). Thirdly, a forced ironic appraisal group (i.e., participants instructed to view all items 
as ironic) is expected to have higher scores than the forced literal appraisal group. This 
criterion aims at ensuring that the appraisals used for the indirect measurement (and hence 
the item scores) are sensitive to irony detection. As a fourth criterion, the item scores within 
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the irony alert group are expected to be positively correlated with direct appraisals (i.e., 
explicit ratings) of ironic content (these were assessed only in this group). 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited in university lectures, via university mailing lists, social 
platforms, and leaflets. The sample consisted of 154 German-speaking subjects (26 male 
[16.9%]). Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 56 years with a mean of 24.8 years (SD = 7.8). 
They were randomly assigned to one of four testing conditions and the groups did not differ 
significantly as to age (F[3, 150] = 1.69, p = .17), nor gender (F[3, 150] = 0.085, p = .97). 
Instruments 
The Test of Verbal Irony Detection Aptitude (TOVIDA; see Study 1 for description and 
Appendix A2 for an example item). Item scores were computed following the method of 
Study 1. 
Procedure 
In an online-survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of four test conditions: (1) 
one group was given a definition of verbal irony, was briefed that some of the scenarios they 
were about to see contain verbal irony whereas others do not, and instructed to take all target 
utterances as ironic when appraising the scenarios along the predefined statements (forced 
ironic appraisal), (2) one group was given a definition of verbal irony, was briefed that some 
of the scenarios they were about to see contain verbal irony whereas others do not, and 
instructed to take all target utterances as literal while appraising the scenarios (forced literal 
appraisal), (3) another group was given a definition of verbal irony, was briefed that some of 
the scenarios they were about to see contain verbal irony whereas others do not, and 
instructed to watch out for irony when appraising the scenarios according to their own 
interpretation (irony alert), and (4) the last group was instructed to appraise the scenarios 
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according to their own interpretation without any mention of irony (irony non-alert). More 
specifically, the experimental instructions in the forced ironic appraisal group and the forced 
literal appraisal group briefed participants (a) to willfully view the last sentence in each of 
the situations as ironic or non-ironic, respectively, and (b) to respond to all of the concerned 
questions as if the last sentence was truly ironic or non-ironic, respectively. In the irony alert 
group, participants were requested to make direct appraisals (i.e., explicit ratings) of ironic 
content in addition to the standard appraisal. These explicit ratings of ironic content were 
assessed via a four-point Likert-type scale (1 = “not ironic, 2 = “rather not ironic”, 3 = “rather 
ironic”, 4 = “ironic”), accounting for the ambiguous nature of the scenarios. Participants in 
the alert group were considered lay judges for this purpose (for the use of laypersons for 
validation purposes see Legree, 1995). The irony alert group was randomly over-sampled in 
order to warrant sufficient sample size for the planned correlational analyses.  
 
Results 
Do the stimuli of the TOVIDA contain irony? 
Group means of item scores are given in Table 2. As Table 2 shows, all items met the 
criterion to verify that they contain irony. More precisely, in line with the expectations, the 
forced literal appraisal group had lower means than the irony alert group with medium to 
large effect sizes, indicating that generally irony is detected in ironic items. Furthermore, in 
the irony alert group item scores were generally higher than in the irony non-alert group with 
small to large effect sizes (however, only ten out of 16 of the comparisons yielded significant 
differences). In line with the expectation, being alert to irony facilitated irony detection.  
PART II 
 99 
Table 2 
Descriptive and Test Statistics of Group Scores in Study 2. 
 Test instruction (group)  Group comparisons 
Item 
1 
Non-ironic  
 2 
Ironic  
 3 
Alert  
 4 
Non-alert  
 
1 vs. 2  1 vs. 3  3 vs. 4 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  t(63) d  t(90) d  t(87) d 
IC1 2.17 0.57  3.18 0.54  2.54 0.67  2.47 0.72  -7.25* 1.83  -2.59* 0.58  0.45 0.10 
IC2 1.60 0.70  3.25 0.62  3.04 0.70  2.76 0.89  -10.09* 2.52  -9.06* 2.06  1.55 0.37 
IC3 1.36 0.42  3.23 0.86  2.82 0.88  2.00 0.89  -10.63* 2.65  -8.34* 1.89  3.92* 0.93 
IC4 1.37 0.55  3.50 0.72  2.64 1.05  2.13 1.06  -13.11* 3.26  -6.06* 1.37  2.05* 0.48 
IC5 1.90 0.64  2.88 0.59  2.46 0.57  2.35 0.75  -6.35* 1.60  -4.19* 0.95  0.80 0.18 
IC6 1.69 0.67  3.36 0.64  3.02 0.68  2.67 0.94  -10.23* 2.56  -8.62* 1.96  1.95 0.46 
                 Table 2 continues. 
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Table 2 continued.               
 Test instruction (group)  Group comparisons 
Item 
1 
Non-ironic  
 2 
Ironic  
 3 
Alert  
 4 
Non-alert  
 
1 vs. 2  1 vs. 3  3 vs. 4 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  t(63) d  t(90) d  t(87) d 
IC7 1.56 0.74  3.49 0.72  3.07 0.80  2.16 1.04  -10.52* 2.65  -8.54* 1.93  4.42* 1.04 
IC8 2.08 0.81  3.25 0.67  2.89 0.56  2.43 0.82  -6.37* 1.60  -5.48* 1.26  3.03* 0.72 
IP1 2.21 0.55  3.71 0.49  3.52 0.58  2.87 0.69  -11.59* 2.90  -10.13* 2.29  4.51* 1.06 
IP2 1.57 0.84  3.31 0.77  3.18 0.61  2.67 0.98  -8.66* 2.17  -10.32* 2.34  2.96* 0.70 
IP3 1.77 0.57  3.34 0.78  2.77 0.69  2.48 0.69  -8.93* 2.25  -6.66* 1.52  1.78 0.42 
IP4 1.38 0.48  3.34 0.93  2.95 0.88  2.38 1.01  -10.18* 2.55  -8.88* 2.01  2.61* 0.62 
                 Table 2 continues. 
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Note. IC1-IC8 = ironic criticism items; IP1-IP8 = ironic praise items. Non-ironic = forced literal appraisal (n = 28), Ironic = forced ironic 
appraisal (n = 37), Alert = irony alert testing (n = 64), Non-alert = irony non-alert testing (n = 25). d = Cohen’s d coefficient of effect size.  
* p < .05. 
 
Table 2 continued.               
 Test instruction (group)  Group comparisons 
Item 
1 
Non-ironic  
 2 
Ironic  
 3 
Alert  
 4 
Non-alert  
 
1 vs. 2  1 vs. 3  3 vs. 4 
M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  t(63) d  t(90) d  t(87) d 
IP5 2.01 0.52  3.05 0.69  2.94 0.51  2.57 0.54  -6.65* 1.67  -7.99* 1.81  3.02* 0.71 
IP6 1.90 0.67  3.43 0.52  3.22 0.55  3.01 0.78  -10.39* 2.60  -9.86* 2.24  1.40 0.34 
IP7 1.44 0.44  3.33 0.84  2.83 0.86  2.15 0.82  -10.87* 2.71  -8.09* 1.83  3.43* 0.80 
IP8 1.77 0.67  3.00 0.91  2.60 0.70  2.21 0.57  -6.03* 1.51  -5.28* 1.20  2.47* 0.59 
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Next, the direct appraisals of ironic content were examined to find out whether ironic 
items are viewed as more ironic than the non-ironic items. The frequencies of the single 
ratings were considered, given in Table 3. As Table 3 shows, ironic criticism items and the 
ironic praise items had numerically higher appraisals of being ironic (“rather ironic” and 
“ironic” answers) than non-ironic control items. It is noteworthy that the distributions of the 
proportions of ironic appraisals had a contact point: the ironic item with the lowest frequency 
of ironic appraisals (IC1) was judged about just as ironic as the non-ironic control item with 
the highest frequency of ironic appraisals (NC08). However, these two items can be seen as 
outliers in their group and as there was still a fair amount of judges consenting that the ironic 
items in question contain irony. Thus, they can be considered as difficult items but still 
containing irony. To test whether ironic criticism and ironic praise items were rated as more 
ironic than the non-ironic control items in the direct appraisals of ironic content, a mean of 
ratings over the eight items per scale was computed as well as the mean of ratings for the ten 
non-ironic control items. These scores were compared with paired sample t-tests. It turned 
out that the non-ironic control items were rated as less ironic (M = 1.59, SD = 0.38) than the 
ironic criticism items (M = 2.95, SD = 0.58, t[63]= -14.47, p < .001) and the ironic praise 
items (M = 3.23, SD = 0.54, t[63]= -18.16, p < .001), indicating large effect sizes (i.e., d = 
2.77 and d = 3.51, respectively).13  
                                                
13 An exploratory analysis indicated that ironic praise items were appraised as somewhat 
more ironic than the ironic criticism items with a medium effect size (d = 0.50). This is 
important to point out, as the direct appraisals are substantially correlated with the item 
scores (i.e., the indirect appraisals). The irony in ironic praise items hence can be seen as less 
difficult to detect than ironic criticism. It is not clear whether this is owed to the fact that the 
ironic praise items used in the present set of studies are less ambiguous than the ironic 
criticism items or whether ironic praise per se is easier to detect than ironic criticism. 
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Table 3 
Direct Irony Appraisal using Explicit Irony Ratings for the Single Items of the TOVIDA 
(Study 2). 
 Rating scale steps 
 “not ironic” 
 “rather not 
ironic” 
 
“rather ironic” 
 
“ironic” 
Items 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
IC1 19 (29.7)  19 (29.7)  12 (18.8)  14 (21.9) 
IC2 3 (4.7)  6 (9.4)  22 (34.4)  33 (51.6) 
IC3 6 (9.4)  17 (26.6)  15 (23.4)  26 (40.6) 
IC4 15 (23.4)  10 (15.6)  17 (26.6)  22 (34.4) 
IC5 10 (15.6)  16 (25.0)  20 (31.3)  18 (28.1) 
IC6 7 (10.9)  3 (4.7)  25 (39.1)  29 (45.3) 
IC7 6 (9.4)  8 (12.5)  17 (26.6)  33 (51.6) 
IC8 5 (7.8)  13 (20.3)  14 (21.9)  32 (50.0) 
IP1 5 (7.8)  6 (9.4)  8 (12.5)  45 (70.3) 
IP2 3 (4.7)  2 (3.1)  4 (6.3)  55 (85.9) 
IP3 10 (15.6)  20 (31.3)  16 (25.0)  18 (28.1) 
        Table 3 continues. 
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Table 3 continued.       
 Rating scale steps 
 “not ironic” 
 “rather not 
ironic” 
 
“rather ironic” 
 
“ironic” 
Items 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
IP4 7 (10.9)  5 (7.8)  23 (35.9)  29 (45.3) 
IP5 2 (3.1)  3 (4.7)  25 (39.1)  34 (53.1) 
IP6 2 (3.1)  3 (4.7)  13 (20.3)  46 (71.9) 
IP7 8 (12.5)  12 (18.8)  14 (21.9)  30 (46.9) 
IP8 11 (17.2)  12 (18.8)  23 (35.9)  18 (28.1) 
NC01 33 (51.6)  21 (32.8)  7 (10.9)  3 (4.7) 
NC02 49 (76.6)  14 (21.9)  1 (1.6)  0 (0) 
NC03 34 (53.1)  18 (28.1)  4 (6.3)  8 (12.5) 
NC04 37 (57.8)  20 (31.3)  2 (3.1)  5 (7.8) 
NC05 47 (73.4)  9 (14.1)  6 (9.4)  2 (3.1) 
NC06 34 (53.1)  23 (35.9)  6 (9.4)  1 (1.6) 
NC07 56 (87.5)  6 (9.4)  1 (1.6)  1 (1.6) 
NC08 18 (28.1)  20 (31.3)  13 (20.3)  13 (20.3) 
        Table 3 continues. 
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Table 3 continued.       
 Rating scale steps 
 “not ironic” 
 “rather not 
ironic” 
 
“rather ironic” 
 
“ironic” 
Items 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
 
f (%) 
NC09 46 (71.9)  15 (23.4)  2 (3.1)  1 (1.6) 
NC10 34 (53.1)  19 (29.7)  8 (12.5)  3 (4.7) 
Descriptive 
statistics   
 
  
 
  
 
  
MIC 
8.88 13.9  11.50 18.0  17.75 27.7  25.88 40.4 
SDIC 
5.49 8.6  5.68 8.9  4.33 6.8  7.24 11.3 
MIP 
6.00 9.4  7.88 12.3  15.75 24.6  34.38 53.7 
SDIP 
3.55 5.5  6.27 9.8  7.55 11.8  13.41 20.9 
MNC 
38.80 60.6  16.50 25.8  5.00 7.8  3.70 5.8 
SDNC 
10.84 16.9  5.48 8.6  3.80 5.9  4.03 6.3 
Note. N = 64. IC1-IC8 = ironic criticism items, IP1-IP8 = ironic praise items, NC01-NC10 = 
non-ironic control items. MIC / SDIC = mean / standard deviation for ironic criticism item 
ratings; MIP / SDIP = mean / standard deviation for ironic praise item ratings; MNC / SDNC = 
mean / standard deviation for non-ironic control item ratings.  
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Is irony detection reflected in the item scores of the TOVIDA? 
As Table 2 shows, the item score means of the forced ironic appraisal group were higher 
than item score means of the forced literal appraisal group, with large effect sizes. This 
indicates that a person will score high in all items if he or she detects the irony and score low 
if this is not the case. Finally, as expected, the direct appraisals (i.e., explicit ratings) of ironic 
content in the irony alert group correlated significantly with the respective item scores in all 
items with a mean of r(63) = .72, indicating good convergence between direct and indirect 
appraisals. This finding indicates that the TOVIDA test scores reflect the degree to which 
participants considered the stimuli as ironic. 
Discussion 
The results support the claim that, the ironic criticism and ironic praise stimuli used 
by the TOVIDA contain irony. Firstly, item scores were higher the group instructed to watch 
out for irony (i.e., the irony alert group) than in the group with experimentally induced 
minimal irony detection (i.e., in the forced literal appraisal group). This finding indicates 
that irony can generally be detected in the items of the TOVIDA (with a fair amount of 
interindividual variance, as shown by substantial standard deviations in irony alert and irony-
non alert individuals’ detection scores). Secondly, alertness to the ironic content of the 
stimuli fostered irony detection as the irony-alert group had higher item scores than the irony 
non-alert group in the majority of the items. Thirdly, the direct appraisals of the ironic 
content indicate that the ironic items were viewed as more ironic than the non-ironic items. 
There is also support for the claim that test scores reflect iron detection. Firstly, this was 
evident in terms of considerable differences between a group with experimentally induced 
minimal irony detection (i.e. in the forced literal appraisal group) and a group with 
experimentally induced maximal irony detection (i.e., in the forced ironic appraisal group). 
Secondly, the item scores corresponded well with direct appraisals (i.e., explicit ratings) of 
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ironic content. These findings indicate that the items of the TOVIDA assess irony detection 
performance and that the stimuli––although they were designed as ambiguous––were 
consented as containing verbal irony to an acceptable degree.  
 
Study 3: Exploring the usefulness of ironic praise in a study of irony detection 
correlates 
Study 3 aimed at exploring whether ironic praise stimuli have a benefit in the investigation of 
ability and personality correlates of irony detection. Among the preexisting studies assuming 
an individual differences perspective in irony research, Ivanko, Pexman, and Olineck (2004) 
explored the possibility to explain interindividual variance in an irony interpretation task (i.e., 
in terms of participants’ ratings of speaker’s intent, such as sarcasm, mocking, and 
politeness) by means of participants’ scores in “conversational indirectness” (i.e., the 
tendency to phrase one’s remarks indirectly and the extent to which a person looks for 
indirect meanings in the remarks of others, cf. Holtgraves, 1997). The present study aims to 
extend this and other previous work (e.g., Blouin & McKelvie, 2012) by (a) looking at irony 
detection (rather than irony comprehension as the interpretation of speaker’s attributes in 
ironic utterances) and (b) including intelligence and a broad range of personality traits as 
individual differences variables.  
As one of the hypothesized correlates, it may be argued that trait cheerfulness has a 
relevance especially to the detection of ironic praise as cheerful individuals may have a more 
positive outlook on themselves and others and hence be more inclined to expect jolly and 
jovial interactions involving playful ironic teasing rather than hostile and negative interaction 
involving serious ridicule, such as in the form of ironic criticism. Furthermore, certain facets 
of the sense of humor may be more relevant to the detection of ironic praise than to the 
detection of ironic criticism. According to Ruch and Heintz (2016a), the sense of humor 
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includes also two virtue-related facets, i.e., benevolent humor and corrective humor. As an 
accepting way of dealing with negative circumstances (e.g., human weaknesses), benevolent 
humor may be relevant especially to ironic criticism (typically occurring in the face of 
negative circumstances) but not as relevant to ironic praise (typically occurring in the face of 
positive circumstances). That is, individuals prone to use, enjoy, seek, and understand 
benevolent humor may have a higher aptitude to detect ironic criticism. The other facet is 
characterized by tendencies to wittily ridicule those who deserve it from a moral stance in 
terms of corrective humor. Importantly, irony is listed as one of the ways in which corrective 
humor manifests itself in speech. It can be argued that by exposing transgressions of social 
rules in a witty and playful way, corrective humor is conceptually more related to ironic 
praise than to ironic criticism, which in turn can be seen as the more serious and less 
ingenious form of irony. Hence, individuals who are prone to use, enjoy, seek, and 
understand corrective humor, may have a higher readiness to detect irony in the case of ironic 
praise more than in the case of ironic criticism. 
Furthermore, irony detection can be related to mental abilities⎯and presumably 
especially so in the case of ironic praise. According to previous studies (e.g., Mitchley et al., 
1998) intelligence can be seen as a prerequisite for the detection of ironic criticism. Under the 
presupposition that the detection of ironic praise poses a different cognitive challenge to the 
individual than the detection of ironic criticism, there may be a unique relationship between 
the detection of ironic praise and mental abilities. Hence, a test for the assessment of general 
mental ability (i.e., intelligence) will be employed. To include a measure of an ability more 
specific to irony detection, a task by Winner et al. (1998) will be jointly administered that 
was designed to assess the ability to discriminate between irony and lies among patients with 
brain damage. Simultaneously, by testing its convergence with the detection of ironic 
criticism and ironic praise, the convergent validity of the TOVIDA will be explored. 
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Accordingly, we expect that there are associations between ironic praise detection and 
individual differences variables that are robust beyond the influence of the variance the 
detection of ironic praise shares with the detection of ironic criticism. Moreover, it is 
expected that both of the two scales of the TOVIDA correlate positively with the irony/lie 
discrimination task, as the ability to distinguish irony from a lie can be seen as relevant to 
ironic praise to the same extent as to ironic criticism.  
As a secondary aim, the association between the two scales of the TOVIDA and the 
Big Five personality traits will be explored to learn more about the discriminant value of the 
irony detection measure. It is expected that the Big Five as broad personality dimensions 
distal to the sense of humor and distinct from mental ability are largely unrelated to irony 
detection scores. For exploratory purposes, again two testing modes will be employed with 
different degrees of irony alertness: hiding the measurement intention from participants (i.e., 
irony non-alert mode) vs. making irony salient (irony alert mode). As there are no 
comparable previous studies on personality and ability correlates of irony detection, it was 
preferred to include both the irony non-alert and the irony alert mode of testing in order to 
safeguard the investigation against a selective method bias. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited in university lectures, and by means of university mailing lists, 
social platforms, and leaflets. Two independent quasi-experimental groups were tested. The 
first group (irony non-alert testing mode) consisted of 103 German-speaking subjects (28 
male [22.0%). Age in Group 1 ranged from 18 to 38 years with a mean of 21.6 (SD = 3.5). 
Group 2 (irony alert testing mode) consisted of 80 German-speaking subjects (16 males 
[17.6%]). Age in this group ranged from 18 to 46 years with a mean of 22.7 (SD = 5.5).  
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Instruments 
The Test Of Verbal Irony Detection Aptitude (TOVIDA) was used for the assessment of irony 
detection performance (see Study 1 for description/Appendix A2). Item scores were 
computed following the method of Study 1. The scores of the eight ironic criticism items and 
the eight ironic praise items were averaged to build an ironic criticism detection score and an 
ironic praise detection score, respectively. The internal consistencies of the two scales were 
comparable to those found in Study 1. Cronbach’s alpha was .81 (.74) for the ironic criticism 
scale and .83 (.79) for the ironic praise scale in the irony non-alert group and the irony alert 
group, respectively (values for the irony alert group in brackets). 
 Achievement Measurement System 2 (LPS-2 [Leistungsprüfsystem 2]; Kreuzpointner, 
Lukesch, & Horn, 2013). The LPS-2 is a performance test for the assessment of general 
mental ability. It employs eleven subtests that are allocated to four of the eight dimensions 
proposed by Carroll’s (1993) model of intelligence, namely “crystallized intelligence” (e.g., 
solving anagrams), “fluid intelligence” (e.g., reasoning), “visual perception” (i.e., the ability 
to generate and process mental representations of spatial objects, to visualize, and to detect 
spatial patterns, e.g., mental rotation), and “cognitive speed” (e.g., arithmetic). A general IQ 
score is derived by aggregating the four subscales. Internal consistencies for subtests and the 
four dimensions are satisfactory in the norm sample with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .72 
to .95. The total internal consistency for form A (form B) is high in the norm sample, α = .96 
(α =. 97). Split-half reliability of subtests ranges from sufficient (rtt = .81) to high (rtt = .93). 
Validity is confirmed in terms of concurrence with a range of other tests of mental ability. 
Furthermore, the targeted dimensional structure of the test is confirmed. The LPS-2 can be 
administered in groups and takes around 60 minutes to complete.  
Irony/lie discrimination task (Winner et al., 1998). This task measures the capacity to 
attribute second-order mental state and the ability to distinguish between ironic statements 
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and lies. Subjects are required to read 15 short stories and to identify whether the final 
assertion is a lie or an ironic joke. There are eight stories involving a lie and seven stories 
implicating irony (in terms of intentionally and overtly uttering a counterfactual statement to 
a person known to be aware of the true circumstances). According to the characterization 
given by Winner et al. (1998), each story describes a context in which one person witnesses 
another individual breaking a rule sneakily (e.g., stealing food). The main difference between 
the two story types is that in the lie stories, the protagonist does not know that he or she had 
been seen doing the “sneaky action” and utters a lie to the witness to avoid getting caught. In 
the ironic stories, the protagonist knows he or she has been seen during the transgression and 
thereupon utters an ironic comment (i.e., a joke) to conceal his or her shame of being caught. 
For each story type (i.e., “joke” stories and lie stories), a separate score is generated by 
summing up participants’ individual false negative decisions (i.e., the discrimination errors).  
State-Trait Cheerfulness Inventory (STCI; Ruch et al., 1996). The STCI is a 
questionnaire measure for the components of exhilaratability as the temperamental basis of 
the sense of humor. The trait version (STCI-T) encompasses three scales assessing 
cheerfulness (e.g., “I have a "sunny" nature.”), seriousness (e.g., “I prefer people who 
communicate with deliberation and objectivity.”) and bad mood (e.g., “Even if there is no 
reason, I often feel ill-humored.”). In current study a 60-item short form of the STCI-T was 
used. The questionnaire assesses the endorsements of statements on a four-point scale 
(ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”). Internal consistencies in the 
present sample were comparable to the ones in the construction sample reported by Ruch et 
al. (1996) with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .80 (seriousness) to .95 (bad mood). 
Statements of Benevolent and Corrective Humor (BenCor; Ruch & Heintz, 2016a). 
The BenCor is a list of statements assessing two virtue-related facets of the sense of humor. 
Six statements are used for benevolent humor (e.g., “Even when facing unpleasant events I 
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can keep my distance and discover something amusing or funny in it”) and corrective humor 
(e.g., “I caricature my fellow humans’ wrongdoings in a funny way to gently urge them to 
change”), each. They were answered on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly 
disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Internal consistencies in the present sample were 
sufficient: Cronbach’s alpha was .75 for benevolent humor and .78 for corrective humor. 
Inventory of Minimal Redundant Scales (MRS-25 [Inventar Minimal Redundanter 
Skalen], Ostendorf, 1990; 25-item short form developed by Schallberger & Venetz, 1999). 
The MRS-25 is a list of 25 bipolar adjectives pairs for the assessment of the Big Five 
personality dimensions extraversion (e.g., impulsive vs. restrained), agreeableness (e.g., 
affirmative vs. oppositional), conscientiousness (e.g., diligent vs. lazy), emotional stability 
(e.g., robust vs. vulnerable), and culture (e.g., inventive vs. conventional). Answers are given 
on a six-point scale (very—quite—rather—rather—quite—very). Schallberger and Venetz 
(1999) report high internal consistencies of the scales and evidence for the validity of the 
MRS-25. Internal consistencies in the present sample were satisfactory with Cronbach’s 
alpha ranging from .72 (agreeableness) to .86 (conscientiousness and emotional stability). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in two consecutive sessions. In Session 1, groups up to 30 
persons completed the LPS-2 as the first part of a larger assessment battery also including 
measures that were unrelated to the present study in the laboratory, quasi-randomly assigned 
to form A or Form B, depending on their seating position (as to avoid influence by 
neighboring participants). Due to time constraints, all other measures were included in an 
online survey. Participants were assigned an individual code and provided with an invitation 
containing an URL directing them to the online survey (Session 2). Within seven days after 
Session 1, participants logged in and indicated their personal code for matching purposes. In 
Session 2, participants first completed the TOVIDA quasi-randomly assigned to one of two 
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conditions: Half of the groups tested in Session 1 were given a definition of verbal irony and 
were instructed to watch out for irony, i.e., they were told that some of the scenarios they 
were about to appraise contain verbal irony whereas others do not (irony alert condition). The 
other half took the test naïve to its true intention (irony non-alert condition), i.e. there was no 
mention of the possible occurrence of verbal irony. Subsequently, STCI-T, the Big Five 
measure (MRS-25), the sense of humor measure (i.e., the BenCor), and the irony/lie 
discrimination task by Winner et al. (1998) were completed.  
 
Results 
Is the detection of ironic criticism and ironic praise associated with abilities and 
traits? 
The correlations between the two subscales of the TOVIDA and the other measures are given 
in Table 4, for the irony non-alert and the irony-alert group separately. As Table 4 shows, the 
ironic criticism scale was correlated substantially with the ironic praise scale but not 
correlated significantly with the other measures in the irony non-alert group. However, there 
was a trend for an association between the ironic criticism scale and the visual perception 
dimension of the LPS-2 (i.e., spatial ability), the performance in the ironic items (i.e., the 
joke stories) of the irony/lie discrimination task by Winner et al. (1998), and culture. In the 
irony alert group, again the ironic criticism scale was correlated substantially with the ironic 
praise scale. Furthermore, as expected, there was an association between the ironic criticism 
scale and the performance in the ironic items of the irony/lie discrimination task by Winner et 
al. (1998). Furthermore, there was also a trend for an association between the ironic criticism 
scale and emotional stability. In line with the expectations, among the self-report measures, 
bad mood and benevolent humor showed a significant relation to the ironic criticism scale 
and there was a trend for an association with cheerfulness. Furthermore, there was also a 
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trend for ironic criticism detection showing an association with agreeableness and emotional 
stability.  
As expected, the ironic praise scale was significantly correlated with intelligence in 
terms of fluid intelligence and with the performance in the ironic items of the irony/lie 
discrimination task in the irony non-alert group. Furthermore, there was a trend for an 
association with visual perception and culture for the ironic praise scale. In the irony alert 
group, the ironic praise scale was associated with intelligence in terms of the LPS-2 
dimension visual perception (and there was also a trend for an association with the fluid 
intelligence dimension). Furthermore, the ironic praise scale again was negatively correlated 
with the number of errors made in the ironic items of the irony/lie discrimination task by 
Winner et al. (1998). Among the scales of the self-report measures, emotional stability, 
cheerfulness, bad mood, benevolent humor, and corrective humor showed significant 
correlations with the ironic praise scale. Furthermore, there was also a trend for an 
association with extraversion for the ironic praise scale in this group.  
Are there unique correlates for ironic praise beyond ironic criticism? 
Next, it was tested whether in the study of irony detection correlates ironic praise generates 
meaningful variance that contributes a surplus value over the meaningful variance found for 
ironic criticism. Therefore, partial correlations were computed between the ironic praise 
detection scale and the external variables while controlling for individuals’ ironic criticism 
detection scores. The partial correlations are given in Table 4. As can be seen in Table 4, in 
the irony non-alert group, ironic praise correlated positively with fluid intelligence and 
negatively with the error rate in the irony items of the irony/lie discrimination task even 
beyond the influence of the variance shared with ironic criticism detection. In the irony alert 
group ironic praise correlated positively with the visual perception dimension of the 
intelligence test, trait cheerfulness, trait bad mood (in a negative direction), and corrective 
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Table 4 
Correlations Between Irony Detection Scores and the Personality and Ability Measures 
(Study 3). 
 
TOVIDA test instruction 
 Irony non-alert  Irony alert 
Personality and ability 
measures IC IP IPp  IC IP IPp 
TOVIDA IP .52* - 
- 
 .46* - 
- 
Intelligence (LPS-2)   
 
   
 
Crystallized intelligence  .03 .04 .03  .00 .10 .11 
Fluid intelligence .05 .25* .26*  -.04 .17 .21 
Visual perception .15 .16 .09  .07 .28* .28* 
Cognitive speed -.07 .09 .14  .00 .14 .16 
General IQ .06 .22* .22*  .03 .23* .24* 
Irony/lie discrimination        
Irony (joke stories) -.17 -.27* -.23*  -.24* -.30* -.22 
Non-irony (lie stories) .09 .01 -.04  .10 .02 -.03 
     Table 4 continues. 
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Table 4 continued.      
 
TOVIDA test instruction 
 Irony non-alert  Irony alert 
Personality and ability 
measures IC IP IPp  IC IP IPp 
Big Five      
Agreeableness .11 .04 -.02  .17 .02 -.06 
Conscientiousness .05 .02 -.01  .05 .12 .12 
Emotional Stability .04 .03 -.01  .17 .24* .18 
Extraversion .06 .05 -.03  .01 .17 .20 
Culture .14 .19 .14  .04 .01 .03 
Temperamental traits        
Cheerfulness -.03 -.08 -.07  .20 .29* .23* 
Seriousness -.08 -.04 -.01  -.07 -.04 -.01 
Bad Mood -.03 .01 .04  -.34* -.35* -.23* 
Sense of Humor        
Benevolent Humor .11 .07 .03  .24* .30* .22 
Corrective Humor -.05 -.06 -.06  .09 .26* .25* 
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Note. n = 97-103 irony non-alert individuals. n = 80 irony alert individuals. IC = ironic 
criticism scale of the TOVIDA, IP = ironic praise scale of the TOVIDA. Sense of Humor = 
scales of the BenCor. IPp= partial correlations with IP controlling for the influence of IC. 
* p < .05 (two-tailed). 
 
humor over and above the variance that the ironic criticism scale shared with ironic praise 
and these variables. 
 
Discussion 
The findings of Study 3 indicate that assessing the detection of ironic praise can provide a 
surplus value over the detection of ironic criticism. Ironic praise detection can be seen as 
more challenging than the detection of ironic criticism in terms of numerically higher 
associations as well as significant partial correlations with the intelligence measure when the 
influence of the aptitude to detect ironic criticism was controlled for.14 Hence, ironic praise 
detection appears to be dependent on mental ability to a certain degree, which is in line with 
previously reported findings on the role of intelligence in irony detection (e.g., Mitchley et 
al., 1998). However, considering the numerical size of the correlations, ironic praise detection 
aptitude can be seen as distinct from intelligence. Furthermore, as expected, it was found that 
the detection of ironic praise was uniquely associated with corrective humor, while ironic 
criticism was related only to benevolent humor. Also, cheerfulness played a unique role in 
the detection of ironic praise. Possibly increasing the readiness to process humorous meta-
                                                
14 Differential associations between the two scales of the TOVIDA and the intelligence 
variables could be explained by differences in average item difficulty. As ironic praise items 
were more frequently appraised as ironic than ironic criticism items in Study 2, it is possible 
that the lack of association between the ironic criticism scale and intelligence hence might be 
an artifact created by higher ambiguity of the materials. This may be the case because 
intelligence may foster irony detection only when items have a low ambiguity. 
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messages or playful cues in ironic teasing, a cheerful temperament hence can be assumed to 
facilitate the detection of irony, foremost in the form of ironic praise.  
The Big Five personality traits were largely unrelated to irony detection scores except 
for a correlation between the ironic praise scale and emotional stability. It can be assumed 
that emotionally stable individuals have a higher readiness to reject the uttered criticism in 
what is literally said and recognize the more benevolent nature of what is ironically implied 
in the ironic praise items, compared to individuals low in emotional stability (who in turn 
may not “get over” the criticism or insult uttered in ironic praise). Although there was also a 
trend for an association between the irony detection scores on the one hand and culture and 
agreeableness on the other, the Big Five can be seen as less relevant for irony detection than 
narrower and more humor-related traits. Moreover, participants’ scores in the TOVIDA 
converged with their scores in the ironic items of the irony/lie discrimination task, indicating 
convergent validity of the TOVIDA.  
Do ability and personality variables interact in irony detection? 
As an exploratory analysis complementing our correlational analyses, we wish to address the 
possibility that ability and personality variables interact in irony detection. To illustrate, 
although intelligence was found as positively related to irony detection, there might be highly 
intelligent individuals who still perform poorly in irony detection because they lack the 
requisite personality traits facilitating irony detection. Guided by the findings displayed in 
Table 4, we explored the data from Study 3 to see whether interactions between intelligence 
and personality could be found to predict irony detection beyond the main effects of the 
separate variables. Indeed, this assumption was found to hold true in one of the cases that we 
studied: in the irony-alert sample the interaction between the spatial ability dimension of the 
LPS-2 (i.e., visual perception) and benevolent humor predicted ironic praise detection 
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significantly by explaining incremental variance beyond the main effects of the single 
predictors.  
A hierarchical regression analysis with two steps was computed with the ironic praise 
detection score as the criterion. In Step 1, visual perception (β = .25) and benevolent humor 
(β = .26) were significant predictors, F(2, 77) = 6.70, p = .002. As it turned out, the 
interaction term (computed as the simple multiplication of visual perception and benevolent 
humor scores) explained a significant increment of criterion variance when added to the 
equation in Step 2, F(3, 76) = 7.27, p < .001; ΔR2 = .075, p = .008. As a possible 
interpretation of this finding, intelligence could be seen as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for irony detection, as irony detection may be facilitated by individuals’ cognitive 
ability only if individuals have enough sense of humor to successfully deal with irony. The 
inverse may also be true: the sense of humor may only manifest itself in irony detection 
performance if individuals have the necessary ability to successfully deal with its cognitive 
demands. 
General Discussion 
Our findings support the assumption that the detection of ironic criticism and the detection of 
ironic praise can be found as two intercorrelated but still discriminant facets of irony 
detection aptitude. Furthermore, our findings substantiate the assumption that ironic praise is 
useful beyond ironic criticism: applied in an investigation of ability and personality 
correlates, the detection of ironic praise was found to be uniquely associated with certain 
variables (i.e., intelligence, trait bad mood, trait cheerfulness, and the corrective facet of the 
measure of the sense of humor,) beyond the influence of ironic criticism detection aptitude.  
Extrapolating our findings, we may propose assumptions as to why more intelligent 
individuals high in cheerfulness and low in bad mood with high scores in benevolent and 
corrective humor may have a higher readiness to detect the irony in ironic praise. Maybe they 
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are more able or ready to (a) reason and infer the meta-message of an ironic praise (i.e., fluid 
intelligence), (b) generate an easily interpreted mental “image” of the background of an 
ironic remark (i.e., visual perception as the ability to generate mental representations, to 
visualize, and to detect patterns), (c) take into account playful and humorous communicative 
intentions in terms of the processing of exhilarant stimuli (i.e., high trait cheerfulness and low 
trait bad mood), (d) have a smiling attitude toward the imperfections of life (e.g., human 
weakness) and know how to deal with them by using benevolent humor (i.e., in terms of the 
principle “it takes one to know one”), and (e) expose transgressions of morally valued social 
rules by using irony with satirical meta-messages in order to educate and better social others 
(i.e., the tendency to produce, to enjoy, and to make sense of corrective humor). 
The role of irony alertness 
There was an irregularity in the findings of Study 3 (which, however, occurred in a quite 
constant fashion): in the irony non-alert group, the association between the personality 
variables and irony detection was not evident compared to the irony alert group. As a 
possible explanation for this finding, participants in the irony non-alert sample may have 
been biased towards expecting a bona fide communication mode, as in the given 
psychological assessment situation a serious state of mind may have been induced. This 
consideration may have an implication for the assessment of irony detection in general terms, 
as in many of the pre-existing measurement procedures for the assessment of irony detection 
irony alertness is reduced by not mentioning to participants that the stimuli they are about to 
encounter contain irony and by using indirect measurement (i.e., not asking the participants 
directly whether they think that there is irony in a stimulus).15 At least as far as the study of 
                                                
15 In previous studies indirect measurement of irony detection was operationalized for 
example by resorting to fact questions (e.g., Ackerman, 1983; Happé, 1993), using questions 
targeting mental states of the speaker and emotions of the target of the ironic utterance (e.g., 
McDonald & Pearce, 1996), asking whether it made any sense for the speaker to make the 
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personality and ability correlates of irony detection is concerned, it can be seen as worthwhile 
to further explore the benefit of maximizing irony alertness and using direct testing. 
Is the TOVIDA too difficult? 
In the construction of the TOVIDA we assumed that, in order to tap into the variance in irony 
performance among normally functioning adults, psychometrically difficult items need to be 
employed (as to avoid ceiling effects). Notably, there is a trade-off between item difficulty 
(i.e., ambiguousness of the stimuli) and test-takers’ consensus as to the ironic nature of the 
stimuli. Certainly, the items should not be too difficult to allow for a sufficient consensus 
among test takers as to whether irony is present in the stimuli or not. However, a fair amount 
of variance (i.e., an imperfect consensus) can be argued to be admissible as this variance (a) 
must be expected when conceptualizing irony detection aptitude as an approximately 
normally distributed variable, and (b) is rooted in the nature of the construct when dealing 
with phenomena involving an inherent uncertainty, which—apart from irony— can also be 
found for example in certain knowledge domains. Accordingly, Legree (1995) for example 
argues in favor of a Likert-based assessment of social intelligence because of the level of 
uncertainty involved in the stimuli. He characterizes the challenge of assessing knowledge of 
ambiguous relationships when he states that “situational judgment scales attempt to simulate 
everyday problem situations but cannot allow the formulation of unambiguously ‘correct’ 
solutions. This ambiguity partially reflects real-world interpersonal interactions, which are 
often ambiguous […]” (Legree, 1995, p. 249).  
The possible role of self-involvement 
In the TOVIDA, test-takers have to make sense of situations containing verbal irony from an 
observer’s perspective (i.e., with low self-involvement). It would also be thinkable to test 
irony detection performance using self-involving situations, such as when instructing test 
                                                                                                                                                  
target utterance (e.g., Langdon & Coltheart, 2004), or rewording the use of irony as “joking” 
(e.g., Winner et al., 1998). 
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takers to place themselves into the respective situation as if they would encounter them in 
real life. Importantly, this may lead to certain variables coming into play more prominently as 
correlates of irony detection performance. For example, self-involvement may accentuate the 
association between ironic praise detection and emotional stability. If a specific instance of 
ironic praise is an interpersonal evaluation, emotionally unstable individuals may be more 
attached to the negative interpersonal valence of the verbatim utterance (which can occur in 
the form of a mock critical offense) and hence may be less prone to reject the literal 
interpretation of the ironic remark⎯and importantly so this mechanism may be accentuated 
as self-involvement in the assessment of irony detection increases. This consideration may 
also apply to certain other traits, such as self-esteem or the fear of being laughed at (i.e., 
gelotophobia; cf. Ruch, Hofmann, Platt, & Proyer, 2014). For example, because of their 
general belief to be inherently ridiculous and deficient, gelotophobes may be sensitive to 
derisive ironic criticism especially when self-involvement is high. Accordingly, future studies 
investigating traits relevant to derisive criticism or offense in irony detection should explore 
the benefit of self-involving test stimuli and instructions. 
Conclusions 
Ironic criticism and ironic praise can be seen as separate scales in irony detection. The two 
types of irony were differently related to ability and personality variables, as ironic praise 
detection showed unique associations with intelligence and certain traits. Hence,⎯at least as 
far as the stimuli used in our investigation are concerned⎯ironic praise can be postulated to 
generate variance with surplus meaning beyond the variance generated by ironic criticism in 
irony detection. Consequently, ironic praise as the less “prototypical” and formerly neglected 
type of irony and can be postulated as especially important to include when studying the role 
of ability, personality, and humor in irony detection. 
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Abstract 
As humor has pervasively been postulated as a function of irony, humor-related traits such as 
the joy of laughing at others (i.e., katagelasticism) or trait seriousness can be assumed to 
predict who is more and who is less inclined to use verbal irony⎯even beyond the possible 
effect of broad personality dimensions. For the present study, N = 153 subjects made 
responses in two different irony use measures and completed personality questionnaires. As 
expected, irony use scores were higher among individuals who tend to break with social 
conventions, joyfully expose others’ transgressions, or aggressively use ridicule (i.e., 
individuals scoring high in psychoticism, katagelasticism, or the aggressive humor style). 
Moreover, irony use was more prevalent among playful individuals who tend to entertain 
others by joyfully exposing themselves as the butt of jokes or engaging in as-if behaviors 
(i.e., low-serious individuals, scoring high in gelotophilia or the histrionic self-presentation 
style). Using a hierarchical regression analysis, it was found that over and above redundancy 
katagelasticism and⎯unexpectedly so⎯the self-defeating humor style predicted irony use 
beyond the influence of psychoticism. Accordingly, irony may also be seen a way to hide 
negative feelings behind humor and to avoid dealing constructively with problems. 
 
Keywords: Humor, Irony, Katagelasticism, Psychoticism, Ridicule, Self-defeating 
humor style, Seriousness, STCI 
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Introduction 
When we use verbal irony, we typically utter something different from what we actually want 
to say, for example by using counterfactual utterances or stating the opposite of what we 
mean (e.g., Haverkate, 1990). Characteristically, we expect the addressee to see through this 
dissimulation and detect what we actually want to express nevertheless (cf. Groeben & 
Scheele, 2003). Initial studies have investigated cultural or situational factors predicting irony 
use—for example by comparing the prevalence of irony use between groups from collectivist 
and individualist cultures (e.g., Rockwell & Theriot, 2001) or between different experimental 
conditions (such as computer-mediated vs. face-to-face communication, i.e., Hancock, 2004). 
However, the investigation of irony use as an enduring tendency—stable across different 
settings or situational contexts—and its relation to personality traits has not been targeted yet. 
Introducing an individual differences perspective in irony research, Bruntsch, 
Hofmann, and Ruch (2016) advocate that the tendency to use irony can be expected to 
systematically differ between individuals, depending on personality traits. Previous findings 
indicate that indeed (a) there is interindividual variance in irony use in terms of considerable 
standard deviations (e.g., Matthews, Hancock, & Dunham, 2006), and (b) this variance is 
meaningful (rather than negligible “noise”) as it can be explained by trait variables relating to 
the utility of irony. That is, Averbeck and Hample (2008) found that individual differences 
variables related to interpersonal aggression, such as verbal aggressiveness, were associated 
with irony use.16 
The role of aggression as a function of irony—foremost in its sarcastic form—is well 
established in irony research (e.g., Dews, Kaplan, & Winner, 1995). Likewise, the notion that 
                                                
16 In the course of evaluating the German adaptation of the irony use measure introduced by 
Averbeck and Hample (2008), we found that the irony use scale of this instrument (consisting 
of ten items) had a sufficient internal consistency to support the assumption that irony use 
varies (a) systematically between individuals and (b) to a relatively small extent within 
individuals in terms of an enduring tendency to use irony (α = .83, N = 97). 
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humor is a function of irony is pervasive in the existing literature. For example, laypersons 
were found to view humor as a reason why irony is used (e.g., Roberts & Kreuz, 1994). 
Furthermore, indicating that humor is a motive for irony use, Matthews et al. (2006) found 
that humorous ironic options were chosen more frequently than less humorous ironic options 
in their irony use measure. From a theoretical stance, if humor is considered also in the 
disparaging part of its spectrum (cf. Zillmann, 1983), irony can be seen as related to humor 
because it is suitable for victimizing others while having a humorous effect on bystanders (cf. 
Garmendia, 2014).  
Accordingly, Bruntsch et al. (2016) hypothesized that a range of humor-related 
personality traits may be associated with the use of irony. Namely, these are trait seriousness 
and trait bad mood (Ruch, Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996), certain dispositions to laughter and 
ridicule (i.e., katagelasticism and gelotophilia; Ruch & Proyer, 2009), the histrionic self-
presentation style (i.e., the inclination to engage in as-if behaviors; Renner, Enz, Friedel, 
Merzbacher, & Laux, 2008), and the sense of humor (in terms of stable interindividual 
differences in the way people react to and produce humor and a cheerfully composed attitude 
toward life; see Ruch, 1998).  
As an approach to conceptualize the sense of humor, Martin, Puhlik-Doris, Larsen, 
Gray, and Weir (2003) introduced four humor “styles” relating to individual differences 
humor use: the affiliative, self-enhancing, aggressive, and self-defeating humor style. As 
irony was reported relate to aggression and humor, the aggressive humor style presumably is 
relevant for the present research question. Furthermore, as irony can be seen as a means of 
interpersonal bonding when used in ironic teasing (cf. Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & 
Heerey, 2001), the affiliative humor style (as the tendency to use humor to enhance one’s 
relationship with others in a benign and self-accepting way; Martin et al., 2003) is expected 
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to be positively associated with irony use. We did not have any hypotheses for the other two 
(i.e., self-enhancing, self-defeating) humor styles. 
Eysenck’s personality dimensions may be used to control for the influence of broad 
personality dimensions (i.e., extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism; cf. Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1991). They were preferred to the Big Five dimensions of personality in the present 
study because psychoticism is not entailed in the Big Five model but may have a special 
importance for our research question. A person scoring high in psychoticism is characterized 
as aggressive, cold, egocentric, impersonal, impulsive, antisocial, unempathic, creative, and 
tough-minded (cf. Eysenck, 1992). Hence, individuals with higher (vs. lower) scores in 
psychoticism may be less (vs. more) inhibited by social norms (such as kindness and 
sympathy) and hence be more (vs. less) prone to use irony in order to expose and ridicule 
others’ transgressions. Extraversion can be seen as relevant for the present research question 
because humor behaviors (including irony use) involve positive emotions, which are typically 
more frequent in extraverts than in introverts (cf. Ruch & Deckers, 1993). Likewise, 
emotionally stable individuals may be more inclined to risk offending others by using playful 
provocation in terms of ironic teasing (cf. Keltner et al., 2001) than neuroticistic individuals.  
The aim of this paper is to explore whether (a) broad personality dimensions and 
humor-related traits predict irony use and, if this is the case, whether (b) humor-related traits 
have an incremental value over broad personality dimensions in this prediction. As a 
prerequisite, it is expected that there is systematic interindividual variance in irony use in 
terms of an enduring tendency manifesting itself in a substantial inter-correlation between 
scores of different measures of irony use. It is hypothesized that traits facilitating humor-
related behavior (i.e., gelotophilia, katagelasticism, the aggressive and the affiliative humor 
style, and the histrionic self-presentation style) as well as trait bad mood will predict irony 
use in a positive direction, just as traits impeding humorous behavior (i.e., trait seriousness) 
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will predict the use of irony in a negative direction. Furthermore, it is expected that irony use 
correlates positively with extraversion and psychoticism but negatively with neuroticism. 
Due to the ubiquitous assumption that humor and irony overlap, the relevant humor-related 
traits are expected to explain incremental variance in irony use behavior beyond the possible 
influence of Eysenck’s personality dimensions.  
 
Method 
Sample. 
Participants were recruited via university mailing lists and social platforms. The sample 
consisted of 153 German-speaking subjects (39 male [25%]; age: 18 to 69 years, M = 26.4, 
SD =10.4). 
Instruments 
Irony use measures 
Forced choice irony use measure. The forced choice measure for the assessment of irony use 
is taken from Matthews et al.’s (2006) materials, translated into German (using a translation 
and back-translation procedure), and adapted. Participants have to give a response to each of 
eight different situations by choosing between four (i.e., one ironic and three non-ironic) 
options. There are two response options added to the original method by Matthews et al. 
(2006, Experiment 4), which serve as distractors: one is designed as a non-ironic aggressive 
response and one designed as a non-ironic humorous response. With only two options 
provided, it can be seen as hard to distinguish whether participants choose a response because 
they are appealed by this response or because they reject the other response. There are four 
situations providing a mock positive evaluation of negative circumstances (ironic criticisms), 
and four situations that provide a mock negative evaluation of positive circumstances (ironic 
praise) as the ironic response option. Participants have to indicate what they most likely 
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would say in place of the respective person in the given situation. Scenarios were also 
adapted to be eliciting the use of irony by including “antecedents” (cf. Kreuz & Glucksberg, 
1989) in the scenario descriptions that hinted at violations of positive expectancies or norms 
that give reason for conveying a critical attitude via an ironic remark (cf. Garmendia, 2014). 
It may be illustrating to take a look at the following scenario used in the present study: “You 
and Chris have been friends all through university. As long as you’ve known him, Chris has 
always been very careful about his appearance and often wears designer clothes. At your 
graduation ceremony, no one was surprised when Chris showed up wearing a new Armani 
suit under his gown. During the ceremony he kept fumbling around with his tie knot, 
discontented, to adjust it to perfect fit.”. The last sentence was added to Matthews et al.’s 
(2006) original scenario in order to make the ironic response option occur more 
characteristically (as in this case vanity can be seen as a transgression of a social norm that is 
suitable to be addressed by ironic praise in a teasing manner). The response options provided 
for this scenario read as follows: “Gosh Chris, you’re looking a little scruffy for the big 
ceremony.” (ironic praise), “That’s really a great suit, Chris.” (non-ironic praise), “Gosh 
Chris, don’t be such a peacock!” (non-ironic aggressive criticism), and “I wish I was able to 
tie a tie knot like this in the first place!” (non-ironic humorous response). A total score 
counting participants’ choices of ironic responses (with a minimum possible value of zero 
and a maximum possible value of eight) was computed. 
Rating-based irony use measure. The rating-based measure for the assessment of 
irony use is taken from Averbeck and Hample (2008) and translated into German (using a 
translation and back-translation procedure). Participants are provided with a detailed scenario 
in which they are asked to assume the perspective of a person who shares a flat with a friend 
who—among other misconducts—is messy and does not pay the bills for the flat. Participants 
are asked to indicate on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“not likely at all”) to 4 (“very 
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likely”) how likely they were to use each of 20 utterances. Among the utterances each of ten 
criticisms (e.g., regarding noise in the flat or unpaid bills) is communicated once ironically 
and once non-ironically. In the total score, the responses to the ten ironic items were 
corrected for the general tendency to utter criticisms by subtracting the average endorsement 
of the ten literal criticisms (α = .79) from the average endorsement of the ten ironic criticisms 
(α = .81).  
Personality and trait measures 
The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-RK) in the German adaptation and 
short form by Ruch (1999) of the English version (EPQ-R; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991) was 
used for the assessment of psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism in terms of Eysenck’s 
model of personality. The 50-item questionnaire contains the three named content scales and 
a lie-scale. The answer format is dichotomous (“yes” or “no”). Internal consistencies in the 
present sample ranged from α = .52 for psychoticism to α = .85 for neuroticism. 
State-Trait Cheerfulness Inventory (STCI-T<60>; Ruch et al., 1996). The STCI-
T<60> is the trait version of the established questionnaire for the assessment of the 
components of exhilaratability as the temperamental basis of the sense of humor. The STCI-
T<60> encompasses three scales assessing the traits cheerfulness, seriousness, and bad mood 
with 20 items each. Items are answered on a four-point scale (ranging from 1 = “strongly 
disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”). Internal consistencies in the present sample ranged from α 
= .81 (seriousness) to α = .95 (bad mood). 
Humor Styles Questionnaire (HSQ; Martin et al., 2003; German version by Ruch & 
Heintz, 2016b). The HSQ consists of 32 items measuring four humor “styles” (the affiliative, 
self-enhancing, aggressive, and self-defeating humor style). The instrument uses a seven-
point Likert-scale from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”). Internal consistencies in 
the present sample ranged from α = .75 (self-defeating) to α = .81 (self-enhancing).  
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  The PhoPhiKat-45 (Ruch & Proyer, 2009) is a questionnaire for the assessment of 
gelotophobia (i.e., fear of being laughed at), gelotophilia (i.e., joy of being laughed at), and 
katagelasticism (i.e., joy of laughing at others; 15 items each) employing a four-point answer 
format (1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”). Internal consistencies in the present 
sample ranged from α = .85 (katagelasticism) to α = .88 (gelotophobia).  
 The As-If Scale (AIS, Renner et al., 2008) assesses the histrionic self-presentation style as an 
inclination to humorously shape everyday interactions by using as-if behaviors such as 
acting, role-playing, or imitating. It consists of eight items and employs a four-point answer 
format (1 = “does not apply at all” to 4 = “totally applies”). The internal consistency of the 
AIS in the present sample was α = .81. 
 
Procedure  
Participants were tested via an online survey. As the completion of the irony use measures 
was reasoned to be more susceptible to priming and carry-over effects (possibly generating 
artificial co-variance between the irony use measures and the trait measures) than the 
assessment of stable and enduring traits, irony use was assessed prior to personality traits. 
Participants first completed the forced choice and then the rating-based irony use measure. 
Subsequently, the EPQ-RK, the STCI-T<60>, the HSQ, the PhoPhiKat-45, and the AIS were 
completed. Participants were instructed to fill in the irony use measures by responding as if 
they would encounter the situations in real life. It was not mentioned to participants that the 
survey would include ironic stimuli.  
 
Analyses 
To arrive at an aggregated measure of irony use, the scores of the forced choice irony use 
measure (M = 1.32, SD = 1.17) and the rating-based irony use measure (M = -1.68, SD = 
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0.78) were standardized by z-transformation and averaged in one total score. A high level of 
aggregation was preferred to analyzing single scores, as (a) we did not have hypotheses 
concerning differences between the two irony use measures as to their associations with the 
personality traits, and (b) we desired to reduce possible measure-specific effects.  
In order to explore personality correlates of irony use, partial correlations between the 
irony use score and the individual differences measures were computed by statistically 
controlling for the influence of gender as a possible confounding variable. Furthermore, to 
simultaneously test (a) which personality traits explain the tendency to use irony in the given 
irony use measures as unique predictors, and (b) whether the predictive power of humor-
related traits goes beyond the influence of broad personality dimensions, a hierarchical 
regression analysis was computed with the irony use score as the criterion and the trait scales 
as predictors. To account for its possible influence, participants’ gender was entered as a 
predictor before all other predictors on the first hierarchical level in Step 1. On the second 
hierarchical level, the scales of the EPQ-RK were entered in Step 2 of the analysis (method: 
stepwise, i.e., in an iterative procedure the strongest predictor is taken into the equation first 
and it is tested whether an additional variable explains incremental variance in the criterion 
beyond what is already accounted for by the previously added predictor[s]). On the third 
hierarchical level (Step 3), participants’ scores in the STCI-T<60>, the HSQ, the PhoPhiKat-
45, and the AIS were given into the analysis in addition to the predictors added to the 
equation in Steps 1 and 2 (method: stepwise). 
 
Results 
The correlation between the two irony use measures was r(151) = .44, (p < .001, 95% CI = 
[.30, .56]). The bivariate correlations between the irony use score and the trait measures are 
given in Table 5.  
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Questionnaire Scores and Correlations Between the Irony Use 
Score and Personality Measures. 
 
Questionnaires   Irony use score 
M SD  rpartial  95% CI 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire      
Psychoticism 0.23 0.14  .33*** [.16, .48] 
Extraversion 0.67 0.26  .14 [-.03, .29] 
Neuroticism 0.39 0.28  -.04 [-.18, .11] 
Lie Scale 0.23 0.17  -.10 [-.24, .05] 
Trait Cheerfulness Inventory      
Cheerfulness 3.15 0.48  .00 [-.19, .19] 
Seriousness 2.48 0.38  -.25** [-.40, -.09] 
Bad Mood 1.91 0.60  .09 [-.09, .26] 
Humor Styles Questionnaire      
Affiliative 5.56 0.91  -.04 [-.24, .15] 
Self-enhancing 4.54 1.05  .09 [-.09, .26] 
    Table 5 continues. 
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Table 5 continued. 
     
 
Questionnaires   Irony use score 
M SD  rpartial  95% CI 
Aggressive 3.54 1.07  .32*** [.17, .46] 
Self-defeating 3.45 1.02  .31*** [.16, .45] 
Dispositions to laughter and ridicule      
Gelotophobia 1.98 0.54  .06 [-.12, .23] 
Gelotophilia 2.39 0.53  .27** [.11, .43] 
Katagelasticism 1.99 0.47  .49*** [.34, .62] 
Histrionic self-presentation style      
As-if scale 2.15 0.55  .23** [.08, .37] 
Note. N = 153. rpartial = partial correlations controlling for the influence of gender. 95% CI = 
lower and upper limit of the 95% confidence interval. 
** p < .01, two-tailed.  
*** p < .001, two-tailed. 
 
As Table 5 shows, among the scales of the EPQ-RK, psychoticism correlated substantially 
with irony use in a positive direction whereas extraversion, neuroticism and the lie scale were 
not associated with irony use significantly. Among the temperamental traits measured by the 
STCI-T<60>, as expected, trait seriousness correlated with the irony use score in a negative 
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direction. Contrary to expectations, trait cheerfulness and trait bad mood were not associated 
with participants’ irony use significantly. Among the scales of the HSQ, the aggressive 
humor style correlated substantially with irony use in the expected (positive) direction. 
Contrary to expectations, the affiliative humor style was not correlated to the irony use score. 
However, unexpectedly, the self-defeating humor style was correlated substantially to irony 
use (in a positive direction). Regarding the dispositions to laughter and ridicule, as expected, 
the irony use score was correlated positively to katagelasticism (the joy of laughing at others) 
and gelotophilia (i.e., the joy of being laughed at). Furthermore, as expected, the As-If Scale 
as the measure of the histrionic self-presentation style was positively correlated with irony 
use.  
The results of the hierarchical regression analysis predicting the irony use score are 
given in Table 6. As Table 6 shows, it was found that gender was a significant predictor, with 
men tending to have higher irony use scores than women, in Step 1, F(1, 151) = 14.76, p < 
.001. Among Eysenck’s personality dimensions, psychoticism was a unique predictor for 
irony use in the model resulting in Step 2 beyond the influence of gender, F(2, 150) = 17.14, 
p < .001. As it turned out, the scores of the humor-related traits given into the analysis in 
addition to Eysenck’s personality dimensions in Step 3 resulted in two further models 
explaining incremental variance beyond the models in the respective previous steps. Firstly, 
katagelasticism entered the equation as a unique predictor in Model 3 , F(3, 149) = 25.89, p < 
.001. Secondly, the self-defeating humor style emerged as a predictor explaining unique 
criterion variance in Model 4, F(4, 148) = 21.39, p < .001. In the final model, psychoticism, 
katagelasticism, and the self-defeating humor style were significant predictors and together 
explained 35% of the variance in the irony use score (adjusted R2 = .35). No other trait 
variable explained incremental variance in the criterion beyond these three predictors 
significantly.  
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Table 6 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting the Irony Use Score.  
 B SE β ΔR2 
Step 1: Gender      
Model 1    .08*** 
Gender  -0.58 0.15 -.30***  
Step 2: Eysenck’s personality dimensions     
Model 2    .09*** 
Gender -0.47 0.15 -.24**  
Psychoticism 1.93 0.46 .32***  
Step 3: Humor-related traits     . 
Model 3     .16*** 
Gender -0.20 0.14 -.10  
Psychoticism 1.25 0.43 .20**  
Katagelasticism 0.79 0.13 .44***  
Model 4    .02* 
Gender -0.26 0.14 -.13  
   Table 6 continues. 
PART III 
 137 
 
Note. N = 153. Gender: 1 = male, 2 = female. Total adjusted R2 = .35. Humor-related traits = 
scales of the STCI-T<60>, HSQ, PhoPhiKat-45, and the AIS. Method: stepwise. 
* p < .05, two-tailed. 
** p < .01, two-tailed. 
*** p < .001, two-tailed. 
Discussion 
The present study found that humor-related traits explained incremental interindividual 
variance in irony use beyond psychoticism as a broad personality dimension. The correlation 
between the two irony use measures substantiates the assumption that there is systematic 
interindividual variance in irony use in terms of an enduring tendency to use irony. Involving 
the tendency to break with social conventions (such as the norm of kindness and sympathy), 
psychoticism was expected to go along with a low inhibition to offend others by callously 
exposing their weaknesses by ridiculing irony. This hypothesis was supported by our results. 
Trait seriousness is defined to go along with the “preference for a sober, object-oriented 
communication style, meaning to say exactly what one means without exaggeration 
ironic/sarcastic undertones” (Ruch et al., 1996, p. 308). This notion can be seen as 
Table 6 continued. 
    
 B SE β ΔR2 
Psychoticism 1.28 0.42 .21**  
Katagelasticism 0.69 0.14 .38***  
Self-defeating humor style 0.14 0.06 .16*  
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supportable in the light of our findings. Furthermore, as expected, the joy of laughing at 
others (i.e., katagelasticism) turned out as a correlate of irony use. Katagelasticism involves 
the tendency to expose others to laughter, which—as irony oftentimes is responded to with 
laughter (Kotthoff, 2003)—may be achieved by using irony. Likewise, we found gelotophilia 
(the joy of being laughed at) to be correlated with irony use. This finding is in line with our 
expectations as individuals scoring high in gelotophilia have a tendency to joyfully expose 
themselves as the butt of jokes (cf. Ruch & Proyer, 2009), which can be attained by using 
self-directed irony. The histrionic self-presentation style involves the tendency to draw 
attention to the own person and entertain others by engaging in as-if behaviors (e.g., acting, 
imitating, or role-playing; Renner et al., 2008). In line with Renner et al. (2008), who listed 
irony among the forms of communication that can be examples for histrionic as-if behaviors, 
the AIS correlated with irony use. Furthermore, as expected, the aggressive humor style was 
found to be associated with irony use. This finding is in line with Martin et al. (2003), who 
defined a link between the aggressive humor style as the inclination to “hostile uses of 
humor, in which the self is enhanced by denigrating, disparaging, excessively teasing, or 
ridiculing others” (p. 52) and the use of sarcasm. 
However, not all of the expectations were met. Other than expected, extraversion and 
neuroticism were not associated with irony use. Furthermore, our results do not support the 
assumption that trait bad mood “might also be a disposition facilitating certain forms of 
humor, such as mockery, irony, cynicism, and sarcasm” (Ruch & Hofmann, 2012,) p. 86). 
Also, contrary to our expectations, the affiliative humor style was not correlated to irony use. 
This is somewhat puzzling as the affiliative humor style is defined to go along with the 
tendency “to engage in spontaneous witty banter” (Martin et al., 2003, p. 53). As a possible 
explanation, the stimuli used in this study may not be accounting for irony in the form of 
witty banter sufficiently. 
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To summarize, how can typical irony users be characterized? We may suggest that 
irony is used both (1) in an interpersonally “cold” fashion by tough-minded and egocentric 
individuals (i.e., scoring high in psychoticism) who tend to break with social conventions 
(e.g., kindness and sympathy) and who do not to bother about the risk of “losing friends” 
when using humor aggressively but rather enjoy raising a laugh when exposing others’ 
transgressions by ridicule (i.e., scoring high in the aggressive humor style and 
katagelasticism), and (2) in an interpersonally “warm” fashion among individuals who are 
prone to not taking themselves and others too seriously and to entertain themselves and 
others by exposing themselves as the butt of laughter, for example when humorously acting 
and imitating (i.e., low-serious individuals, scoring high in gelotophilia and the histrionic 
self-presentation style).  
When redundancy was eliminated in the prediction of irony use, a less diverse picture 
presented itself. Among Eysenck’s personality traits psychoticism was the only unique 
predictor and beyond its influence only katagelasticism and—unexpectedly so—the self-
defeating humor style were explaining the irony use score over and above redundancy. 
Hence, irony may foremost be used to callously expose others’ transgressions, especially by 
those who enjoy to laugh or to raise a laugh at someone else’s expense. As an unexpected 
aspect, irony use may also be a way by which the self-defeating humor style is expressed. 
Jocular (i.e., ironic) versions of necessary criticisms on serious topics may be a way of using 
humor to the detriment of the self by “hiding one’s underlying negative feelings, or avoiding 
dealing constructively with problems” (Martin et al., 2003, p. 54). For example, ironically 
joking about inacceptable misbehavior and unpaid bills in a shared flat may be a self-
defeating way to mute the expression of one’s justified anger and concern about what is a 
serious threat to the social integrity and the economic well-being in the scenario given in the 
rating-based irony use measure. 
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Limitations and future studies 
It is noteworthy that the selection of relevant personality traits is not exhaustive in the present 
study and could be extended in future studies. For example, as they denote “behavior 
tendencies toward self-promotion, emotional coldness, duplicity, and aggressiveness” 
(Paulhus & Williams, 2002, p. 557), the socially aversive traits delineated by the dark triad of 
personality (i.e., Machiavellianism, subclinical narcissism, and subclinical psychopathy) may 
predict irony use in its aggressive or “cold” spectrum. Substantiating this assumption, 
previous studies indicate that sub-clinical psychopathy and Machiavellianism relate to the 
aggressive humor style (e.g., Veselka, Schermer, Martin, & Vernon, 2010), which may 
manifest itself in irony use as a way to enhance the self by “denigrating, disparaging, 
excessively teasing, or ridiculing others” (Martin et al., 2003, p. 52). Furthermore, although 
in the present study a high level of aggregation was preferred, it may be worthwhile to 
investigate the role of personality in different forms of irony in future studies, such as ironic 
praise and ironic criticism. 
 
Conclusion 
Our findings can help to get a picture of who uses irony but also give a hint on why irony is 
used. Irony use can be predicted foremost by such traits that are relevant to 
humor⎯especially when humor is considered not only in its benevolent “fun part” but also in 
the disparaging part of its spectrum. 
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General Discussion 
The three studies investigated whether (a) there is interindividual variance in irony detection 
performance and irony use, (b) this variance is systematic (rather than negligible “noise”), 
i.e., whether an irony detection aptitude and an enduring tendency to use irony can be found, 
(c) this variance is meaningful, i.e., whether it can be explained by ability and trait variables, 
(d) humor can be seen as a central aspect when generating hypotheses as to which traits are 
most important, (e) two different basic forms of irony lead to different results when employed 
in a test of irony detection aptitude as to their association with humor-related traits and 
intelligence, and (f) humor-relevant traits explain incremental variance in irony use behavior 
beyond broad personality dimensions. 
 
Overview of the Main Results and Conclusions 
PART I  
In PART I it was argued that irony behaviors can be considered a phenomenon native to the 
realm of individual differences. Based on theoretical considerations and previous empirical 
findings, it was shown that (a) there is interindividual variance in irony behavior, and (b) this 
variance can be easily related to individual differences variables such as the sense of humor, 
dispositions towards laughter and ridicule (e.g., gelotophobia), and general mental ability. 
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that there is sense of irony as an individual differences 
variable denoting maximal and typical irony behavior. The sense of irony is assumed to go 
along with inclinations towards specific affective and cognitive processing patterns when 
dealing with verbal irony. 
 
PART II 
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In PART II, the results indicate that (a) there are two facets of irony detection aptitude, 
namely the aptitude to detect ironic criticism vs. the aptitude to detect ironic praise, and (b) 
these facets need to be scored separately in order to make more accurate predictions and 
conclusions when exploring personality and ability correlates of irony detection aptitude. 
Certain ability and personality correlates for ironic praise detection (i.e., intelligence, 
cheerfulness, and corrective humor) were found to have a unique association with ironic 
praise detection beyond the influence of ironic criticism detection aptitude, while others (i.e., 
trait bad mood and benevolent humor) were jointly related to both scales (i.e., ironic criticism 
and ironic praise) of the irony detection measure. As a possible explanation for the unique 
role of intelligence in the detection of ironic praise, ironic praise detection can be assumed to 
require a more complex mental representation of the background of the ironic remark and a 
more effortful cognitive search for the antecedent event (as compared to the detection of 
ironic criticism). Concerning the finding that cheerfulness was associated with the detection 
of ironic praise beyond the influence of the variance it shares with ironic criticism detection 
aptitude, it may be argued that trait cheerfulness has a relevance especially to the detection of 
ironic praise: a cheerful and light-hearted disposition may facilitate the processing of cues 
signaling benevolent ironic teasing and hence may help to reject the uttered negative 
evaluation of circumstances (which can also take the form of a mock insult) and construe it as 
a playful provocation. The unique role of corrective humor in ironic praise detection is in line 
with the notion that by exposing transgressions of social rules in a witty and playful way, 
corrective humor is conceptually more related to ironic praise than to ironic criticism, which 
in turn can be seen as the more serious and less ingenious form of irony.  
 
PART III 
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The findings of PART III help to paint a picture of who uses irony, but they also provide a 
hint on why irony is used. Irony use can be predicted incrementally beyond brad personality 
dimensions by those traits that are relevant for humor⎯especially when humor is considered 
not only for its benevolent “fun part”, but also for the disparaging part of its spectrum. Taken 
together, the findings of PART III provide support for both (1) the notion that irony can be a 
means of anti-social interaction when victimizing others by relational aggression, for 
example in the form of disparagement humor (cf. Bowes & Katz, 2011), and (2) the notion 
that irony can be used as a means for shaping benevolent interactions in relationships by 
humorous interaction, such as in the form of entertaining or playfully teasing others. 
However, when looking only at unique predictors, it was found that irony is used foremost in 
the context of (a) aggressive, cold, egocentric, impersonal, impulsive, antisocial, 
unempathetic, creative, and tough-minded tendencies (i.e., psychoticism), and (b) the 
tendency to expose others to laughter and ridicule (i.e., katagelasticism/the joy of laughing at 
others). As an additional aspect, irony use can be seen as a self-defeating way to hide one’s 
negative emotions behind jocularity in order not to deal with conflicts more directly and more 
openly. 
One of the findings of PART III, the relation between irony use and the histrionic 
self-presentation style (Renner, Enz, Friedel, Merzbacher, & Laux, 2008) can be seen as 
worthwhile of being discussed in somewhat more detail, as this finding substantiates pre-
existing theories of irony. One of the features of irony that different theories of irony agree on 
is that it involves an overt pretense (cf. Groeben & Scheele, 2003). As the insincerity in 
ironic utterances is typically supposed to be recognized by the addressee, irony can be 
characterized as involving evident simulation. This assumption is supported by the finding 
that irony use relates to the tendency to engage in as-if behavior (i.e., histrionic self-
presentation). To illustrate: In the case of echoic irony use, the ironic utterance picks 
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something up that was previously said—in order to reject it as ridiculous or simply not true 
(e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1981). Accordingly, it could be argued that echoic irony is similar to 
the concept of imitation, which again is characteristic for the histrionic self-presentation 
style.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Works 
Strengths 
The studies conducted for the present thesis contribute to the literature by introducing a novel 
aspect in the psychological investigation of irony. An individual differences perspective on 
irony was assumed and demonstrated to be a fruitful approach to investigate the phenomena 
of irony detection and irony use. The studies conducted for the present thesis related the 
tendency to engage in irony use behavior and the aptitude to successfully detect irony to trait 
and ability variables. Accordingly, self-report measures and performance tests were used in 
order to account for irony behavior in terms of a preference-related tendency, but also as an 
ability-related aptitude. In PART II, the aptitude to detect irony was measured by means of a 
newly developed performance test (i.e., the Test of Verbal Irony Detection, TOVIDA) and 
related to intelligence. Unlike previously used measures (such as the irony vs. lie 
discrimination task by Winner et al., 1998), the TOVIDA was validated as to whether (a) the 
design of the stimuli is valid, i.e., whether laypersons recognize that there is irony in the 
stimuli, and (b) the rationale of the measurement approach is valid, i.e., whether higher (vs. 
lower) irony detection aptitude manifests itself in higher (vs. lower) test scores. This 
validation was attained by using an experimental approach, i.e., by comparing groups with 
“artificially” increased or decreased irony detection performance. Two central aspects of 
irony behavior were addressed, by examining both irony detection aptitude (i.e., irony 
reception ability) and the tendency to irony use irony (i.e., irony production preference).  
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Limitations 
Irony creation ability and irony appreciation 
There are four domains of irony behavior that result from the combination of irony reception 
vs. production and irony preference vs. ability. These four domains are described in 
Appendix A1. These domains are irony reception ability (i.e., irony detection aptitude), irony 
production preference (i.e., irony use tendency), irony reception preference (i.e., irony 
appreciation), and irony production ability (i.e., irony creation ability). While the former two 
were investigated in the present thesis, the latter two were not. Just like irony detection 
aptitude and irony use tendency (as investigated in the present thesis), irony creation ability 
and irony appreciation can be expected to vary systematically between individuals. It seems 
worthwhile to complete the picture of which individual difference variables play a role in 
irony behavior by investigating irony creation ability and irony appreciation. In PART I, the 
suggestion was made that there is a sense of irony denoting individual differences in the 
extent to which people detect irony, produce irony, seek irony, or enjoy irony. As a central 
question arising from this claim that needs to be explored is whether the four domains of 
irony behavior are truly interrelated.  
Overlearned ironic criticism 
There is another aspect worth discussing in the context of the findings presented in PART II: 
Since ironic criticism can be seen as the more prevalent type of verbal irony, individuals’ 
aptitude to detect ironic criticism may in part depend on the automated recognition of 
overlearned idiomatic phrases in conventionalized irony (cf. Schwoebel, Dews, Winner, & 
Srinivas, 2000; e.g., “There’s no need to rush, we’ve got all the time in the world!”, when the 
speaker is in a hurry) or stereotypical sayings (e.g., “Brilliant, I just love this idea!”, when the 
speaker disapproves of something). In contrast, ironic praise as the rarer form of irony may 
provide a more pristine paradigm for the study of irony detection, as individuals may not 
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have overlearned instances of ironic praise to the same extent as instances of ironic criticism. 
Substantiating this assumption, Schwoebel et al. (2000) report that they observed ironic 
praise (“e.g., saying ‘You have a hard life’ to a friend going off to the Caribbean for an all-
expense-paid vacation”, p. 48), as less prevalent than ironic criticism in contemporary 
American television shows. Hence, the detection of ironic praise can be seen as more 
diagnostic of individuals’ primary irony detection aptitude. This may be especially interesting 
for the investigation of correlates of irony detection, because the detection of ironic praise 
can be seen as less biased by automaticity and, therefore, possible associations with relevant 
ability and personality variables may be less distorted by experience, education, or culture 
than may be the case for ironic criticism. Thus, the interpretability of the results of PART II 
may be limited because the correlations found between the detection of ironic criticism and 
personality and intelligence may have been underestimated. 
Measurement of the five factors of personality (“Big Five”) 
As an important weakness of Study 3 in PART II, the findings need to be seen as limited by 
the use of a relatively short measure of the “Big Five” personality traits (i.e., employing five 
items per dimension only). Although internal consistencies in the present sample were 
satisfactory with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .72 (agreeableness) to .86 
(conscientiousness and emotional stability), it is most likely that longer questionnaires for the 
assessment of the five factors cover more facets of the traits. Possibly, the MRS-25 omits 
some of the very aspects of the traits that may be most relevant to irony detection aptitude. 
Hence, some of the correlational trends found in Study 3 of PART II may have been found as 
substantial correlations (such as the association between ironic criticism detection aptitude on 
the one hand and agreeableness and culture on the other), if longer and more content valid 
scales had been used (not to mention that reliability is higher in longer scales, reducing noise 
in the correlation). To conclude: the role of the five factors of personality can be seen as 
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worth addressing in future studies on irony detection aptitude, preferably using the original 
inventories rather than their short forms. 
The self-defeating humor style 
As regards the finding that the self-defeating humor style unexpectedly emerged as a unique 
predictor, it may be necessary to discuss possible limitations that go along with the concept 
of this trait. It was found earlier that the self-defeating humor style scale of the HSQ is 
negatively associated with self-esteem (cf. Ruch & Heintz, 2014). Furthermore, Ruch and 
Heintz (2014) suggest that it may be possible to disentangle the self-defeating humor style 
into two components: The actual humor component (i.e., in terms of making others laugh at 
one’s own expense) and a context component (i.e., in terms of a more general self-defeating 
social interaction style). In a study by Ruch and Heintz (2017), this assumption was 
substantiated when experimentally manipulating the wording of the items of the HSQ to 
either contain only (or mostly) humor (as the construct-relevant content) or to change the 
wording by using non-humorous alternatives instead of humor (so only context content was 
provided): For the self-defeating scale, it was found that “the non-humorous elements 
determined this humor style more than humor did” (Ruch & Heintz, 2017, p. 11). It remains a 
question for future studies how self-esteem and irony use are related to each other, and which 
component of the self-defeating humor style it is that plays the more prominent role in irony 
use. For now, it makes sense to suggest that irony use—presumably foremost in the case of 
anger-deflecting ironic criticism—can be seen as a type of behavior by which the self-
defeating humor style is apt to express itself. 
Irony use and corrective humor 
As stated in PART III, the selection of measures for humor-related traits is not exhaustive in 
the respective study and could be extended in future studies. For example, Ruch and Heintz 
(2016a) list irony among the linguistic peculiarities of corrective humor. As Ruch and Heintz 
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(2016a) point out, corrective humor “uses wit to ridicule vices, follies, abuses, and 
shortcomings with the intent of shaming individuals and groups into improvement” (p. 36). 
This could also be taken to suggest that irony should be seen a tool for bettering others and 
for educational purposes, not just for anti-social aggression or simple amusement.  
Assessment beyond predefined utterances 
One possible limitation of the present study is that with regard to the two irony use measures, 
participants had to respond to predefined ironic utterances, thereby possibly over-estimating 
the frequency of irony use. Although an over-estimation of the absolute frequency of irony 
use may not affect the relative association between irony use tendency and personality traits, 
future studies could also employ measures of irony use with an open-ended response format, 
which was demonstrated to be a useful approach by Dress et al. (2008).  
Some thoughts on the adaptation of the irony use measures 
Another issue that requires discussing is that of the adaptation of the instruments used for the 
assessment of irony use tendency. In PART II it was not discussed whether the newly 
adapted versions of the instruments were comparable with the original instruments as to their 
psychometric properties. Although originally, i.e., in the studies by Matthews et al. (2006) 
and Averbeck and Hample (2008), the instruments were not intended to be evaluated in terms 
of their psychometric properties (as they were used as experimental tasks or outcomes), it is 
possible to gather some of the information necessary for such a comparison from their 
research reports. As described in PART III, the distribution of the scores of the forced choice 
irony use measure indicated that irony was used on average only somewhat more than once 
by each individual across the eight items (M = 1.32, SD = 1.17). That means that, for 
example, most participants chose the ironic response option, while mostly they responded by 
choosing one of the three non-ironic options provided. It is noteworthy that Matthews et al. 
(2006) provided only two response options in their experiment (Experiment 4). When, in a 
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first experimental condition (between subjects), their scenarios were framed to make the 
ironic response option (e.g., “Great shot, Dave.”) to appear as an ironic criticism (i.e., when 
the scenario involved an act with a negative valence), their participants on average preferred 
to ironic response in somewhat more than half of the eight scenarios (M = 4.31, SD = 1.14). 
When, in a second experimental condition, the scenarios were phrased to include a positive 
act, the ironic response options appear as an ironic praise (e.g., “Wow Dave, you suck.”), on 
average two out of the eight items were answered with an ironic response (M = 2.00, SD = 
1.75). Hence, it seems almost natural that the frequency of irony use was lower in PART III, 
as there were two more non-ironic response options for each item, one of which may have 
been especially appealing in terms of humorousness (i.e., the non-ironic humorous response). 
Furthermore, in PART III, ironic criticism scenarios and ironic praise scenarios were 
counterbalances within subjects instead of between subjects (in order to attain a content valid 
instrument featuring both basic forms of irony). Also, using the measure as an experimental 
task, Matthews et al. (2006) did not report internal consistencies. Taken together, it is hard to 
compare the instrument used by Matthews et al. (2006) and the one used in PART III. Taking 
into account that generally the items of the forced-choice measure used in PART III 
psychometrically were rather difficult (as indicated by the low means of the score) it is 
recommendable to revise either the stimuli or the response format in future studies (for 
example by using rankings) to avoid a floor effect. By means of rankings, it would be 
possible to attain a score for each option of each item, which would make the estimation of 
reliability by means of internal consistency possible (as for the forced-choice format, 
information about the preferences beyond the “first” choices are missing). 
As regards the rating-based measure for the assessment of irony use tendency, again, 
there were substantial deviations between the original measure as used by Averbeck and 
Hample’s (2008) and the adaptation as used in PART III. Most importantly, Averbeck and 
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Hample’s (2008) report does not allow for a strict replication of their procedure, as they 
described neither (a) which instruction they used for their participants’ task nor (b) the 
response format they employed. Most likely, telling from the descriptive statistics they report, 
they used either (a) the frequency of statements endorsed in a dichotomous response format, 
or (b) the frequency with which an ironic response was preferred over a non-ironic response, 
both leading to a score with a possible range between “1” and “10”. Telling from the 
distribution of their “irony endorsement” score in the “roommate scenario” (M = 2.10, SD = 
2.58), ironic utterances were endorsed less often than literal utterances (M = 8.08, SD = 2.10). 
This corresponds to the findings of PART III, as individuals on average endorsed literal 
criticism more strongly than ironic utterances in terms of the likelihood with which they 
would make the statement in real life, as indicated by the negative mean of the difference 
score (M = -1.68, SD = 0.78; i.e., individuals’ scores averaging the ratings of the ten literal 
utterances were subtracted from individuals’ scores averaging the ratings of the ten ironic 
utterances, leading to a possible range of “-4” to “+4”, given the four-point answer format). 
Using the measure as an experimental task, Averbeck and Hample (2008) did not report 
internal consistencies, which is why this psychometric property cannot be compared between 
PART III and their study. The internal consistency of the rating-based measure as found in 
PART III at least makes it thinkable to recommend it as a reliable instrument for the use in 
future studies. The coefficient alpha found for the literal criticism scale (α = .79) was equally 
high than the one found for ironic criticism scale (α = .81), and the two scales were 
negatively intercorrelated (r[152] = -.31, p < .001; as found in a re-analysis of the data), 
which may be seen as an indicator for the construct validity of the measure (as the preference 
for literal communication is supposed to be inverse to irony use tendency). Not least, the two 
measures were substantially intercorrelated, indicating concurrent validity. 
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To conclude: the adaptation of the two irony use measures used in PART III should 
be seen primarily as an adaptation of instruments originally used as experimental outcomes 
(i.e., measures for a dependent variable) into individual differences measures. That is, the 
term adaptation should not be confused with its meaning in a narrow sense within the field of 
psychological assessment, which mostly denotes the procedure with which questionnaires are 
translated and their psychometric properties are evaluated in a different language and culture. 
Nonetheless, in PART III it was found that there are indicators of good reliability and validity 
for the two measures, making it possible to recommend the respective approaches for future 
studies. 
 
Future Works  
The “mixed-motive hypothesis” of irony use 
While PART III proposed an interpersonally “cold” vs. “warm” taxonomy of irony use, the 
characteristics of irony may not always be that clear-cut. Therefore, we could propose that, 
rather than conceptualizing the effects of irony use as a dichotomy, ironic communication 
may run along the same continuum that was suggested for conversational joking by Boxer 
and Cortés-Conde (1997). As these authors suggest, “conversational joking, when it involves 
teasing, functions on a continuum that ranges from bonding to nipping to biting” (Boxer & 
Cortés-Conde, 1997, p. 276). If the social function of irony is conceptualized as a continuum, 
there may be ironic interactions in which interpersonally “cold” and “warm” intentions are 
mixed, for example, when engaging in playful provocation of close others in terms of ironic 
teasing. Here, teasing can be seen as a mixed-motive interaction aiming to both (a) convey 
mockery, and (b) signal social inclusion. This may be the case because teasers demonstrate 
that they think that the relationship with the communication partner is beyond the “politeness 
stage” when everyone is trying to be respectful and friendly in order not to offend each other 
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(cf. Norrick, 1994). As Kreuz, Long, and Church, 1991) point out, irony makes it possible for 
the speaker to fulfill communication goals that would be more difficult to fulfill literally, if 
not impossible. Conveying both a positive and a negative message at the same time in terms 
of multiple communication goals may be one of the core achievements of verbal irony. Or, as 
Norrick (1994) puts it: “sarcasm […] can express both aggression and solidarity - aggression 
in the message, attacking others for their foibles and errors, and solidarity in the 
metamessage, including others in a playful relationship with increased involvement” (p. 423). 
It may be worthwhile to address the assumptions going along with this mixed-motive 
hypothesis in future studies. For example, it may be possible to explore the interaction 
between personality traits and experimental variations of social consequences of ironic 
utterances (such as ostracizing or hurting others’ feelings). As one central assumption, it may 
be expected that traits relating socially “cold” use of irony come into play more prominently 
if irony use has more serious negative social consequences (compared to a condition in which 
the social threat to the target of irony is low). Individuals scoring high in psychoticism can be 
expected to have a lower social dependency and individuals scoring high in katagelasticism 
may be dominated by the motivation to ridicule others (rather than to make friends), 
compared to low scorers in the respective trait. This is why we may expect high scorers to be 
less influenced by variations of social damage than low scorers. Conversely, among 
individuals scoring low in psychoticism or katagelasticism, irony use can be expected to 
decrease more strongly than among high scorers as the social consequences of the irony 
become more severe. 
Interplay between irony detection aptitude and personality variables in irony use 
Extending the research question of the study conducted in PART III, it may not only be a 
question of personality whether or not irony is preferred over non-irony in communication, 
but also a question of irony detection aptitude. It may be hypothesized that the more that 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 153 
individuals are able to detect irony, the more it will depend on theoretically relevant 
personality traits whether they prefer to use irony or not. In other words, irony detection 
aptitude can be hypothesized as a necessary but not sufficient condition for irony use, and 
there may be an interaction between irony detection aptitude and irony-relevant personality 
traits. More specifically, the capacity to detect irony may be a prerequisite to be able use 
irony; however, it may not fully explain irony use when individuals have the prerequisite 
ability to use irony (but due their scores in certain traits do not make use of it).  
Gelotophobia and false alarms in irony detection 
As suggested in PART I of the present thesis, an individual differences variable likely to 
affect the misinterpretation of verbal irony is the fear of being laughed at (gelotophobia). The 
fear of being laughed at is a personality trait characterized by the bias to experience a broad 
range of social interactions involving humor (which gelotophobes generally misperceive as 
put-down humor if directed at them) and laughter (generally perceived as victimizing) as 
hurtful attacks, ridicule, and contempt (see Ruch, Hofmann, Platt & Proyer, 2014, for a 
review). Gelotophobia has received considerable attention in a substantial body of research 
(see Ruch et al., 2014). In previous studies it was found that individuals with the fear of being 
laughed at are inclined to misperceive social situations involving laughter, criticism and 
teasing (Platt, 2008; Ruch, Altfreder, & Proyer, 2009). Considering that (a) verbal irony can 
be a humorous form of delivering a critical attitude (Garmendia, 2014), and (b) gelotophobes 
believe themselves to be a likely victim of humor and ridicule (which typically involves 
criticism), it can be hypothesized that gelotophobes have a disposition to mistake certain 
types of ironic verbal communication as literal, and also certain types of literal 
communication as ironic. Hence, there is reason to assume that the fear of being laughed at 
(gelotophobia) affects verbal irony comprehension, specifically when dealing with intended 
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compliments that are expressed via a mock criticism (false negative irony detection) and also 
when dealing with literal compliments (in terms of false positive irony detection). 
There are several reasons to assume that gelotophobes may be prone to suspect that a 
sincere compliment is ironic, but also that an ironic criticism is literal, whereas non-
gelotophobes do not. Firstly, gelotophobes are characterized by a strong sensitivity towards 
offense (Titze, 2009) and low self-esteem (see Ruch et al., 2014, for a review). Being 
convinced that they are deficient, they can be considered to have a tendency to expect being 
criticized by others, especially in a derisive way. Secondly, given that biting sarcasm can be 
employed to ridicule others, gelotophobes may suspect irony when receiving compliments 
because they have a bias to expect being ridiculed. Although the role of irony in bullying 
ridicule has not been investigated yet, irony may be used when putting down others in a 
derisive way. Hence, as a third explanation, gelotophobes may have been traumatized by 
events involving ridicule conveyed by ironic compliments and thereafter – with a paranoid 
tendency − view others as likely to address them with sarcasm or, in other words, may expect 
the worst when interacting with others. Fourth, considering that humor is often a by-product 
of irony (Garmendia, 2014), and that laughter is a typical response to humorous stimuli, 
gelotophobes can be assumed to generalize their paranoid sensitivity to anticipated ridicule 
(cf. Platt, Ruch, Hofmann, & Proyer, 2012). More specifically, it can be assumed that high 
scorers in gelotophobia believe that they are prone to encounter the very object of their fear 
also in the context of verbal irony: humor (which they believe to be put down by) and 
laughter (which they have a strong tendency to feel victimized by). 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of why gelotophobes may be prone to take 
ironic criticisms as literal criticism, it may be instructive to take a closer look at ironic speech 
as a method of teasing, and gelotophobes’ experiences of teasing situations. As Keltner, 
Capps, Ring, Young, and Heerey (2001) note, “[…] sarcasm and ironic utterances can be 
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forms of teasing when directed at another as a provocation or commentary” (p. 238). They 
view teasing to be central to human social life and support the notion that humor and play 
serves prosocial purposes such as socializing, flirting, entertaining and resolving conflicts. 
However, gelotophobes can be assumed to be oblivious to the good-natured character of 
teasing and mistake it as bullying ridicule. As Platt (2008) demonstrated, gelotophobes report 
more fear and shame than non-gelotophobes when dealing both with laughter situations in 
which they are addressed by a bullying-type of ridicule as well as in imagined situations 
involving good-natured teasing. Non-gelotophobic controls showed a distinct negative 
emotional reaction only to bullying ridicule. In other words, Platt’s study showed that 
gelotophobes, when being addressed in a ridiculing or teasing manner, experience a stronger 
negative emotional reaction than non-gelotophobes. Furthermore, unlike non-gelotophobes, 
they do not distinguish between bullying ridicule and good-natured teasing. Understanding 
the mechanism and functions of teasing may help to explain why. Although they do not use 
the term ridicule, Boxer and Cortés-Conde (1997) postulate that teasing “[…] runs along a 
continuum of bonding to nipping to biting” (p. 279). They argue that teasing bonds in cases 
in which a humorous interaction (or conversational joking directed at someone present) is 
framed as play, while it bites when the playful character of the conversation is not 
recognized. According to Boxer and Cortés-Conde (1997), the target’s construal of the 
teasing as playful moderates its emotional impact. Supporting this notion, Platt (2008) 
suggests that gelotophobes’ undifferentiated negative response towards bullying ridicule and 
good-natured teasing originates from their failure to identify “the metamessage signal” 
conveyed by teasing that the “[…] interaction is playful, for fun and no harm is intended” (p. 
122). However, Platt (2008) also notes that gelotophobes may recognize playful teasing 
signals but thereupon may not trust in the good-natured and fun character of the interaction. 
These considerations may help to further explain why gelotophobes can be assumed to take 
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ironic criticism as literal: They may not have developed a sense of being bonded to a social 
(peer) group but instead may have experienced traumatizing situations of being ostracized 
through ridicule in adolescence (cf. Titze, 2009). Therefore, they may distrust the cues 
signaling a playful and bonding interaction when being teased by benevolent ironic 
criticisms, taking them as literal criticisms.  
Future development of the Test Of Verbal Irony Detection Aptitude (TOVIDA) 
In order to make the TOVIDA usable in future studies investigating false alarms in irony 
detection, it would be necessary to construct a non-ironic criticism scale and a non-ironic 
praise scale. So far, the non-ironic items of the TOVIDA are used as fillers (or as a control 
scale in Study 2 of PART II). Future studies should employ the ironic criticism and ironic 
praise scale of the TOVIDA along with an extended list of non-ironic criticism and non-
ironic praise items and develop two respective non-ironic scales. Furthermore, representative 
norms could be gathered to allow for normative comparisons of single individual’s scores. 
These norms could help to identify high scorers and low scorers in irony detection aptitude 
without having to collect large samples for a certain investigation. Also, these norms could 
help to interpret test scores in an individual assessment setting. As to the psychometric 
properties, test-retest-correlations should verify the reliability of the scales and the stability of 
the constructs measured. Also, it must be seen as necessary to replicate the factorial structure 
in different (and preferably: large) samples, to further support the factorial validity indicated 
by PART II of the present thesis. Not least, the possibility to employ a more economic 
answer format should be explored, which can be seen as feasible when using the TOVIDA in 
the irony-alert mode of testing (i.e., when distracting test-takers from the intention of the test 
is not necessary). 
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Summarizing and organizing the constructs tested or assumed in the present thesis 
One declared objective of the present thesis is to propose a theoretical model that summarizes 
and organizes the theoretical notions and empirical findings reported in the present thesis. 
The aim is to arrive at a psychological model of irony that accounts for individual differences 
in irony behavior. Following Eysenck’s (1993) approach of deriving suggestions for a theory 
that accounts for the role of individual differences in creativity, the organization of the 
different constructs investigated in the present thesis was summarized in a theoretical model. 
Appendix A1 describes this relation.  
As Appendix A1 summarizes, the argument is made that the success or the frequency 
of irony detection and use depend on four different groups of factors: (1) individual 
differences variables, i.e., ability variables (for example intelligence) and personality traits 
(such as psychoticism and the sense of humor). Furthermore, the model also comprises (2) 
mediating mechanisms that were assumed in the present thesis (e.g., metamessage 
processing; see section “Deriving a theory explaining successful irony reception” for details). 
To account for previous studies dealing with situational conditions that play a role in the 
interpretation of irony (such as the “common ground” or the quality of relationship between 
speaker and addressee, see Pexman & Zvaigzne, 2004, for an overview) or studies addressing 
cultural differences (such as between collectivist vs. individualist cultures, i.e., Rockwell & 
Theriot, 2001) that play a role in use, the model also includes (3) situational factors and (4) 
cultural factors. This may be seen as especially important if one takes into account that there 
may be personality-situation interactions: for example, emotional stability may come into 
play more prominently in ironic praise detection when self-involvement is high (vs. low, see 
general discussion in PART II of the present thesis). 
This model describes that ironic communication is more (vs. less) frequent and more 
(vs. less) successful if the speaker and the listener score high (vs. low) in the abilities and 
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most of the traits listed, while some traits (i.e., seriousness, trait bad mood and gelotophobia) 
are supposed to be negatively associated to maximal and typical irony behavior. Situational 
and cultural factors may have both (a) main effects on the given irony behaviors, and (b) 
moderating effects on the association between ability and personality variables on the one 
hand and the irony behaviors on the other. 
The variables listed are not claimed to be an exhaustive set, and some variables (such 
as humor creation ability and irony appreciation) that were not investigated in the present 
thesis have been integrated into the model. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that not all of the 
constructs were included based on sound empirical evidence found in the studies conducted 
for the present thesis; for some of them there were only correlational trends (i.e., 
agreeableness and culture, see PART II) which may indicate that substantial association may 
be found using different operationalizations (for example when using larger samples and 
more content valid instruments for their assessment). For other constructs listed in the model, 
preexisting findings indicate that they play a role in irony detection or use and should be 
included (e.g., creativity; Blouin & McKelvie, 2012; see also section “Postformal thinking 
and creativity in irony detection” in the General Introduction). Not least, the socially aversive 
personality traits delineated by the term “Dark Triad” were included based on the theoretical 
consideration that irony may be used as a means of aggression or disparagement of others, 
which may be a way subclinical psychopathy or narcissism may manifest in behavior (cf. 
Paulhus & Williams, 2002; see also PART III of the present thesis).  
It needs to be noted that the model summarizing and organizing the constructs that the 
present thesis deals with must be seen as selective (as it is likely that relevant variables are 
not included). Furthermore, it needs to be seen whether (a) the findings integrated in this 
model are replicable and can be generalized, and (b) the assumptions made hold true when 
empirically tested. It is recommended to view the model as an initial summary and 
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organization of existing findings and relevant constructs which should be further elaborated, 
corrected, extended, and discussed in the light of future findings.  
As a central aspect of this model, the sense of irony (see PART I) is postulated to 
explain interindividual variance in irony behavior. As described in the General Introduction, 
a theoretical construct consists of a system of laws that is referred to as a nomological 
network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). As Cronbach and Meehl (1995) point out, “"[l]earning 
more about" a theoretical construct is a matter of elaborating the nomological network in 
which it occurs, or of increasing the definiteness of the components.” (p. 290). To discuss the 
validity of this hypothetical construct, the “laws” by which the sense of irony manifests itself 
in irony behavior will be explored on a hypothetical basis in the next section.  
 
Nomological network of the sense of irony 
To discuss its validity, the sense of irony should be examined in terms of how, in its 
nomological network, (a) observable properties or quantities indicating the construct relate to 
each other, (b) the construct relates to observables; and (c) the construct relates to other 
theoretical constructs (cf. Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). The sense of irony is conceptualized as 
denoting (a) individuals’ aptitude to successfully deal with irony in terms of an ability 
component and (b) individuals’ tendency to enjoy, to like, or to seek irony in terms of a 
habitual preference component, both for the detection and the use of irony. Accordingly, 
individual differences variables from both the realm of personality and ability can be used for 
exploring the construct validity of the sense of irony. 
How do observable properties or quantities relate to each other? 
In PART I, the sense of irony was reasoned to include an ability component and a trait-like 
habitual component, which respectively refer to maximal irony behavior and typical irony 
behavior. Maximal irony behavior was defined as “a person’s capacity to produce or detect 
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irony” and it was reasoned that it “determines the upper limit of possible performance in the 
sense of ability” (Bruntsch et al., 2016, p. 31; i.e., PART I). The typical irony behavior, on 
the other hand, was defined as a person’s habitual level of irony production and detection. 
This implies that individuals’ typical levels of irony performance may deviate from their 
actual ability to perform irony. The observable properties of the sense of irony are 
summarized in Appendix A1. As Appendix A1 shows, maximal irony behavior comprises 
irony detection aptitude (as the reception ability) and irony creation ability (as the maximal 
production behavior). Typical irony behavior comprises irony use tendency (as the 
production preference) and irony appreciation (as the reception preference). 
As a part of the nomological network of the sense of irony, a relationship between measures 
of irony detection aptitude and measures of irony use can be postulated. Importantly, this 
relationship can be expected to be moderated by irony preference. There may be individuals 
with a high aptitude to detect irony (as an indicator for the ability component of the sense of 
irony), who hardly ever use irony in daily life. On the level of observable properties or 
quantities, this consideration may lead to a possible operationalization for an empirical test of 
the assumption that there is an ability component and a habitual component in the sense of 
irony. Maximizing individuals’ irony-alertness in an irony detection measure may serve as a 
way to measure the ability component. If participants were explicitly instructed to watch out 
for irony in an irony detection performance test (such as the TOVIDA), test scores would 
indicate how successful individuals deal with irony when instructed to do so. It can be 
reasoned that, if an irony use measure (such as the measures used in PART III) is employed 
without any mention of the relevance of irony, the ability component and the habitual 
component are confounded in the score. That is, the ability to successfully deal with irony is 
confounded with the habitual preference for irony. As an operationalization of irony 
preference, an irony appreciation measure can be employed as a moderator variable. If the 
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ability component and the habitual component of the sense of irony truly confound in a 
measure of irony use, one must expect that irony appreciation interacts with irony detection 
aptitude when explaining variance in irony use. This may be the case because irony 
appreciation (as an indicator for irony reception preference) cannot have an impact among 
individuals who do not have the ability to detect irony, but will manifest in irony use among 
individuals who are able to successfully deal with irony. 
How does the sense of irony relate to observable quantities? 
Since it includes an ability and a habitual component, the sense of irony must be viewed as a 
construct that manifests itself in both typical and maximal behavior. Accordingly, the sense 
of irony must be observable as an enduring tendency in a variety of different settings and 
contexts. In terms of measurement, the sense of irony is expected to be observable in the 
scores of performance measures, just as in measures of preference. It is noteworthy that, 
although the sense of irony is conceptualized as a unique construct, the observables indicating 
the sense of irony (e.g., irony detection performance) are also consequences of other traits 
and abilities. Appendix A1 summarizes relevant traits and abilities as predictors of irony 
behavior. As Appendix A1 shows, the sense of irony is listed as a construct that overlaps with 
both the ability and the personality domain of individual differences. Accordingly, the sense 
of irony is assumed to effect both maximal and typical irony behavior in terms of irony 
detection ability, irony appreciation, irony use tendency, and irony creation ability. 
How do different theoretical constructs relate to the sense of irony? 
Although the sense of irony must be seen as a narrower trait, it has a conceptual resemblance 
to constructs like creativity or the sense of humor (cf. Ruch, 1998). The sense of irony is 
conceptualized as a trait relating to personality and ability, in the same way that creativity is 
an individual characteristic associated with personality traits and ability (cf. Kandler et al., 
2016). And just like creativity, the sense of irony is assumed to be an individual differences 
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variable that summarizes an ability component and a preference (or habitual) component. 
Furthermore, just like the sense of humor, the sense of irony manifests in different behavioral 
domains, such as the production and the reception of irony.  
When defining the nomological network for the sense of irony, the relation between 
the construct and other theoretically relevant constructs is a crucial criterion for exploring the 
construct’s validity. Usually, construct validity is studied in the course of evaluating the 
psychometric properties of measures for the assessment of a construct, especially when there 
is no suitable criterion measure of the construct (meaning one must resort to indirect 
measures). Importantly, construct validity is not a property of a test measure, because “[h]ere 
the trait or quality underlying the test is of central importance, rather than either the test 
behavior or the scores on the criteria” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 282). Accordingly, the 
relation between the sense of irony and other theoretically relevant constructs can be seen as a 
way to define the nomological network of this construct. As in the sense of irony, an ability 
and a habitual component are assumed, the sense of irony is expected to relate to both ability 
and personality constructs. Since the observables indicating the sense of irony (e.g., irony 
detection performance) are also consequences of other traits and abilities, it almost seems 
natural that there is an overlap between measures for the sense of irony and measures of 
personality and ability variables relevant to irony use, such as the abilities and traits listed in 
Appendix A1. One important question that needs to be addressed is: How could one test 
whether the sense of irony is discrete from the constructs it converges with, such as the sense 
of humor and intelligence. The following section deals with this question. 
 
Is the sense of irony a discrete construct? 
As a central assumption, the sense of irony was conceptualized as a unique construct discrete 
from different constructs relevant to irony use (such as intelligence and humor-related traits, 
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see PART I of the present thesis). Therefore, future studies should test whether the sense of 
irony can predict irony behavior beyond known traits and ability. One suggested possible 
operationalization targeting maximal irony behavior could use a measure of irony detection 
aptitude as an indicator for the ability component of the sense of irony, and a measure of 
irony creation ability as the criterion. The irony creation performance measure should 
maximize irony alertness and employ an open-ended response format in order to assess 
individuals’ capacity to generate irony, rather than the preference for ironic utterances when 
measuring irony use by employing pre-defined ironic utterances (see PART III). Using a 
hierarchical regression method, it should be possible to test whether the sense of irony, as 
measured, for example, with the Test of Verbal irony Detection Aptitude (TOVIDA, see 
PART II), can explain incremental variance in irony use beyond intelligence and humor 
creation ability (which can be measured, for example, with the Cartoon Punch line 
Production Test, cf. Köhler & Ruch, 1996). 
One suggestion for testing whether the sense of irony explains incremental variance in 
typical irony behavior would be to use irony appreciation (as an indicator for the habitual 
component of the sense of irony) as a predictor, and a measure of irony use preference as the 
criterion. The irony use preference measure should minimize irony alertness so that 
individuals’ habitual tendency to use irony can be assessed. Using a hierarchical regression 
method once more, it should be possible to test whether the sense of irony, as measured with 
a test assessing the appreciation of ironic stimuli, can explain incremental variance in irony 
use preference beyond broad personality dimensions and humor-related traits (i.e., foremost 
the ones found as predictors for irony use in PART III). If incremental variance is explained, 
this would be an indication for the sense of irony as a unique construct. 
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Deriving a theory explaining successful irony reception 
By addressing an important aspect of irony behavior, the suggested theory of irony aims to 
explain “when and why” a listener successfully receives irony. However, this theory does not 
include situational or cultural factors, building instead on individual differences factors 
intervening in the communication process. So actually it aims to predict which listeners are 
more ready to detect irony successfully in terms of individual difference variables. As one of 
the crucial aspects of the suggested theory, it is proposed that irony has a metamessage (or 
also multiple metamessages). The metamessages of irony are assumed to be the “surplus” 
value of irony (beyond non-ironic communication) and typically go beyond the direct literal 
back-translation of an ironic utterance. The metamessages can be assumed as typically 
including a criticism toward the transgression of a social rule and running along a continuum 
from playful teasing to hostile ridicule.17 As a prerequisite, the speaker must imply at least 
one meaningful metamessage by his ironic utterance in the sense of a purposeful 
communication contribution (see section “Grice’s [1975] theory of conversational 
implicature and the cooperative principle” in the General Introduction of the present thesis). 
If this condition is satisfied, the communication process of ironic utterances can be assumed 
                                                
17 To illustrate: imagine that two friends watch a soccer match and friend A says “I bet you 
we will win this one! I studied the other’s line-up, they have terrible players in the offense”. 
When the other team scores the winning goal (meaning that the expectation fails), friend B 
might ironically comment to friend A “Terrible players in the offense!”. The literal 
translation of this utterance on the “lowest” level could be “Excellent shot!”. However, the 
metamessage of the ironic utterance goes beyond this translation, as friend B might be 
intending to teasingly ridicule his friend’s false prediction by echoing his choice of words 
(i.e., by using the expression “terrible”). The possible critical metamessages might be, for 
example, “Don’t boast with your analytical skills!”, “Don’t be too self-assured!”, “Look at 
you, wannabe expert!”, and so forth. Multiple metamessages (like in this example) with 
different contents may not only be admissible; they may actually be the very benefit that 
irony provides over literal communication. Also, different metamessages on different 
abstraction levels and in different facets of communication are thinkable. Accordingly, the 
metamessage may be encoded with factual information, an appeal, a self-revelation, and an 
assertion about a relationship (cf. Thun, 1981). For example, in the given situation a higher-
level metamessage about the relationship between the speaker and the addressee may be: “I 
tease you in order to show you that I think we are close friends” (cf. Norrick, 1994). 
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to be mediated by individual differences variables facilitating the decoding of the 
metamessage(s).  
As was established in PART II, more intelligent or emotionally stable individuals that 
are high in cheerfulness or low in bad mood, with high scores in benevolent or corrective 
humor, have a higher readiness to detect the irony in ironic praise (than less intelligent, 
emotionally unstable [i.e., neurotic], low-cheerful individuals, high in bad mood or low in 
benevolent or corrective humor). But how are these variables supposed to contribute to 
successful irony reception? As suggested in PART II, this may be the case because 
individuals with the respective scores are more able or ready to (a) reason and infer the 
metamessage of an ironic praise (i.e., fluid intelligence), (b) generate an easily interpreted 
mental “image” of the background of an ironic remark (i.e., visual perception), (c) reject the 
uttered criticism in what is literally said and recognize the more benevolent nature of what is 
ironically implied in the ironic praise (i.e., emotional stability), (d) take into account playful 
and humorous communicative intentions in terms of the processing of exhilarant stimuli (i.e., 
high trait cheerfulness and low trait bad mood), (e) have a smiling attitude towards the 
imperfections of life (e.g., human weakness) and know how to deal with them by using 
benevolent humor, and (f) expose transgressions of morally valued social rules by using irony 
with satirical metamessages in order to educate and better social others (i.e., the tendency to 
produce, to enjoy, and to make sense of corrective humor). Some of these assumptions about 
the mechanisms involved in irony detection will be taken when building a theory explaining 
successful irony reception in the next section. 
The “Person-centered theory of irony reception” 
The suggested theory, which shall be coined as the “Person-centered theory of irony 
reception” (accounting for its origin in the field of individual differences and for the sake of 
simplicity), posits that irony detection is facilitated by individual differences variables 
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(including the hypothesized sense of irony) that intervene in information processing when (1) 
rejecting the verbatim meaning of the ironic utterance (such as emotional stability and 
presumably also [low] gelotophobia) and (2) detecting that there is an implied metamessage 
behind the irony. The described assumed two-factorial process could be labeled as the 
“reject-and-detect axiom”. In addition to this assumption, the individual differences variables 
suggested as possible mediators are assumed to help individuals to successfully process the 
humorously critical content of the metamessage of irony. Accordingly, the second important 
assumption of the suggested theory may be labeled as the “metamessage processing axiom”, 
which posits that irony is only successfully received when the individual, due to his or her 
ability- and trait-dependent disposition, is ready to process its (humorously) critical 
metamessage effectively. 
How does this theory fit in with the findings of PART II and PART III? As irony was 
postulated as humorous, it makes sense that the traits that were found as relevant for irony 
detection in PART II delineate tendencies toward jolly and compassionate humor behaviors 
(i.e., cheerfulness and benevolent humor). Furthermore, as irony is also theorized to be 
aggressive and critical (cf. Garmendia, 2014), it is coherent that, as a trait denoting the 
combination of humorous and critical behavior, corrective humor (as the tendency to 
satirically use “wit to ridicule vices, follies, abuses, and shortcomings with the intent of 
shaming individuals and groups into improvement”, Ruch & Heintz, 2016a, p. 36) was found 
as a correlate of irony detection. As it is suggested in the section “The mixed-motive 
hypothesis of irony use”, irony may be used interpersonally to be “warm” and “cold” at the 
same time (in terms of a mixed-motive communication). Accordingly, for the successful 
reception of irony, traits may be of special importance if they go along with the tendency to 
process the playful offense in the metamessage of irony (which is typically used when 
individuals ironically tease and ridicule others). In terms of the principle “It takes one to 
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know one”, these might me the same traits that facilitate the use of irony as a double-edged 
vessel of humor and criticism, such as katagelasticism and the aggressive humor style (which 
were found among the correlates of irony use in PART III). This may be the case because the 
tendency to use these forms of humor (also in the form of irony) is likely to require the 
comprehension of these same forms of humor (i.e., as an aspect of the sense of humor 
overarching different behavioral domains). 
To summarize, the “Person-centered theory of irony reception” suggested in this 
section makes assumptions as to (a) the utilities of irony (i.e., humor and aggression), (b) two 
processes jointly representing irony reception (i.e., rejecting the verbatim meaning and 
detecting the intended meaning), (c) the importance of the metamessages of irony, which 
typically criticize the transgression of social rules (but at the same time can include positive 
assertions about the relationship between the speaker and the addressee), and (d) the person-
specific factors (i.e., traits and abilities) relating to the utilities of irony, relevant for one or 
both of the two processes jointly representing irony reception (i.e., “reject and detect”), and 
intervening in the processing of the metamessage. However, the axioms and many of the 
assumptions that the “Person-centered theory of irony reception” comprises have not been 
tested in the studies conducted for the present thesis. Hence, the theory still needs to be 
validated and should be refined by considering the findings of future works. 
 
Application of the present findings 
Humor training and dealing with intercultural challenges 
As one possible application of the present findings, irony could be included in training 
interventions. Existing humor intervention programs do not target irony skills (see Ruch & 
McGhee, 2014, for an overview). Integrating irony as a humor technique could help to add 
new ways of being humorous to the behavioral repertoire coached in humor trainings. 
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Furthermore, it should help to identify individuals who are inclined to miscomprehend the 
intended meaning and could benefit from targeted interventions aiming to help develop irony 
skills. Adapting to cultural humor habits can be viewed as a necessity for employees of 
globally operating companies and institutions. Given that the assumption that the use of irony 
varies across cultures (and maybe also across sub-cultures) is valid (cf. Dress et al., 2008; 
Rockwell & Theriot, 2001), professional and social performance in an intercultural context 
may depend on an individual’s opportunities to not only sensitize themselves to prevent 
missing irony, but also to prevent interpreting literal language as irony. As in the present 
thesis an instrument for the assessment of normally functioning adults’ irony detection 
aptitude was developed and validated, this could help to design and tailor training 
interventions to the needs of the individual.  
Using the TOVIDA in clinical studies 
The findings of the current investigation suggest that future studies on irony detection 
aptitude should employ the two basic types of verbal irony that were investigated in this 
study, and to distinguish them using separate scores. This finding may not be restricted to the 
research question of who is inclined to mis-detect the intended meaning in ironic utterances 
among normally functioning adults: When working with clinical groups (i.e., patients with 
disorders or brain injuries that assumed as relevant to irony processing), deficits in irony 
detection aptitude may be more or less evident depending on which type of irony is being 
investigated. Taking into account that Langdon, Davies, and Coltheart (2002) found more 
pronounced results for banter (ironic praise) as compared to sarcasm (ironic criticism) when 
looking at schizophrenic patients’ irony detection, it can be hypothesized that ironic praise 
(as the more challenging type of irony) may be more strongly affected by impaired or unusual 
functioning of cognitive and affective processing than ironic criticism (see PART II). Hence, 
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it may be worthwhile to also employ the TOVIDA for comparisons between patient groups 
and controls to test this assumption.  
 
General Conclusion 
The present thesis was first to target the question whether (a) systematic interindividual 
differences in irony performance can be found and (b) whether this interindividual variance 
can be explained by personality and ability variables. The results of the studies conducted for 
the present thesis paint a picture of who is able or inclined to detect or use irony. In dealing 
with these questions, it was possible to open up a new field of research for both personality 
and irony research by demonstrably linking the aptitude to detect irony and the tendency to 
use irony to ability and personality.  
The present thesis introduced irony behavior as a phenomenon native to the realm of 
individual differences. As substantial relationship to general mental ability and personality 
traits were found, explaining irony behaviors should not remain a topic of experimental 
research (or the study of cultural groups or gender). The results of the studies conducted 
support the central claims of the present thesis in that they indicate that (a) there is systematic 
and measurable interindividual variance in irony detection and use (rather than merely 
negligible “noise”), and (b) this interindividual variance can be explained to a substantial 
degree by variables from the realm of ability and personality as two central domains of 
individual differences. While intelligence can be viewed as an important factor for maximal 
irony behavior (such as the ability to detect irony), typical irony behavior (such as the 
tendency to use irony) can be seen as linked to the affective, behavioral, cognitive, and 
motivational aspects summarized by personality traits.  
As a secondary result of the studies in PART II and PART III, pre-existing 
assumptions about the special role of humor-related traits were put to the test, confirming that 
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(a) in irony detection, humor-related traits (i.e., cheerfulness or corrective humor) were 
predictive, while broad personality dimensions (i.e., the Big Five dimensions of personality) 
were only correlated in the case of emotional stability in the detection of ironic praise and (b) 
in irony use, humor-related traits explain incremental variance beyond broad personality 
dimensions (i.e., Eysenck’s personality dimensions: psychoticism). This finding has an 
important implication for the consequences of the sense of humor. As temperamental traits 
constituting exhilaratability (e.g., trait cheerfulness) and also aspects of the sense of humor 
itself (e.g., benevolent and corrective humor) were found to be associated with individuals’ 
aptitude to detect irony, the sense of humor can be seen as a trait relevant to successfully 
dealing with a range of different types of situations including irony in everyday life—such as 
in social and professional interactions (e.g., when flirting and teasing, or when debating and 
negotiating) or when consuming media products (for example: TV shows). The finding that 
humor-related traits correlate with irony detection aptitude highlights the importance of the 
sense of humor in everyday life (and, accordingly, the relevance of its investigation within 
psychological research). This is because having the disposition to miss out on the joke in 
humor (i.e., low scores in humor-related traits facilitating the experience of humor) can have 
significant consequences when this disposition is also associated with missing out on the 
meaning of irony encountered in daily life.  
Ultimately, the findings of the studies conducted for the present thesis were integrated 
in a model that accounts for individual differences in irony behavior, and also includes the 
sense of irony as a newly introduced construct. The validity of the sense of irony was 
discussed by describing its nomological network and by listing possible designs for exploring 
its construct validity. The resulting model (see Appendix A1) was used as a basis for deriving 
a theory that explains successful irony reception. The suggested theory, which was coined as 
the “Person-centered theory of irony reception”, aims to explain interindividual differences in 
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irony reception by making assumptions about (a) the utilities of irony (i.e., humor and 
aggression), (b) two processes jointly representing irony reception (i.e., rejecting the literal 
meaning and detecting the intended meaning), (c) the importance of the metamessages of 
irony, which typically criticize the transgression of social rules (but at the same time can 
include positive assertions about the relationship between the speaker and the addressee), and 
(d) the person-specific factors (i.e., traits and abilities) relating to the utilities of irony, 
relevant for one or both of the two processes jointly representing irony reception (i.e., the 
reject-and-detect aspect), as well as being beneficial for the processing of the metamessage.  
To conclude, the results of the theoretical and empirical work conducted for the present thesis 
demonstrate (a) associations between general mental ability and personality on the one hand, 
and irony detection on the other, and (b) associations between personality and irony use. 
Furthermore, the results validate newly introduced means of assessing irony detection 
aptitude and support pre-existing assumptions about the role of humor in irony behaviors. 
The findings have implications for different fields of irony research. For example, in the 
investigation of psychological and neuro-physiological correlates of irony, irony detection 
aptitude can be assessed in a more feasible and controlled fashion when the use of samples of 
normal functioning adults is made possible. 
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Psychology, University of Zürich 
 
 Teaching BSc-students in the seminar: 
“Experimentalpsychologisches Praktikum” [Experimental 
practice seminar] at the Department of Psychology, University 
of Zürich 
 
2014- Teaching assistant at the Swiss distance learning university in 
personality psychology (www.fernuni.ch) 
 
2015- Supervision of MSc-theses at the Department of Psychology, 
University of Zürich: 
 “The association of gelotophobia and irony detection” (Isabelle 
Brunner, BSc), “Evaluating a novel performance test for the 
assessment of irony detection” (Jasmine Fong, BSc), “The role 
of humor and personality in irony use” (Kristina Rettich, BSc), 
“Is there a sense of irony?” (Fabian Langensteiner, BSc) 
 
2014- Supervision of BSc theses at the Department of Psychology, 
University of Zürich:  
 “Individual differences in the comprehension and use of irony 
and sarcasm” (Stefan Schönholzer), 
 “Is resiliency a matter of personality?” (Christine Wolfer), 
 “Self-esteem: aggregation of domain-specific self-concepts?” 
(Vincy Chennamparampil),  
 “How are personality and dysfunction related” (Barbara Boller), 
“Personality and intoxicant abuse” (Cecilia Longo),  
 “Theory of Mind: An individual differences variable?” 
(Jaqueline Ritzmann),  
 “Shyness in the context of personality” (Jan Juchli). 
 
 Research 
 
Research interests: Study of interindividual differences in irony detection and use,
 personality and character in the moral domain, development of 
 psychometric measures (e.g., for the assessment of irony 
 detection aptitude, gelotophobia, and cynicism) 
 
 Academic awards 
 
2015 “Best Poster” award at the 13th European Conference on 
Psychological Assessment (ECPA13), Zurich, Switzerland, for 
the contribution: Bruntsch, R., & Ruch, W. (2015, July). 
Evaluating the rationale of a novel irony performance test.  
 
 Professional Memberships 
 
2015- Member of the European Association of Psychological 
Assessment (EAPA, http://www.eapa-homepage.org) 
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2014- Member of the International Society for Humor Studies (ISHS, 
www.humorstudies.org) 
 
2014- Founding member of the Swiss Society for Positive Psychology 
(SWIPPA, www.swippa.ch)  
 
 Administrative academic functions 
 
2014-2015 Member of the organizing committee for the 13th European 
Conference on Psychological Assessment (ECPA13) of the 
European Association for Psychological Assessment (EAPA), 
22 to 25 July 2015, Zürich, Switzerland 
 
2015 Invited peer reviewer for Translational Issues in Psychological 
Science (TPS) 
 
 Under-graduate internships 
 
2011 Research internship at Zentralinstitut für Seelische Gesundheit 
(ZI) Mannheim, AG Imaging in der Psychiatrie 
 
2009 Internship at Zentralinstitut für Seelische Gesundheit (ZI) 
Mannheim, Klinik für Psychosomatik und 
Psychotherapeutische Medizin 
   
 Undergraduate Research and Dissemination Experience 
 
2009-2010 Student helper in the section of Social Psychology of the 
University of Heidelberg 
 
2008  Student helper in the research project “SOPHOS” on social 
phobia at Medizinische Fakultät Heidelberg, Klinik für 
psychosomatische und allgemeine klinische Medizin 
 
2007-2008 Student helper in in the research projects “SENSO-AGE” and 
“INSEL” of the section of Psychological Research on Ageing of 
the University of Heidelberg  
  
 Community service 
 
2002-2003  Care of handicapped persons at „Club Behinderter und ihrer 
Freunde in Darmstadt und Umgebung e.V.“ 
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Publications  
 
Journal articles 
 
Bruntsch, R., & Ruch, W. (2017). Studying irony detection beyond ironic criticism: Let’s 
include ironic praise. Frontiers in Psychology, 8:606. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00606 
 
Bruntsch, R., & Ruch, W. (2017). The role of humor-related traits and broad personality 
dimensions in irony use. Personality and Individual Differences, 112, 139–143. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2017.03.004 
 
Ruch, W., Bruntsch, R., & Wagner, L. (2017). The role of character traits in economic 
games. Personality and Individual Differences, 108, 186–190. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2016.12.007 
 
Bruntsch, R., Hofmann, J., & Ruch, W. (2016). Virgin soil in irony research: Personality, 
humor, and the “sense of irony.” Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 2, 25–34. 
doi:10.1037/tps0000054 
 
Posters presented at professional meetings 
 
Ruch, W., Bruntsch, R., & Wagner, L. (2016, May). Character strengths predict decisions in 
economic games over and above personality traits. Poster presented at the 13th MaDoKo of 
the Department of Psychology at the University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland. 
 
Bruntsch, R., & Ruch, W. (2015, July). Evaluating the rationale of a novel irony 
performance test. Poster presented at the 13th European Conference on Psychological 
Assessment (ECPA13), Zurich, Switzerland. 
 
Bruntsch, R., Platt, T., & Ruch, W. (2014, May). Psychometric properties, structure, and 
concurrent validity of a picture-based test for the assessment of gelotophobia. Poster 
presented at the 11th LiMaDoKo of the Department of Psychology at the University of 
Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland. 
 
Talks delivered at professional meetings 
 
Bruntsch, R., & Ruch, W. (2016). Studying correlates of irony detection performance: Do 
not hide the measurement intention!. Talk at the 28th International Society for Humor Studies 
(ISHS) Conference, June 27th-July 1st 2016, Dublin, Ireland, UK. 
 
Bruntsch, R., Ruch, W., & Platt, T. (2014). Evaluation of a picture-based test for the 
assessment of gelotophobia (Picture-Geloph). Talk at the 26th International Society for 
Humor Studies (ISHS) Conference, July 7th-11th 2014, Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
 
Bruntsch, R., Ruch, W., & Platt, T. (2014). Proposing a short form of the Picture-Geloph. 
Talk at the 14th International Summer School and Symposium on Humour and Laughter: 
Theory, Research and Applications, July 14th-19th 2014, Sheffield, United Kingdom 
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Invited talks/workshops 
 
Bruntsch, R. (2016). “Ironie und Humor in der Pädagogik” [Irony and humor in education]. 
Talk for teachers of the Kantonschule Zürcher Unterland, Schloss Marbach, Germany, 
November 18th 2016. 
 
Bruntsch, R. (2015). “Verbale Ironie besser verstehen und übersetzen lernen” [Learning 
more about verbal irony and its translation]. Workshop for Berufsvereinigung 
GebärdensprachdolmetscherInnen Deutschschweiz, Zürich, Switzerland, November 21st 
2015. 
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Appendix  
Appendix A1: Suggested model summarizing and organizing constructs and factors 
featured in the present thesis  
 
Variables that are assumed as relevant or found as relevant in the studies conducted 
for the present thesis or previous studies. Variables for which no substantial empirical 
support has been found yet are printed in italics. For the sake of simplicity, interactions 
between ability and personality variables as well as situational factors and the mediators 
assumed by the “Person-centered theory of irony reception” (e.g., metamessage decoding) 
are not explicated. 
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Appendix A2: Ironic praise sample item 
The following sample item of the TOVIDA given below is translated from German language. 
The statements for the appraisal of the situation were rated on a four-point scale as to how 
much the sentences apply to the situation (1= “does not apply at all”, 2=”rather does not 
apply”, 3= “rather applies”, 4= “fully applies”). Statements printed in bold were used as 
(inversed) indicators of irony detection in the studies and averaged to build the item score. 
Three of the appraisal statements were designed as distractors for each item. 
 
Ironic praise sample item (IP6): 
Situation: 
Christian has invited three friends over for dinner. He prepares a meal trying a new recipe. 
Sitting at the table starting to eat, Julia asks for the saltshaker. Christian immediately 
apologizes that he could not salt the food to taste as he has a cold and cannot taste properly. 
This is when Julia says: “You are right, the food is inedible!“. 
 
Instruction: Please indicate how much you think that each of the following statements applies 
to the situation.  
 
Statements: 
1. The saltshaker is not within Julia’s reach.  
2. Christian behaves like a typical male. 
3. Julia is having a good time. 
4. Christian will feel bad because of Julia’s final utterance. (-) 
5. Julia will not finish her plate without more salt. (-) 
6. Christian is making up excuses 
